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ABSTRACT 
NATURAL LAW THEORY AND THE 
―IS‖—―OUGHT‖ PROBLEM: 
A CRITIQUE OF FOUR SOLUTIONS 
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Marquette University, 2010 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation explores the ―Is‖—―Ought‖ problem (IOP) as it relates to natural 
law theory (NLT).   It begins with a brief analysis of the type of ―ought‖ precepts upheld 
by traditional natural law theorists as well as a consideration of the precise nature of the 
IOP. Chapter two considers the attempts of Searle and Gewirth at establishing that it is 
possible validly to derive an ―ought‖ conclusion from ―is‖ premises and asks whether 
their attempts can be imitated successfully by those who wish to uphold the basic claims 
of NLT.  Chapter three considers whether it is possible to bypass the IOP by beginning 
with premises concerning the de facto desires of human agents.  Chapter four consists of 
an analysis of Geach, Veatch, McInerny, MacIntyre, and Lisska who put forth the 
solution of returning to the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of the telos, function, or 
essence of the human person.   In Chapter five the new natural law solution is analyzed; 
and in Chapter six an overall critique is offered. 
 
The overarching thesis of this dissertation is that—although each solution is in 
some way problematic—the solution of new natural law theorists is the least problematic 
if one wishes to implement an ―ought‖ that is moral, prescriptive, non- relativistic, 
determinate, and related to the common good. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The dilemma is simply this: one must either 
produce the means by which to proceed 
from facts to norms, or discontinue the 
 attempt to espouse natural-law philosophy.
1
 
 
Henry Veatch 
 
 
 
One of the most fundamental concepts in ethics is the concept of obligation.  Like 
time, it is a concept which seems simple until one is asked to explicate it.  Much of this 
difficulty is undoubtedly due to the fact that the term Ought is used differently in 
different contexts and has many different meanings.
2   
Even when we try to narrow down 
the concept of obligation to moral obligation, the difficulty does not subside and an often 
time even worsens.  It seems safe to assume that at the core of every major ethical debate, 
whether it pertains to applied ethics or the theory of ethics, is a debate about what 
constitutes the moral Ought.
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  
Henry Veatch, ―Natural Law and the ‗Is‘—‗Ought‘ Question‖ in Catholic Lawyer 26 (1980- 
1981), 253. 
 
2  
Rather than put the terms ―ought‖ and ―is‖ in quotation marks when appropriate, I will instead 
capitalize the terms. 
 
3  
For example, in ethical theory, hedonic utilitarians base the Ought on the notion of pleasure and 
pain, Kantian deontologists base it in the notion of universalizing maxims, and virtue ethicists 
base it in the notion of character and habits.  An example in applied ethics would be the 
euthanasia debate which is based on the question of whether seeking to alleviate suffering can 
justify an Ought in regard to terminating patients. 
2 
 
 
In this dissertation I will provide an analysis of the concept of moral obligation as 
it is utilized within the context of natural law theory.  In so doing, I will discuss the 
problems inherent in the attempt to derive a moral Ought from factual statements about 
human nature. Although I will consider the problem from both metaphysical and 
epistemological perspectives, my primary focus will be on the epistemological aspects of 
the problem. 
 
A. The Historical Origins of the Is-Ought Problem 
The locus classicus of the Is--Ought problem (IOP) is David Hume‘s Treatise of 
 
Human Nature wherein he states: 
 
in every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of 
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning 
human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual 
copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not 
connected with an ought, or an ought not.  This change is imperceptible; but is, 
however, of the last consequence.  For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some 
new relation or affirmation, ‗tis necessary that . . . a reason should be given, for 
what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction 
from the others, which are entirely different from it.
4
 
 
Hume‘s concern here is not only that it seems impossible to deduce an Ought-statement 
from an Is-statement but that moral philosophers fail to even attempt to bridge the gap. 
Since Hume‘s recognition of the basic problem, philosophers have continued to 
look at it from new angles.  G.E. Moore‘s discussion of the ‗naturalistic fallacy‘ in his 
Principia Ethica, for example, is considered to be an elaboration of the IOP.  He notes 
that notion of good conduct is at the heart of ethics and then proceeds to argue that ‗good‘ 
 
is a non-natural property which cannot be defined.   When we say something is ‗good‘ we 
 
4
David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1992), 469. 
3 
 
 
are not stating a fact in the way astronomers are stating facts when they say that an object 
is a star. 
5   
When we say something is ‗good‘ in a moral sense, we are not referring to a 
natural property at all.  ‗Good‘, Moore argues, is a simple notion and a non-natural 
property analogous to yellow.  Just as yellow cannot be adequately defined by stating 
facts about the frequency of wavelengths (since when we use the term ‗yellow‘ we may 
mean something other than merely ‗wavelengths of a specific frequency‘) so too it is not 
possible to define ‗good‘ in terms of factual statements about pleasure or anything else. 
Like yellow, ‗good‘ is a simple notion which is irreducible to notions of natural fact.6 
Thus, statements in which ‗good‘ figures are not derivable from statements of fact since 
 
such statements cannot be analyzed by merely referring to natural properties.  Hume 
claims that you cannot derive an Ought from an Is and Moore develops this by seeking to 
establish that you cannot derive a Good from statements concerning natural properties.
7
 
Some fifty-five years after the publication of Principia Ethica, G.E.M Anscombe 
advises moral philosophers to jettison the emphatic use of the term Ought altogether. 
Aware of the difficulties inherent in the very notion of an emphatic Ought (i.e., an Ought 
that is moral and absolute) she also recommends returning to virtue ethics—which does 
not rely on the notion of such an Ought— until an adequate theory of human psychology 
 
5  
G.E.Moore, Principia Ethica, Revised edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
 
6  
G.E.Moore, Principia Ethica, 62 :  ―It may be true that all things which are yellow are also 
something else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of 
vibration in the light.  And it is a fact that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other 
properties belonging to all things which are good.  But far too many philosophers have though 
that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these 
properties, in fact, were simply not ‗other,‘ but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. 
This view I propose to call the ‗naturalistic fallacy‘ and of it I shall now endeavour to dispose.‖ 
 
7  
Moore‘s claims are, in part, responsible for the fact that normative ethics was considered to be 
irrelevant in the twentieth century. Cf. Anthony Lisska, Aquinas‟s Theory of Natural Law: An 
Analytic Reconstruction, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996): 62. 
4 
 
 
can be developed.   She argues that the emphatic Ought is only useful when utilized in 
certain contexts—such as within the context of a theory of a divine legislator—and that 
these contexts no longer exist or are obsolete.  Like Hume and Moore, she too realizes 
that the theoretical issues involved in the notion of an Ought are legion and that a solution 
must be sought. 
Given Hume‘s and Moore‘s concerns, if natural law theorists wish to claim that 
moral obligation and the related notion of moral value are grounded in facts about human 
nature, they will first need to establish that it is possible to overcome the difficulties 
inherent in doing so.  Moreover, given Anscombe‘s warnings, if natural lawyers wish to 
utilize an emphatic Ought, they will again need to establish that it is possible to overcome 
the difficulties inherent in doing so.
8   
In this dissertation I will focus primarily on the 
 
former but—since natural law theory generally utilizes an emphatic Ought—I will also 
touch on issues concerning the latter. 
 
B. Why Natural Law Seems to Fall Into the Is—Ought Problem 
Natural law theory, more than any other ethical theory, seems enmeshed in the 
IOP.  This is because unlike other theories it rests on the claim that the Ought in some 
sense rests on the Is of human nature.  In order to make this more explicit, it will be 
helpful to explore the main claims of natural law and the nature of the IOP in more detail. 
In this next section, I will explain five essential claims made by virtually all natural law 
theorists.  I will then lay out the precise nature of what I take the real IOP to be.  Lastly, I 
will explain why natural law theory seems to illicitly derive an Ought from an Is. 
 
 
8  
For example, they will need to establish that it is possible to utilize the notion of an emphatic 
Ought without relying on a theory—such as the theory of a divine legislator-- that is no longer 
assumed to be correct. 
5 
 
 
 
 
1. The Essential Claims of Natural Law 
 
Although there is some debate regarding how best to define natural law theory, 
most-- if not all-- ethicists would agree that it entails at least at least the following five 
claims.
9     
The first and most fundamental claim is that there is a relation between human 
nature and what humans ought to do and ought to avoid.  Although other ethical theories 
may also directly or indirectly hold to this claim, any theory that did not would fail to 
qualify as theory of natural law.   One of the most stark examples of this is St. Thomas‘s 
claim that preserving human life belongs to natural law precisely because it is in 
accordance with human nature.
10
 
A second essential claim is that in some way knowledge of human nature enables 
 
one to know or determine what ought to be done and avoided.   Admittedly, there is much 
debate regarding what type of knowledge is necessary.   Some claim that one must have 
speculative, theoretical, or objective knowledge of human nature in order to arrive at 
knowledge of the Ought; others, that subjective or connatural knowledge of one‘s own 
inclinations is sufficient.   H. Veatch, who argues for the former, holds that one must 
have a conceptual understanding of the metaphysical aspects of human nature before one 
 
can determine what is good and, in turn, determine what ought to be done and avoided.
11
 
 
 
 
 
9  
Because Cicero and St. Thomas are held to be clear examples of natural law theorists, in what 
follows I will primarily draw upon examples from their works. 
 
10  
ST I-II, 94, 2: ―Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the 
nature which he has in common with all substances; that is, every substance seeks the 
preservation of its own being according to its nature.  And by reason of this inclination, whatever 
is a means of preserving human life and of warding off its obstacles belongs to the natural law.‖ 
 
11  
Henry Veatch, ―Natural Law and the ‗Is‘—‗Ought‘ Question: Queries to Finnis and Grisez‖, 
Catholic Lawyer: (1980-1981), 261. 
6 
 
 
J. Maritain, on the other hand, claims that a first-person experience of one‘s own nature 
via one‘s own inner inclinations is sufficient.  Maritain states: 
The genuine concept of Natural Law is the concept of a law which is natural… 
insofar as it is naturally known, that is, known through inclination or through 
connaturality, not through conceptual knowledge and by way of reasoning.  . . . 
judgments in which Natural Law are made manifest to practical Reason do not 
proceed from any conceptual, discursive, rational exercise of reason; they proceed 
from that connaturality or congeniality through which what is consonant with the 
essential inclinations of human nature is grasped by the intellect as good; what is 
dissonant, as bad.
12
 
 
Veatch claims that one must have a speculative and discursive understanding of human 
nature whereas Maritain claims that an experience of one‘s own inclinations is sufficient. 
Yet, regardless of the fact that there is much debate about what kind of knowledge of 
human nature relates to knowledge of natural law, all natural lawyers agree that there is 
such knowledge. 
The third essential claim is that human positive law is only authentic, just, and 
binding when it is in harmony with natural law.  St. Thomas asserts, 
. . . the force of law depends on the extent of its justice.  Now in human affairs a 
thing is said to be just from being right according to the rule of reason.  But the 
first rule of reason is the law of nature…. Consequently every human law has just 
so much of the character of law as it is derived from the law of nature.  But if at 
any point it differs from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a corruption of 
law.
13
 
It is precisely because St. Thomas holds that human law is just and authentic only if it is 
derived from the law of nature that he also holds that if human law is not in accord with 
natural law, it is not binding in conscience.
14   
Cicero holds something similar and claims 
 
 
12  
Jacques Maritain, Natural Law: Reflections on Theory and Practice, William Sweet ed., (South 
Bend: St. Augustine Press, 1943), 20. 
 
13  
ST I-II, 95, 2. 
 
14  
ST I-II, 96, 4. 
7 
 
 
that if law were merely based on the decisions of the senate or the will of the people, and 
had no basis in a higher law, it would be possible to make even heinous acts legal.
15    
It is 
precisely for this reason that Cicero thinks true law has some other basis. 
A fourth essential claim is that the Ought of natural law is universal, unchanging, 
and non-relativistic.  Cicero states, 
True law… cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is not liable either to 
deterioration or abrogation.  Neither the senate nor the people can give us any 
dispensation for not obeying this universal law of justice.  …It is not one thing at 
Rome, and another at Athens; one thing today and another to-morrow, but in all 
times and nations this universal law must for ever reign, eternal and 
imperishable.
16
 
This claim is often related to the first claim above.  Natural law theorists ordinarily claim 
that human nature is universal and unchanging, that is, that all humans have the same 
essence regardless of the time or culture in which they happen to live.  Given that the 
Ought is held to be based in human nature, then, it is no surprise that the Ought is also 
held to be universal and unchanging.  Moreover, given that human nature is said to be 
universal and unchanging, it is also no surprise that the Ought is said to be non- 
relativistic.  What human beings are morally obligated to do does not stem from culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15  
Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Laws, Charles Duce Yonge Trans. (London: H.G. Bohn, 1853), 
I, 12, 18:  ―If the will of the people, the decree of the senate, the adjudications of magistrates were 
sufficient to establish rights, then it might become right to rob, commit adultery, substitute forged 
wills if such conduct were sanctioned by the votes or decrees of the multitude. . . . This, then, as 
it appears to me, has been the decision of the wisest philosophers, that law is neither a thing 
contrived by the genius of man, nor established by the decree of the people, but a certain eternal 
principle which governs the entire universe….‖ 
 
16  
Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Republic, Charles Duke Yonge, trans. (London: G.G. Bohn, 
183), III, 22. 
8 
 
 
or subjective and capricious desires but from their very nature. It is for this reason that 
natural law theory is at odds with cultural and subjective relativism.
17
 
A fifth essential claim—which dovetails with the first two-- is that natural law has 
sanctions in so far as to act in accordance with it leads to flourishing and to act contrary 
to it leads to a failure to flourish.  As Cicero puts it, ―…he who does not obey it flies from 
himself, and does violence to the very nature of man.  And by so doing he will endure the 
severest penalties even if he avoids the other evils which are usually accounted 
punishments.‖18 This claim is sometimes illustrated by use of an analogy.  For instance, if 
one fails to put oil in one‘s car, it will eventually cease to function.  This is not because 
someone capriciously decreed that oil ought to be put in cars but because, given the 
nature of a car and its physical make-up, if one fails to put oil in one‘s car it is a fact that 
it will eventually cease to run.  Analogously, if a person fails to act in accord with her 
own nature, she will cease to flourish.  This is not because someone decreed that humans 
ought to act in accord with their nature but because, given the nature of the human 
person, if a person fails to do so she will cease to flourish.   Thus, given the nature of the 
human person, given that there are certain acts which are contrary to human nature, and 
given the fact that humans like to flourish and dislike the opposite, there is a built-in 
sanction to act in accordance with one‘s nature.   In other words, natural lawyers agree 
that to act in accord with natural law is in some sense to act in accord with human nature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17  
Regarding the universal nature of natural law see also, ST I-II, 94, 4 and 94, 5, wherein St. 
Thomas claims that the first principles of natural law can never be changed or obliterated. 
 
18  
Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Republic, Charles Duke Yonge, trans. (London: G.G. Bohn, 
183), III, 22.  Quoted by Kainz, 11. 
9 
 
 
and leads to flourishing.  They also agree that because of this, there are natural 
sanctions.
19
 
In categorizing these claims, the first would be ontological since it is a claim 
about the existence of a relationship between ethics and facts about human nature; the 
second would be epistemological since it pertains to how we know natural law; and the 
third would be jurisprudential since it pertains to the relationship between human or 
positive law and a higher law.
20   
The fourth claim is a specification of the Ought of 
natural law.   The fifth pertains to the sanctions of natural law and is a specification of 
how natural law relates to human nature.  Although each of these claims is approached in 
a different way by natural lawyers, all natural lawyers accept and often implement 
them.
21
 
 
 
 
 
 
19  
In her book Immovable Laws, Irresistable Rights, Christine Pierce quotes Ken Kesey who says, 
―You don‘t put crankcase oil in your power steering system.  And when God says, ‗Do not put 
crankcase oil in your power steering system, ‗he‘s not saying ‗if you do, you‘ll go to hell, he‘s 
saying, ‗if you do, you‘ll blow the seals out of your power steering.‘‖ (47)  (see Richard 
Goldstein, ―A Plague on All Our Houses,‖ Village Voice, Literary Supplement, Sept 1986, 17.) 
 
20
More will be said latter regarding the importance of properly distinguishing epistemological and 
ontological claims. 
 
21  
Although many natural law theorists discuss natural law within the context of divine law and a 
divine legislator, belief in God or the supernatural is not an essential component of natural law 
theory.   It is entirely possible for a theory of natural law to be understood without ascribing to a 
theory of divine law.  Moreover, many who speak of natural law within the context of a divine 
legislator—such as Aquinas and Grotius--do not claim that one must first believe that God or 
divine law exists in order to understand and accept the claims of natural law.  An adequate 
treatment of this would far surpass the limits of this dissertation and so, in what follows, I will be 
assuming that it is possible to subscribe to a theory of natural law without believing in a divine 
legislator. 
10 
 
 
2.  The Nature of the Is—Ought Problem in Ethics 
In order to assess the extent to which natural law theory is susceptible to the IOP, 
it will be helpful first to consider the insights of Gewirth regarding the type of Ought 
which is pertinent to ethics in general.  Upon considering his insights I will consider the 
ways in which they pertain to natural law theory in particular. 
In his article The Is-Ought Problem Resolved, Gewirth establishes that ethicists 
need not be concerned with the problem of deriving just any type of Ought but with the 
problem of deriving a moral, prescriptive, egalitarian, determinate, and categorical 
Ought.  He asserts that ―‗oughts‘ are moral ones in the sense that they take positive 
account of the interests of other persons as well as the agent . . . especially as regards the 
distribution of what is considered to be basic well-being.‖
22 
He also asserts that moral 
 
Oughts may be either negative—in so far as they pertain to what should be avoided— or 
positive—in so far as they pertain to what should be done.   Thus, any Oughts which do 
not take consideration of the well-being of persons would not be at issue.
23
 
By ‗prescriptive,‘ Gewirth means that the Ought must ―seek to guide or influence 
actions.‖24   For an Ought to qualify as prescriptive, it must be conjoined to reasons which 
explain why it is mandatory.  Thus, the Ought-statement: ―You ought to jump off a cliff‖ 
would not qualify whereas the Ought-statement: ―You ought to avoid wounding people 
because it is not conducive to their well-being‖ would qualify.25   Likewise, an Ought- 
 
 
22
Allan Gewirth, ―The ‗Is-Ought‘ Problem Resolved,‖ Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association 47 (1974):  35. The emphasis is that of Gewirth. Hereafter this article will be 
abbreviated IOPR. 
 
23  
For example, the following Ought-statements would not be relevant: ―It ought to be hot in 
July,‖ and ―A cup ought to hold water.‖ 
 
24  
IOPR, 35. 
 
25  
Gewirth does not specify whether these ―reasons‖ merely need to provide justification or a 
general rationale for doing what is mandatory or whether they need to provide the agent with 
11 
 
 
conclusion that was not derived from a premise which provided reasons why it is 
mandatory would not qualify whereas one that was derived from such a premise would 
qualify. 
By ‗egalitarian,‘ Gewirth means that the Ought must ―require that at least basic 
well-being be distributed equally…between the agent addressed and his potential 
recipients, or… among members of a society.‖26   In other words, the relevant Ought must 
pertain to fostering the basic well-being of persons in an equitable fashion.  By this 
standard, an Ought that prescribed egoism would not be they type of Ought which 
ethicists need to be concerned about.
27
 
By ‗determinate,‘ he means that ―the actions they prescribe have definite contents 
 
such that the opposite contents cannot be obtained by the same mode of derivation.‖28 
Otherwise stated, if an Ought is determinate, it cannot be derived from facts in such a 
way that the opposite prescription could also be derived.  For example, an Ought that 
prescribed rescuing a drowning person would only be ‗determinate‘ if it also forbade not 
rescuing a drowning person.
29
 
 
 
 
 
motivation to do what is mandatory.  Since he elsewhere implicitly relies on the principles that 
one ought to be logically consistent without explaining how this principle relates to one‘s desires, 
he seems to be proposing the former. More will be said about this below. 
 
26  
IOPR, 35-36. 
 
27  
Gewirth notes that this criterion overlaps with the first, viz., that the Ought must be moral. 
IOPR, 36. 
 
28  
IOPR, 36. 
 
29  
IOPR, 40-41. Consider the following: John knows how to swim.  Therefore, if all those who 
know how to swim ought to rescue drowning persons when they have the opportunity, then John 
ought to rescue drowning persons when he has the opportunity.   According to Gewirth, this 
derivation of an Ought from a statement of fact would not be relevant since we could also derive 
the opposite conclusion via the same means as in: John knows how to swim.  Therefore, if all 
12 
 
 
Finally, by ‗categorical,‘ Gewirth means that the Ought is ―normatively overriding 
and ineluctable or necessary, in that [its] bindingness cannot be removed by, and hence is 
not contingent on or determined by, variable, escapable features either of the persons 
addressed or of their social relations.‖30   By this criterion, any Ought which was 
contingent on ―self-interested desires, variable choices, opinions, or institutional rules 
whose obligatoriness may itself be doubtful or variable‖ would not pertain to the real 
IOP.
31   
In short, Gewirth‘s claim here is that the Ought that ethicists need to be concerned 
about when it comes to the problem of derivation, is a specific type of Ought with various 
characteristics.  Even if it can be shown that an Ought-statement can be derived from Is- 
premises, the Ought would need to have all five of the above characteristics to be relevant 
to ethical theory. 
In addition to the claims Gewirth makes regarding these five characteristics, he 
claims that any purported counterargument or solution to the IOP would need to be non- 
circular, insofar as ―the premises from which the ‗ought‘-conclusions are derived must 
not themselves be moral or prescriptive.‖32   He thus points out that any authentic 
derivation of an Ought from an Is would not only need to have premises which do not 
contain the term Ought, but which also do not contain moral or prescriptive statements. 
To be sure, Gewirth‘s version of the IOP is much more specific than other 
 
versions.  It is precisely for this reason that many of the attempts to derive an Ought from 
 
 
those who know how to swim ought to avoid rescuing drowning persons, then John ought to avoid 
rescuing drowning persons. 
 
30  
IOPR, 35-36. 
 
31  
IOPR, 36. 
 
32  
IOPR, 36. 
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an Is which have been proposed would not, by Gewirthian standards, be acceptable.  For 
example, although the following arguments are counterexamples to the thesis that no 
Ought-conclusion can be validly derived from Is-premises, they would not be acceptable 
by Gewirth‘s standards. 
A. David believes that Allison ought to marry Jason. 
 
Everything that David believes is true. 
Therefore, Allison ought to marry Jason.
33
 
 
Even if we assume that the first premise is not moral or prescriptive but, rather, a 
statement about what David believes, this would not be acceptable.  Given that the 
conclusion is contingent on and determined by a variable feature (i.e., David‘s belief), it 
is not categorical.
34
 
B. It is Sunday and it is not Sunday. 
 
Therefore, we ought to give to charity. 
Although this argument is valid insofar as a contradiction entails any statement 
whatsoever, it would not be acceptable since it is neither prescriptive nor determinate. 
 
 
 
33  
A similar purported counterargument is offered by Mark T. Nelson. See ―Is It Always 
Fallacious to Derive Values from Facts?.‖  Argumentation 9 (November, 1995): 555. Nelson uses 
this argument to establish only that it is possible validly to derive an Ought from an Is.  He fully 
admits that his argument does not establish that ―any sound Is-to-Ought argument exist[s]‖ (559) 
He likewise fully admits that it does not establish that it is possible to derive a specifically 
prescriptive Ought from Is-premises. (560) 
 
34  
It is important to note that even an argument which is not formally hypothetical can fail to be 
categorical in the Gewirthian sense.  In order to be categorized as ―categorical‖ in the Gewirthian 
sense of the term, it is necessary for the conclusion to be derived from premises that cannot 
change at the whims of an agent.  Although it is possible for David to believe that Allison ought 
to marry Jason, if it is possible for him to eventually come to believe the opposite, an Ought 
derived from his belief would not be ―categorical.‖  Since nothing is said about whether or not 
David‘s belief is necessary, this argument would not work as it stands.  More will be said about 
this issue in Chapter Three. 
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Given that the opposite conclusion ―we ought to never give to charity‖ could also be 
derived, the Ought is not determinate.  Also, given that the premise does not provide a 
rationale for giving to charity which could legitimately guide or influence action, it is not 
prescriptive.  If the agent were to ask ―Why ought I to give to charity?‖ the response, 
―Because it is Sunday and it is not Sunday‖ would not, in an ordinary context, guide or 
influence the agents action. 
C. It is Sunday. 
 
Therefore everybody ought to do what he ought to do. 
 
Although this argument is valid insofar as a tautology validly follows from any statement 
whatsoever, it too fails.  Like argument B, the Ought-conclusion is not prescriptive since 
the premise does not really provide a reason for acting which could legitimately guide or 
influence action. 
 
 
3. Natural Law and the Is—Ought Problem 
 
Given the basic claims of natural law theory, there are numerous reasons why one 
might conclude that it falls prey to the IOP as Gewirth sets it up.   First, the Ought of 
natural law theory would appear to be prescriptive, moral, determinate, egalitarian, and 
categorical.  Although the terminology used by natural law theorists differs from that of 
Gewirth, the Ought implemented by most natural law theorists has characteristics that are 
very similar to those discussed by him.  Second, as discussed above, one of the basic 
claims of natural law theory is that there is a correlation between facts regarding human 
nature and what humans ought to do and refrain from doing; and hence, there is a need to 
bridge this gap in a manner in which there is relevance between the facts and the Ought. 
15 
 
 
The reason why natural law needs a moral and prescriptive Ought is that no 
natural law theorist would be satisfied with an Ought that did not pertain to moral 
obligation (such as the Oughts of adequacy and likelihood) or with an Ought that did not 
seek to influence or guide human actions.  Aquinas, for example, places his treatment of 
natural law within the context of his discussion of law in general and, in turn, he claims 
that the effect of law in general is ―to lead its subjects to their proper virtue; and since 
virtue is ‗that which makes its subject good,‘ it follows that the proper effect of law is to 
make those to whom it is given good….‖
35    
Likewise, he states, ―Law is a rule and 
 
measure of acts, by which man is induced to act or is restrained from acting.‖36   He 
thereby claims that law—whether it is divine, natural, or human—is moral and 
prescriptive by its very nature. 
Natural law also clearly needs an Ought that is determinate since no natural law 
theorist would be satisfied with a positive Ought that could, by the same means of 
derivation, be made into a negative Ought.  For instance, if it could be proven in a natural 
law context that ―humans ought to preserve their species‖ and it could also be proven that 
―it is morally permissible for humans to annihilate their species,‖ there would be a 
definite problem with the method being used.  No natural law theorist would be satisfied 
with a method that could be used to affirm and deny the same moral precepts.  Just as 
Aquinas begins with the principle ―Good is to be pursued and done and evil is to be 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35  
ST I-II, 92, 1. 
 
36  
ST I-II, 90, 1. 
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avoided,‖ and claims that this precept can never be altered, so too would any natural 
lawyer maintain that some precepts can never be altered.
37
 
It would also seem that natural law needs--and in fact implements--an Ought that 
is egalitarian.  For example, at numerous points in his discussion of law, Aquinas claims 
that the common good, as opposed to mere individual good, is at stake.  In defining law 
in general, he says it is a rule or measure of reason directed to the common good.  We 
read, ―…since the law is chiefly ordered to the common good, any other precept in regard 
to some individual work, must be empty of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards 
the common good.  Therefore every law is ordered to the common good.‖38   Given that 
the very nature of law involves the fostering of the common good, natural law can only 
be categorized as ―law‖– in the thought of Aquinas--insofar as it contains an egalitarian 
Ought.  Moreover, any natural lawyer who sought to implement a non-egalitarian Ought 
would first need to establish that humans are not social by nature and that it is not in 
accord with human nature to promote the common good.  Such a task would be difficult, 
if not impossible, and would fly in the face of all, or at least virtually all, theories of 
natural law.
39
 
 
 
 
 
 
37  
ST I-II, 94, 2. 
 
38  
ST I-II, 90, 2. 
 
39  
If Hobbes is accepted as a natural law theorist, it could be argued that he does not recognize the 
common good as the motivating factor behind an agent‘s moral action and, hence, does not implement an 
egalitarian Ought.  Nevertheless, even Hobbes acknowledges the relevance of the common good in 
determining what is morally obligatory. For a discussion of whether Hobbes can be categorized as a 
natural law theorist see: Brown, Montague, The Quest for Moral Foundations, (Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 
1996), 89-90; Braybrooke, David, Natural Law Modernized, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 
90ff; and Kainz, Howard, Natural Law: An Introduction and Re-examination, (Chicago: Open Court, 
2004), 34-36. 
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Finally, it would seem that natural law needs an Ought that is categorical, i.e., that 
is ―normatively overriding and ineluctable or necessary, in that [its] bindingness cannot 
be removed by, and hence is not contingent on or determined by, variable, escapable 
features either of the persons addressed or of their social relations.‖40 There are several 
reasons why natural law needs such an Ought.  First, as mentioned above, one of the 
main claims of natural law theory is that the Ought is universal, unchanging, and non- 
relativistic.  The Ought does not vary from time to time, from social context to social 
context, or from person to person.  Consider again the following quotation from Cicero: 
True law… cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is not liable either to 
deterioration or abrogation.  Neither the senate nor the people can give us any 
dispensation for not obeying this universal law of justice. …It is not one thing at 
Rome, and another at Athens; one thing today and another to-morrow, but in all 
times and nations this universal law must for ever reign, eternal and 
imperishable.
41
 
 
Clearly Cicero‘s claim here rests on a categorical Ought.  His claim is not that the 
universal law of justice ought to be obeyed if cultural circumstances require it, or if the 
senate or people uphold it, or if the agent happens to want to obey it. 
Although Aquinas claims that the natural law is alterable in the sense that it can 
 
be added to, this does not change the fact that a categorical Ought is proper to his theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40  
Allan Gewirth, ―The ‗Is-Ought‘ Problem Resolved,‖ Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association 47 (1974):  35. I will subsequently use the term ―categorical‖ in the Gewirthian 
sense unless otherwise indicated.  Although the term ―categorical‖ is used by some philosophers to mean 
―having no relation to or basis whatsoever in the desires of agents‖, I am using it, as Gewirth does, in the 
sense of ―having no relation to or basis in variable features or variable desires of agents.‖ 
 
40  
Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Republic, Charles Duke Yonge, trans. (London: G.G. Bohn, 
183), III, 22.  Quoted by Kainz, 11. 
 
41  
The question of whether a hypothetical Ought is sufficient in natural law ethics will be 
considered in greater detail in a later Chapter. 
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as well.  The reason for this is that he also claims that is it not alterable in the sense that it 
can be subtracted from.  He states: 
…we can understand the mutability of the natural law in two ways.  We can 
understand it in one way by things being added to it.  And then nothing prevents 
the natural law changing, since both divine law and human laws add to natural 
law many things beneficial to human life.  We can understand the mutability of 
the natural law in a second way by way of subtraction, namely, that things 
previously subject to the law cease to be so.  And then the natural law is 
altogether immutable as to its first principles.
42
 
 
If a precept belongs to natural law, then, it is categorical given that the Ought cannot be 
changed once it is established.  For example, if it is a precept of natural law that people 
should seek to live peacefully in society, this is categorically so.
43    
However, it would be 
entirely possible to add a specification to this precept such as: ―stealing ought to be 
avoided‖.  Adding a specification such as this would in no way alter the original precept 
given that respecting another‘s private property is conducive to living peacefully in 
society; and so the original precept would remain categorical.  Thus, in spite of Thomas‘s 
claim, here, he endorse a hypothetical Ought. 
It could be argued that Aquinas elsewhere leaves room for a hypothetical or 
contingent Ought. In his discussion of whether natural law is the same for all human 
beings, he states, ―…practical reason is concerned about contingent things, which include 
human actions.  And so the more reason goes from the general to the particular, the more 
exceptions we find….‖44   Nevertheless, it is important to realize that, in the same context, 
he also claims that general principles do not vary and are not contingent.  He says, 
 
 
 
42  
ST I-II, 94, 5. 
 
43  
Cf. ST I-II, 94, 2. 
 
44  
ST I-II, 94, 4. 
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…as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, 
truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all.  … it is right and 
true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a 
proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their 
owner.  Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a 
particular case that it would be injurious and therefore unreasonable, to restore 
goods held in trust…45 
 
In other words, he claims that the conclusions one draws from the general principles 
sometimes vary, but the principles themselves do not.  It is true for all persons, at all 
times, and in all cultures that they ought to act in accord with reason; and this is the case 
even though the conclusions drawn from this principle may vary according to the 
circumstances. In one circumstance it may be in accord with reason to return goods that 
belong to others; but in a different circumstance it may not be --such as when a madman 
asks you to return his hatchet.  What Aquinas is claiming, then, is not that the Ought itself 
is contingent or hypothetical but that the conclusions drawn from it may depend on 
contingent circumstances.  That we ought to act rationally is categorical even though 
different actions can only be categorized as rational or irrational by considering 
contingent circumstances. Therefore, the mere fact that Aquinas leaves room for 
contingency in regard to conclusions does not mean that the Ought from which those 
conclusions are drawn is itself hypothetical or contingent. 
Another reason why natural law theory needs a categorical Ought is that the 
obligatory force is said to be based in human nature rather than the contingencies of 
culture or the capricious desires of the agent. Moreover, the aspects of human nature that 
are relevant are not changeable.  Aquinas asserts that the first principle of practical reason 
is: ―good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided‖.  He then asserts that we 
 
 
 
45  
ST I-II, 94, 4. 
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grasp as ―good‖ that which is in accord with our nature (and hence in accord with our 
inclinations).  The aspects of our nature that he says are relevant are our life, sensation, 
and rationality.
46   
Since these aspects of our nature (and the inclinations which stem from 
them) are essential aspects of our nature, anyone who wanted to claim that the Ought of 
traditional natural law is hypothetical would have to first claim that these aspects of our 
nature are alterable.  Yet to do so would be no small task.  In other words, since the 
Ought stems from our living, sensate, and rational nature, and since our nature is not 
alterable or contingent, the Ought itself would be categorical. 
Consider the following example.  Aquinas states that ―Because in man there is 
first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common 
with all substances; that is, every substance seeks the preservation of its own being 
according to its nature.  And by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of 
preserving human life and of warding off its obstacles belongs to the natural law.‖47 
Otherwise stated, it belongs to natural law to preserve our human life and to avoid that 
which is contrary to preserving human life; hence we have a moral obligation to preserve 
our human life and to avoid that which is contrary.  Thus, that we ought to preserve 
human life is not hypothetical.  The claim here is not that if such-and-such is the case, we 
ought to preserve life but, rather, since we are human and it is part of our (authentic) 
human nature to be inclined to preserve human life, we ought to preserve human life.
48
 
 
 
 
46  
ST I-II, 94, 2. 
 
47  
ST I-II, 94, 2. 
 
48  
If Aquinas were to consider this claim in light of the possible existence of other rational 
creatures, he could still maintain that the Ought of natural law is categorical within a given 
species. For example, he could maintain that all the precepts of natural law which stem from 
human nature are always binding for humans.  It is important to note that natural law theory does 
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Although it seems clear that the Ought of natural law is categorical, some have 
argued that it is not.  For example, in his article ―The Alterability of Natural Law,‖ R. 
Hall argues that natural law is alterable.  His argument seems to suggest that natural law 
rests on a hypothetical Ought.  One of his arguments runs thus: since natural law 
commands us to do that which fulfills our nature and since it is possible for our nature to 
change, what humans ought to do in one era may be different from what they ought to do 
in another.  In his argument, Hall claims that this alterability pertains not only to the 
conclusions which are derived from such principles but also (contra Aquinas) to the 
principles themselves.  In seeking to back up his claim that human nature can change, he 
points out that a genetic change could cause us to lose our innate inclination to know 
God.  If such should occur, ―the knowledge of God would not be a natural end, and there 
could not be a first principle of natural law telling us to realize that end.‖
49    
It seems, 
then, that if Hall is correct, natural law would rest on a hypothetical Ought given that its 
precepts would only hold if our nature were of a certain type.  For example, we would 
only have a moral obligation to seek to know God if our nature led us to have an 
inclination to do so. 
 
 
 
not need a categorical Ought in the Kantian sense of an Ought which would be binding for all 
possible rational beings.  It merely needs a categorical Ought which is binding for all humans 
who have reached the age of reason and are not mentally handicapped or otherwise incapacitated. 
Thus, natural lawyers need concern themselves only with the question of whether or not they are 
able to validly, soundly, and relevantly derive an Ought which is categorical in regard to human 
beings.  The Kantian project of attempting to base morality on precepts which would pertain to all 
possible rational creatures does not need to be considered and would be a problem for Kantians to 
solve. This is not to say, however, that if Kantians have solved the problem, and in a way which 
is relevant to the problem as it is in the context of natural law theory, their solution would not be 
worth considering.  It is for this reason that in Chapter Two, I will consider Gewirth‘s solution 
IOP even though he is a Kantian. 
 
49  
Hall, Richard, ―The Alterability of Natural Law‖, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: 
55, (Autumn 1981), 478. 
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Although it is fair to argue that if human nature is alterable, the first principles of 
natural law are alterable, Hall fails to establish that natural law is alterable in any 
substantial sense and, hence, his argument cannot be used to establish that the Ought of 
natural law is hypothetical.
50   
The only support he seems to offer for his claim that human 
nature is alterable is his example regarding the knowledge of God, but this example is 
faulty.  The first problem is that this is not an example of a precept of natural law in the 
first place.  Aquinas claims that since human beings are rational by nature, they have an 
inclination to know the truth about God and, hence, it belongs to natural law for them to 
seek to know that truth.  Nevertheless, he does not claim precisely that one has a moral 
obligation to know God in a personal manner or even to know that God exists.
51   
Though 
this distinction may seem subtle, it is important given that it does not seem possible that a 
rational creature, even through genetic mutation, could cease to have a desire to know at 
least whether or not it is true that God exists.  In short, Hall‘s argument fails because he 
does not show that it is possible for a genetic mutation to alter our rational nature in such 
a way that we would no longer have a desire to know whether God exists; nor does he 
show that it is in fact a precept of natural law that humans ought to actually attain 
knowledge of God. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50  
Ibid., 478. 
 
51  
ST I-II, 94, 2: ―… human beings have inclinations for good by their rational nature, which is 
proper to them.  For example, human beings by nature have inclinations to know truths about God 
and to live in society with other human beings.  And so things that relate to such inclinations 
belong to the natural law (e.g., that human beings such ignorance, that they not offend those with 
whom they ought to live sociably, and other such things regarding those inclinations).‖ Notice 
that Aquinas is not arguing that since we have a rational nature we must know that God exists or 
that God has a particular nature.  Notice also that although he says we have an inclination to 
know God, he only concludes that it belongs to natural law that we ―shun ignorance‖. 
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Even if we attempt to provide a better founded example, it does not seem that 
Hall‘s argument would work.  It could be argued that human nature is alterable in the 
sense that humans can be born without a rational capacity or subsequently lose it. We 
would not consider a child, a severely mentally handicapped adult, a comatose person, or 
an elderly person with severe dementia to be non-human; and yet such persons do not 
have an inclination to know truth.  Further, given that such persons do not have such an 
inclination, no natural law theorist would claim that they still have a moral obligation to 
pursue knowledge, shun ignorance, and the like.  Nevertheless, such examples would not 
establish that natural law is alterable per se, but merely that it is not binding for persons 
who lack a fully rational nature.  In other words, such an argument might require natural 
law theorists to make an addendum to their theories such as ―if persons have full use of 
their rational faculty, then they Ought to shun ignorance‖ but it would be unfair to 
conclude that the Ought is alterable or hypothetical per se.  If a person does not have a 
rational nature, it would be more accurate to say that the natural law does not pertain to 
such a person given that ethics and Oughts only pertain to persons who are capable of 
reasoning.  If a natural capacity does not exist in a person, the precepts do not even exist 
in regard to that person.   It is not that the precepts themselves change from one thing to 
another or are hypothetical in the sense that they are one thing in one situation and 
something else in another situation. 
In addition to claiming that the precepts of natural law are alterable since human 
nature is alterable, Hall also claims that even if human nature were static, the precepts 
would still be alterable.  He asserts, 
…it can be shown that first precepts might become false even assuming the 
constancy of human nature.  Imagine that radiation from the sun causes all human 
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beings to become sterile.  The procreation of children would then be impossible 
even though everyone had an innate inclination to procreate.  Thus, even if human 
nature (the set of our natural inclinations) were to remain constant, changes in the 
world may come about which prevent us from realizing some natural ends.
52
 
 
The problem inherent in this argument should be readily evident.  Although it is true that 
if a person did not have the capacity to procreate she would not have an obligation to do 
so, it does not follow that the natural law precept regarding procreation is alterable.  It 
would be more accurate to say that if one is sterile, the precept regarding procreation is 
not binding for that person.  The term ―alterable‖ suggests that something which exists is 
one thing at one time and another thing at a different time; but the precepts of natural law 
are not alterable in this way.  Rather, the precept is not binding or existent in regard to 
certain people. Thus, again, Hall‘s claim cannot be used to establish that the Ought of 
natural law precepts are per se hypothetical.  It is true that if a person does not have a 
functional nature, she cannot be obligated to follow the precepts which stem from that 
nature.  Nevertheless it does not follow that natural law does not need—and implement— 
a categorical Ought. 
With his claims that the precepts of natural law are alterable as a backdrop, Hall 
continues by claiming that the precepts of natural law could differ from one society to the 
next.  He states: 
It can be clearly demonstrated that the alterability of natural law implies that 
different sets of natural law precepts could hold for different societies . . . .  All 
we need do is imagine…those changes in human nature or the external 
environment which can falsify natural law precepts to occur in some societies but 
not in others.  In a society in which everyone is sterile, for example, monogamy 
will not be required by natural law since this institution is required only if it is the 
best means to the procreation of children, whereas natural law may require such 
an institution in a fertile society as the best means to this end.‖53 
 
52  
Hall, 479. 
 
53  
Hall, 480. 
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Hall‘s argument here is faulty for two main reasons.  First, the example he provides in 
support of his argument fails given that—according to most if not all natural law 
theorists—procreation is not the only end of marriage.  Aquinas, for example, claims that 
the ends of marriage include not only procreation but also the education of children and 
the mutual affection of spouses.  He also claims that taking multiple spouses would 
seriously hinder the latter.
54    
Thus, even in a society in which all people became sterile, 
 
monogamy would still be required as the best means to fostering mutual affection. 
 
A second difficulty is that Hall, once again, does not distinguish between natural 
law being alterable and natural law being non-binding for persons who lack certain 
capacities.  If—in a given society—all persons were sterile, they would not be obligated 
to procreate; nevertheless, it would be more accurate to say that in such a case natural law 
 
would be non-binding rather than alterable.
55 
Thus, in spite of the fact that the Ought of 
 
 
 
 
 
54
ST III (suppl.), 65, 1.  Now marriage has for its principal end the begetting and rearing of 
children, and this end is competent to man according to his generic nature, wherefore it is 
common to other animals (Ethic. viii, 12), and thus it is that the "offspring" is assigned as a 
marriage good. But for its secondary end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), it has, among 
men alone, the community of works that are a necessity of life, as stated above (Question 41, 
Article 1). And in reference to this they owe one another ‗fidelity‘ which is one of the goods of 
marriage.… Wherefore the first end corresponds to the marriage of man inasmuch as he is an 
animal: the second, inasmuch as he is a man…. Accordingly plurality of wives neither wholly 
destroys nor in any way hinders the first end of marriage, since one man is sufficient to get 
children of several wives, and to rear the children born of them. But though it does not wholly 
destroy the second end, it hinders it considerably for there cannot easily be peace in a family 
where several wives are joined to one husband, since one husband cannot suffice to satisfy the 
requisitions of several wives, and again because the sharing of several in one occupation is a 
cause of strife: thus ‗potters quarrel with one another‘ [Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 4,] and in like manner 
the several wives of one husband. …It is therefore evident from what has been said that plurality 
of wives is in a way against the law of nature….‖ 
 
55  
In a footnote, Hall briefly acknowledges this distinction.  (478, footnote #1)  Yet it seems to be 
an afterthought and Hall does not appear to realize that once it is made the following claims of his 
stand in need of revision: (1) a principle could be a natural law precept at one time but not at 
another (2) a principle could be a natural law precept for one society but not for another (477) and 
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natural law may appear to be hypothetical, it is only hypothetical in the sense that if 
particular individuals do not have the capacity to follow a precept, they are not obligated 
to follow it.  The Ought is still categorical in the sense that it is not based on the 
capricious desires of the agent or on the cultural context. 
 
C. Four Solutions to the IOP 
 
During the past half century philosophers have come up with numerous solutions 
to the IOP both as it relates to the ethics in general and as it relates to natural law theory 
in particular. The first of these solutions attempts to show that the problem is merely a 
pseudo-problem.  Searle, for example, claims to have offered a counterexample to the 
IOP by showing that an Ought can be derived from an Is.  Moreover, his counterexample 
seems to be valid.   Although he admits that one counterexample cannot in itself ―refute a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) ―If the set of our natural inclinations were to change or the right sorts of changes in the 
external environment were to occur, any action whatever could undergo a radical change in moral 
quality, not just once, but many times.  In effect no moral values would be fixed. We are 
therefore forced to conclude that our natural law theory fails an essential requirement for 
absolutism.‖  (482 )  Claim (1) would have to be revised to state: If all people lost a natural 
capacity which they had at a different time, the precept of natural law pertaining to that capacity 
would no longer hold.  Claim (2) would have to be revised to state: If all people in one society 
lacked a capacity which people in another society lacked, the precept pertaining to that capacity 
would hold in one society but not the other.  Finally, claim (3) would have to be revised to state: 
If the set of our natural inclinations were to change, we would cease to have some of the moral 
obligations that we would otherwise have. These revised claims are much more moderate than 
Hall‘s claims and cannot be used to establish that the Ought of natural law theory is hypothetical 
in the sense of being contingent upon self-interested desires, variable choices, opinions, 
institutional rules, or cultural context. 
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philosophical thesis,‖ he argues that a counterexample in addition to an explanation of 
how the counterexample works, can.
56 
Gewirth also attempts to offer a counterexample.
57
 
Even if these counterexamples are valid, however, several questions need to be 
asked.  First, since neither Searle nor Gewirth are natural law theorists, it needs to be 
asked whether their counterexamples are pertinent to natural law theory.  Even if we 
assume that Searle and Gewrith are successful in providing counterexamples, it could still 
be argued that, unless they implement the claims of natural law theory, the IOP is still a 
problem for natural law theory.  Second, it needs to be asked whether the Ought derived 
in their counterexamples are moral, prescriptive, determinate, categorical, and egalitarian. 
Only if both of these questions can be answered affirmatively can these counterexamples 
be used by natural law theorists. 
A second solution involves deriving an Ought from the desires of agents.
58    
By 
utilizing this method, it is possible to derive a conclusion containing an Ought from 
statements concerning human nature as in the following argument:  (1) Doing X is 
contrary to human nature.  (2) Because X damages or goes against human nature, it 
leads to bad consequences.  Therefore, (3) if agents desire to avoid these bad 
consequences, they ought to avoid doing X.  Although, at this point, only a hypothetical 
Ought has been derived, further statements can be added to derive a categorical one. 
These statements are: (4) All agents in fact desire to avoid bad consequences and (5) 
 
 
56  
J.R.Searle, ―How to derive ‗ought‘ from ‗is‘‖ in The Is—Ought Question, ed. W.D. Hudson 
(London: MacMillan, 1969), 120. 
 
57
Gewirth, Allan. ―The ‗Is-Ought‘ Problem Resolved.‖ Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association 47 (1974):  34-61. 
 
58  
Janet Smith is an example of a natural law theorist who utilizes this type of methodology 
(although she does not specifically claim that it is a way of overcoming the IOP). 
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Doing X always leads to bad consequences.  With these additional statements, it is 
possible to conclude (6) All agents always ought to avoid doing X. 
The most obvious difficulty with this approach is that it would not seem to address 
all aspects of the IOP.  Although the Ought-conclusion is not formulated as a hypothetical 
statement per se, the argument as a whole seems to be contingent on the desires of the 
agent and, hence, does not seem to be a viable solution. Otherwise stated, since a 
categorical Ought cannot be based on contingent on variable or escapable features 
either of agents
59
—and since desires are variable, escapable features—any derivation 
 
based on desires would not seem to be properly categorized as categorical.  A related 
difficulty is that the Ought-conclusion would seem, at least at first blush, to lack 
determinacy since different agents have different desires.  Yet another difficulty is that it 
does not seem that the Ought derived is necessarily moral.  Thus, more work needs to be 
done if natural law theorists utilize this approach. 
A third solution attempts to show that if we return to an Aristotelian, teleological, 
and functional understanding of human nature, the problem disappears.
60   
The claim is 
that once we come to understand the function of the human person, the Ought emerges. 
Analogously, if we grasp the notion of a watch as something which has the function of 
 
 
 
59  
Cf. Gewirth, IOPR, 35-36. 
 
60  
MacIntyre, for example, argues that ―we may safely assert that if some amended version of the 
‗No ought conclusion from is premises‘ principle is to hold good, it must exclude arguments 
involving functional concepts from its scope.‖ MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue 2nd ed. (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 58. Following in the same vein, Lisska says, ―the 
relation of final cause to formal cause renders insignificant the claim that a value is added to a 
fact. The value as fact is a state of completion of the disposition as fact. This is an important 
consequence of Aristotelian/ Aquinian natural kind essence theory.  A dispositional view of 
natural kinds is, therefore, a necessary condition in rendering the fact/value question inapplicable 
to Aristotelian/ Aquinian moral theory.‖  Lisska, Anthony, Aquinas‟s Theory of Natural Law: An 
Analytic Reconstruction, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 199. 
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keeping time accurately, we can conclude that a watch which does not keep time properly 
is a bad watch and one which does is a good watch. In other words, once we grasp what 
the function of a watch is, it becomes clear that a watch ought to keep time accurately. 
Likewise, if we grasp the notion of a farmer as someone who has the function of 
producing crops, we can conclude that a farmer who does not produce crops is a bad 
farmer and one who does is a good farmer. Once we grasp the function of a farmer, it 
becomes clear that a farmer ought to produce crops.
61    
It would seem, then, that if we can 
acquire an understanding of the function of the human person, the Ought would at once 
surface or-- to put it differently-- it would seem that since natural law theory incorporates 
a functional view of human nature, the IOP may not apply to it. 
 
Although many natural law theorists have accepted this as a solution to the 
problem, it too leads to difficulties.  One of the main difficulties is that it is not clear that 
it is possible to come to know the function or essence of the human person.  Another 
difficulty is that, even if we assume that it is possible to know the function of a human 
being, it is not clear that knowing that function would provide us with a moral Ought 
rather than merely an Ought of adequacy.  It is clear that, since the very function of a 
watch is to keep time accurately, a watch ought to keep time accurately.  It may also be 
clear, at least in some cases, that since the very function of a farmer is to produce crops, a 
farmer ought to do so (provided that he is able to).  What is not clear, however, is that this 
is a moral Ought rather than just an Ought of adequacy.  It would be absurd to argue that, 
since the function of a watch is to keep time, a watch has a moral obligation to keep time. 
It would also be absurd to argue that just because the function of a farmer is to produce 
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MacIntyre, After Virtue, 57-58.  Examples are those of MacIntyre. 
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crops, he has a moral obligation to do so.  Why, then, must we accept that just because 
the human person has a particular function, he has a moral obligation to act in accord 
with this function?  Apparently, if this approach is to be used, more work needs to be 
done here too. 
A fourth solution, which has been put forth by Finnis, Grisez and others, has been 
to start with an underived, self-evident Ought.  This approach involves arguing that some 
goods are self-evident and, hence, need not be derived from statements about human 
nature at all.  As Finnis puts it, 
the first principles of natural law, which specify the basic forms of good and evil 
and which can be adequately grasped by anyone of the age of reason (and not just 
by metaphysicians, are per se nota  (self-evident) and indemonstrable.  They are 
not inferred from speculative principles.  They are not inferred from facts.  They 
are not inferred from metaphysical propositions about human nature, or about the 
nature of good and evil, or about ‗the function of a human being‘, nor are they 
inferred from a teleological conception of nature or any other conception of 
nature.
62
 
 
Finnis also claims that specifically moral Ought statements must be derived from these 
self-evident first principles and, hence, he fully admits that the moral Ought must be 
derived.  Nevertheless, he maintains that the moral Ought is not derived from Is- 
statements but, rather, directly from a pre-moral Ought-statement. 
However, this solution too meets with difficulties.  One such difficulty is that it is 
not clear that the Ought is related to human nature and so it is not clear that this method is 
proper to natural law theory.
63   
If this approach is utilized by natural law theorists, they 
must establish that there is some link between the moral Ought and human nature. 
Another difficulty is that it would seem to leave us with an indeterminate Ought since 
 
 
62  
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 33-34. 
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Cf. Henery Veatch, ―Natural Law and the ‗Is‘—‗Ought‘ Question: Queries to Finnis and 
Grisez.‖ Catholic Lawyer (1980-81): 253. 
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there is much disagreement about what the first principles and basic forms of good and 
evil are.  Although all persons within a given culture might be able to agree on some 
principles, it is not clear that all persons tout court are able to agree.  What might be 
accepted as a self-evident principle or Ought by some agents might differ from what is 
accepted as self-evident by other agents. 
Each of these proposed solutions have pros and cons, that is, each of them offer a 
path to a solution to the IOP as it pertains specifically to natural law theory while at the 
same time leaving some questions unanswered.  The purpose of this dissertation is to 
explore each of these solutions and attempt to answer some of the questions which they 
leave us with.  I will ultimately argue that the second and fourth solutions are the least 
problematic and defend them against some of the objections which have been raised 
against them.  However, I will also show that the first and third solutions also have 
something to offer. 
 
 
D. Status of the Problem 
 
There is ample literature on natural law theory and the IOP in general.  Likewise, 
much literature has been written by proponents of all four of the above solutions.  What is 
lacking is a full analysis of these solutions within the context of a consideration of the 
fact that natural law needs a robust, Gewirthian Ought and within the context of a 
consideration of the type of derivability that is pertinent to the real IOP (i.e., derivability 
which is valid, sound, and in which there is relevance between the premises and the 
conclusion). 
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Lisska briefly touches on part of this issue.  He acknowledges that eudaimonistic 
approaches to natural law -- which rely on the premise that if we desire to attain 
eudaimonia, we ought to act in a particular way—fall prey to the objection that such an 
Ought only provides us with a hypothetical imperative.  He seeks to surmount this 
difficulty by claiming that if Kant is able to arrive at a categorical Ought, then Aquinas 
and the natural law theorist can do the same. Lisska begins by pointing out the 
similarities between moral normativity in Kant and in Aquinas. He states, ―in the 
Kantian scheme, in so far as rational beings engage in the process of moral deliberation, a 
contradiction—being fundamentally irrational—strikes against what human beings are in 
their very existence; i.e., rational beings.‖64 According to Lisska, the precept that we must 
act in accord with our rational nature is the source of the Ought in the categorical 
imperative since—according to the categorical imperative—it is always wrong to act 
contrary to one‘s rational nature.  Lisska then goes on to argue that the Ought in Aquinas 
is analogous since it rests on the claim that ―it is categorically necessary that the practical 
reason undertake those actions which lead to eudaimonia‖.65    Although Lisska discusses 
the issue in this manner, he does so briefly and—by his own admission—his argument is 
―limited at best‖.66 
In his article ―The Naturalistic Fallacy and Natural Law Methodology,‖ W.M 
Grant also briefly touches on part of the issue.  He states that ―although this point is 
seldom noticed, whether or not there is a genuine fallacy in deducing an ought from a set 
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Lisska, Anthony, Aquinas‟s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996), 204. 
 
65  
Ibid. 
 
66  
Ibid, 205. 
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of exclusively descriptive premises depends on what kind of ought one seeks to deduce. 
One can quite easily deduce a conditional ought from a set of exclusively descriptive 
premises, but attempts . . . fail to show how one can deduce a categorical ought.‖67   In 
the course of his short article, he discusses difficulties inherent in attempts made by 
McInerny, Veatch, and Lisska to licitly derive a categorical Ought from facts about 
human nature. He also briefly discusses problems inherent in the attempt to ground the 
Ought in the desires of the agent.  What Grant does not provide is a full treatment of the 
issue.  For example, he does not consider attempts made by philosophers outside the 
Thomistic tradition to licitly derive an Ought from an Is (which may be relevant to 
natural law) nor does he adequately establish that natural law theory needs a categorical 
 
ought. Thus, although there is literature concerning the topic of this dissertation, lacunae 
remain. 
In the Chapters that follow, I will proceed by way of a close analysis and critique 
of the works of the main proponents of each of the four solutions.  Although most who 
have done work on the problem have attempted to establish that their own approach is the 
most consistent with the thought of St. Thomas, I will not explore this issue even though I 
will often draw upon the texts of Aquinas. 
 
 
E. Outline of the Dissertation: 
Chapter 2 will provide a treatment of attempts which have been made to provide a 
counterexample to the IOP.  This will involve an analysis of the attempts of both Searle 
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W. Matthews Grant, ―The Naturalistic Fallacy and Natural Law Methodology,‖ in Truth 
Matters: Essays in Honor of Jacques Maritain (Washington, D.C. Catholic University Press, 
2004), 168. 
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and Gewirth to validly and soundly derive an Ought-conclusion from Is-premises.  This 
Chapter will also offer an exploration of whether their counterexamples are relevant to 
natural law theory and whether they implicitly rely on self-evident precepts. 
Chapter 3 will consider the fact that many natural law theorists, such as J. Smith, 
rely on a seemingly hypothetical Ought.   It will offer an analysis and critique of this 
approach and a consideration of whether there is any way to derive a categorical and 
determinate Ought from premises that include hypothetical statements.  I will argue that it 
is possible to do so but only within certain parameters and if certain assumptions are 
made. 
Chapter 4 will focus on the work of philosophers such as Lisska, McInerny, and 
MacIntyre who have argued that the problem can be resolved by returning to an 
Aristotelian, dispositional, and teleological understanding of human nature.  I will 
provide both an analysis and critique of this solution and argue that it is inadequate if 
used in isolation. 
Chapter 5 will provide an overview and critique of the approach of New Natural 
Law theorists, such as Finnis, Grisez, R. George, and C. Paterson, who have sought to 
avoid the problem by starting with a self-evident Ought.  I will look at both the 
limitations and benefits of this approach.  I will also offer a response to some of the 
criticisms which have been leveled against it. 
Finally, Chapter 6 will provide a summary of the foregoing arguments and 
conclusions. I will claim that if one wants a theory of natural law that overcomes the real 
IOP, the New Natural Law approach is the least problematic. 
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CHAPTER II 
 COUNTEREXAMPLES, NATURAL 
LAW AND THE „IS‟—„OUGHT‟ 
PROBLEM 
 
 
 
One of the most straight-forward ways of attempting to respond to those who 
claim that it is not possible to validly deduce an Is from an Ought is to come up with a 
counter-example which shows that this is an inaccurate assumption.  Since Searle and 
Gewirth-- among others-- have attempted to do just this, it will be worthwhile to analyze 
their counter-examples and to consider whether they are successful.  It will also be 
worthwhile to consider whether their counter-examples, if at least partially successful, 
might be imitated by natural law theorists. 
In this Chapter, I will first consider Searle‘s counter-example and the theory he 
develops in an attempt to establish that it is possible to derive an indefinite number of 
Ought-statements from Is-premises. I will subsequently consider whether his method of 
derivation could be imitated by natural lawyers while still affirming the main claims of 
natural law theory.  I will then do the same with Gewirth‘s counter-argument.  I will 
ultimately argue that Searle‘s counter-example cannot be imitated since the Ought which 
he derives does not have a sufficient grounding in human nature.  I will also argue that 
Gewirth‘s counter-example can be imitated since the Ought which he derives has an 
implicit ontological and epistemic grounding in human nature. 
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A. Searle‟s Counter-Example  
1.  A Summary of Searle‟s Counter-Example 
In his article How to Derive „Ought‟ from „Is‟, Searle proposes the following 
counter-example which purportedly refutes the general claim that it is never possible to 
derive an Ought from an Is: 
(1) 
Jones uttered the words, ―I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars.‖68 
 
             
 
 
 (1a) Under certain conditions C anyone who utters the words (sentence) ―I 
 
 
 hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars‖ promises to pay Smith 
five dollars.
69
 
  
(1b) 
 
Conditions C obtain.
70
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Searle, J.R. ―How to derive ‗ought‘ from ‗is‘,‖ in The Is—Ought Question, edited by 
W.D. Hudson  (London: MacMillan, 1969), 120-134.  Hereafter abbreviated as HTD. 
 
69  
According to Searle, conditions C are all empirical.  In explicating them he states, ―The 
conditions will include such things as that the speaker is in the presence of the hearer Smith, they 
are both conscious, both speakers f English, speaking seriously. The speaker knows what he is 
doing, is not under the influence of drugs, not hypnotized or acting in a play, not telling a joke or 
reporting an event, and so forth.‖  Searle, HTD, 121-122. 
 
70  
This is an empirical claim that the requisite conditions are present (i.e., that Jones is in the 
presence of Smith, that he and Smith are both conscious speakers of English, etc.). 
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(2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
71
 
 
(2a) All promises are acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an obligation 
to do the thing promised.
72
 
 
(3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. 
(3a) Other things are equal.
73
 
(3b) All those who place themselves under an obligation are, other things being 
equal, under an obligation.
74
 
 
 
 
(4) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. 
(4a) Other things are equal. 
(5) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.
75
 
Searle claims that the relationship between each premise and its successor is one 
of entailment and is based on tautologies, empirical assumptions, the definition of the 
 
 
 
 
 
71  
Searle claims that the argument from (1) to (2) is valid and takes on the form ―If C then (if U 
then P): C for conditions, U for utterance, P for promise.‖  (HTD, 122) More will be said latter 
regarding the fact that this step involves a hypothetical condition. 
 
72  
Searle adds this tautological sub-premise for the sake of formal neatness but does not think it is 
necessary in order to derive premise (3). In commenting on the relationship between (2) and (3), 
Searle claims that, ―…promising is, by definition, an act of placing oneself under an obligation.‖ 
(HTD, 122)  Thus, the derivation is based on the definition of promising. 
 
73  
Searle adds this sub-premise in order to account for the fact that it is possible for one to be 
released from an obligation due to extenuating circumstances.   He adds (4a) for the same reason. 
(HTD, 123) 
 
74  
As with (2a), Searle adds this tautological sub-premise for the sake of formal neatness.  Searle 
asserts that the move from (3) to (4) takes the form of ―If E then (if PUO then UO): E for other 
things are equal, PUO for place under obligation and UO for under obligation.  Adding the two 
premises E and PUO we derive UO.‖  (HTD, 123) 
 
75  
According to Searle, the move from (4) to (5) takes the form ―if E then (if UO then O); E for 
other things are equal, UO for under obligation, O for ought.  Adding the premises E and UO we 
derive O.‖ (HTD, 124) 
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term ―obligation‖, or takes the form: If X then (if Y then Z). In addition, when this latter 
form is utilized, Searle provides premises stating that X and Y hold.  Thus, the counter- 
example can be reformulated to read: 
If anyone utters the words “I hereby promise to pay you, Smith five dollars” then, 
if certain conditions obtain (such as that Jones is in the presence of Smith, that he and 
Smith are both conscious speakers of English, etc.) then he thereby promises to pay Smith 
five dollars.   Jones utters the words “I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars. 
Certain conditions obtain.  Therefore, Jones promises to pay Smith five dollars. 
By definition, promising is an act of placing oneself under an obligation to do the 
thing promised.  Therefore, since Jones promises to pay Smith five dollars, Jones is under 
an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. 
If all things are equal then, if Jones has placed himself under an obligation to pay 
Smith five dollars, then Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.  All things 
are equal.  Jones has placed himself under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. 
Therefore, Jones is under an obligation on to pay Smith five dollars. 
If all things are equal then, if Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five 
dollars, then Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.  All things are equal.  Jones is under 
an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.  Therefore Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars. 
In spite of the seeming success of this derivation, numerous objections have been 
made which Searle has acknowledged.
76   
One such objection is that the ceteris paribus 
premise (4a) allows an implicit Ought to seep into the premises and, hence, the premises 
are not purely descriptive.  Another is that Searle fails to provide a statement establishing 
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Searle, Speech Acts, 188-198.  Hereafter abbreviated as SA. 
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that there is a logical connection between the obligation-statement of premise (4), and the 
 
Ought-statement of conclusion (5). 
 
In response to these objections, Searle himself revises his counter-example in 
Speech Acts.  The first two premises and their sub-premises are identical but he slightly 
alters the other premises, which are formulated thus: 
(3
ii
) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. 
 
(3a
ii
) All those who place themselves under an obligation are (at the time when 
they so place themselves) under an obligation. 
 
(4
ii
) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. 
 
(4a
ii
)  If one is under an obligation to do something, then as regards that 
obligation one ought to do what one is under an obligation to do. 
 
(5
ii
) As regards his obligation to pay Smith five dollars, Jones ought to pay Smith 
five dollars.
77
 
 
In this revision, the ceteris paribus clause is eliminated and (4a) establishes the necessary 
link between (4) and (5).  Thus, it would seem that—in spite of objections to the 
contrary-- at least this revised derivation is valid.
78
 
 
 
 
2. Searle‟s Theory Regarding the Derivation 
 
Acknowledging that one counter-example is not sufficient to address all of the 
issues pertinent to the IOP, Searle examines how his counter-example works, why there 
is thought to be a gap between descriptive and evaluative terms, and offers a theory 
supporting the claim that it is possible to derive an indefinite number of Ought-statements 
 
from Is-premises.  In explaining why there is thought to be a gap, he asserts that if we 
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More will be said in what follows regarding the validity of Searle‘s derivation. 
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consider the problem from an empirical standpoint, the gap will always seems 
unbridgeable.  This is because, from an empirical standpoint, evaluative statements are 
seen as serving the function merely of expressing emotions or attitudes, praising, 
insulting, recommending, advising, commending, and so forth; whereas descriptive 
statements are seen as serving the function of describing states of affairs in the world. 
From this standpoint, in order for evaluative statements to serve their function of 
evaluating, they cannot refer to states of affairs in the world, nor can they be defined in 
terms of descriptive statements.
79
 
 
Searle argues that this empirical standpoint fails to take into account the fact that 
there are various types of descriptive statements. According to Searle, a distinction needs 
to be made between descriptive statements that are based on brute facts and ones that are 
based on institutional facts.
80   
Statements such as ―Judith has a million dollars‖ and 
―Raymond won the tennis match,‖ are examples of the latter and, as such, they can only 
be understood within the context of institutions.  The statement ―Judith has a million 
dollars‖ only makes sense within the context of the institution of currency; and the 
statement ―Raymond won the tennis match‖ only makes sense within the institution of 
tennis.  On the other hand, statements such as ―Judith has a lot of paper with green ink on 
it‖ and ―Raymond hit the yellow sphere and the person on the other side of the net did not 
hit it back‖ are statements of brute facts.  As such, they can be understood without 
reference to institutional facts.   One need not know anything about currency or tennis in 
order to verify these statements. 
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HTD, 129. This distinction is first made by G.E.M Anscombe.  See: ―On Brute Facts,‖ 
Analysis, 18 (1958). 
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HTD, 130. 
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With this distinction in mind, Searle is able to develop a theory as to how his 
derivation works and, in turn, he uses this theory to establish that an indefinite number of 
similar derivations are possible.  He states: 
It is often a matter of fact that one has certain obligations, commitments, rights, 
and responsibilities, but it is a matter of institutional, not brute, fact.  It is one such 
institutionalized form of obligation, promising which I invoked . . . to derive an 
‗ought‘ from an ‗is‘.  I started with a brute fact, that a man uttered certain words, 
and then invoked the institution in such a way as to generate institutional facts by 
which we arrived at the institutional fact that the man ought to pay another man 
five dollars.  The whole proof rests on an appeal to the constitutive rules that to 
make a promise is to undertake an obligation.
81
 
In short, Searle claims that it is because he starts with an institutional fact that he is able 
validly to derive an Ought. Because the act of promising is constituted by undertaking an 
obligation and because undertaking an obligation is in turn constituted by an Ought, the 
Ought-conclusion follows validly from the premises.  Analogously, if a man strikes out in 
a game of baseball, he ought to leave the field given the institutional facts, that is, given 
the rules of the game.  If, upon striking out, he protests having to leave the field by 
pointing out that it is a mere fact that he missed the ball and that no Ought follows from 
this fact, his claim would seem to preposterous to all present.  And rightly so.
82    
The 
reason it would seem preposterous is that within the context of the rules of the game, 
which are constitutive rules, it is a fact that he ought to leave the field.  Searle claims, 
then, that by starting with constitutive rules, we are capable of validly deriving 
institutional Oughts.  This is how his counter-argument works and many other such 
derivations are possible.
83
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The making of any promise would imply an Ought in this sense, as would any positive law. 
42 
 
 
3.  Does it solve all aspects IOP? 
 
Since Searle does not propose these counter-examples within the context of a 
consideration of the IOP as it pertains to a robust Ought, but is merely trying to show that 
in general it is possible to deduce an Ought from an Is and to offer a theory as to how it 
works, the first question which needs to be asked is whether he succeeds in dealing with 
the problem as it pertains to ethics.  More specifically, it needs to be asked whether 
Searle has non-fallaciously deduced a prescriptive, moral, egalitarian, determinate, and 
categorical Ought. 
In regard to the question of whether the derivation commits any fallacies, there is 
no reason to suppose that the second formulation of Searle‘s counter-argument even 
though his first formulation may seem to do so.  It is possible to interpret Searle‘s first 
formulation of the derivation in such a way that it is question-begging since there seems 
to be a need for an explicit premise linking the obligation-statement in premise (4) with 
the Ought-statement in conclusion.  In the first formulation, premise (4) reads ―Jones is 
under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars‖ and the conclusions reads ―Jones ought to 
pay Smith five dollars‖.   Since there is no explicit premise stating that if one is under an 
obligation then one ought to fulfill it, it is possible to argue that the argument begs the 
question.  However, in the second of his formulations, Searle provides the needed 
premise.  In the second formulation, premise (4a
ii
) reads ―If one is under an obligation to 
 
do something, then as regards that obligation one ought to do what one is under an 
obligation to do‖; and the conclusion reads ―As regards his obligation to pay Smith five 
dollars, Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.‖ Given that Searle provides this linking 
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premise, there is no reason to suppose that there is anything fallacious about the second 
formulation. 
Although it is not fallacious, Searle‘s counterexample fails in regard to providing 
us with an explicitly egalitarian Ought.  Since no information is given about the 
circumstances of the promise made, and since the derivation would work regardless of 
the circumstances, this criterion is not ostensibly met.  None of the premises indicate 
whether Jones or Smith are rich or poor, and the Ought-conclusion would stand 
regardless.  If Jones and his family are starving and if Smith and his family are 
abundantly wealthy, the conclusion still stands: ―Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars‖. 
Moreover, this type of derivation could easily be used to derive a non-egalitarian Ought. 
For example, if Jones were to promise to rob the poor and seriously diminish the common 
good of his community, we could still derive the conclusion ―Jones ought to rob the poor 
and seriously diminish the common good of his community.‖ Given that the derivation 
works regardless of whether or not the Ought has any relation to the common good, then, 
the Ought of this derivation is not explicitly egalitarian.   A natural law theorist who 
desired to derive an Ought that specifically upholds the common good, would therefore 
be better off looking for a different method of deriving an Ought. 
 
It has been argued that Searle‘s counterargument also fails in regard to the 
criterion of determinacy.  Gewirth claims that, since the opposite conclusion can be 
reached using the same method, the counterargument does not pertain to the real IOP.  In 
reference to institutional-based derivations such as Searle‘s, Gewirth states that the 
derivation 
fails the test of determinacy.  One could, by the same mode of derivation, infer 
diametrically opposed ‗oughts‘.  For example, if one participates in the institution 
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of constitutional democracy then one ought to support civil liberties, but if one 
participates in the institution of dictatorship then one ought to oppose such 
liberties, and if one participates in the institution of slavery then one ought to 
regard some humans as other humans‘ property and so forth.84 
 
In other words, Gewirth objects to institution-based derivations since all we need to do in 
order to derive the opposite conclusion is simply choose to start with a different type of 
institution.  If we happen to adopt the institution of promising, then Searle‘s derivation 
enables us to derive the conclusion ―Jones ought to pay Smith five-dollars.‖ However, if 
we chose not to adopt this institution, and instead adopt an institution in which lying is 
considered to be obligatory, we could easily derive the conclusion ―Jones ought to avoid 
paying Smith five dollars.‖ 
Although Gewirth‘s objection may seem to be legitimate at first glance, he fails to 
take into account the fact that Searle himself deals with this type of objection in his 
article ―Deriving ‗ought‘ from ‗is‘ objections and replies.‖   In this article, Searle 
essentially responds by pointing out that the Ought does not stem from an ambiguous 
decision to accept the institution of promising but, rather, from the very meaning of the 
term ―promise‖.  Given the very meaning of the term ―promise‖, anyone who states, ―I 
hereby promise to pay you, Smith five dollars‖ ipso facto ought to pay Smith five dollars. 
This is not because he has arbitrarily decided to accept the institution of promising but 
simply because uttering the phrase ―I promise to pay‖, by definition, entails being subject 
to the Ought which follows from it.
85 
So long as the promise is made, the Ought- 
 
conclusion is determinate.  Moreover, it is not determinate because of an ambiguous 
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acceptance of an institutional fact but, rather, because of the nature of the speech act of 
promising which is made by the agent. 
Although it can easily be argued that Searle‘s Ought is determinate provided that 
someone makes a promise, the Ought would seem to fail in regard to being categorical 
since it is only binding if someone makes the utterance which comprises a promise.  The 
conclusion is not that all persons categorically ought to pay Smith five dollars but only 
that if someone utters the phrase, ―I promise to pay you, Smith five dollars,‖ then that 
particular person ought to pay him.  It could just as easily happen that nobody makes any 
promise to pay Smith or anybody else.
86   
An ethical theory which utilizes an Ought that is 
 
only binding if someone makes a speech act of a certain type--such as promising--might 
be appropriate in contractarian theories of ethics, or perhaps even positivistic theories of 
law, but would not be appropriate in natural law theory, virtue ethics, or utilitarianism.
87
 
Moreover, given that the Ought of the real IOP needs to be categorical in the sense that it 
―cannot be removed by, and hence is not contingent on or determined by, variable, 
escapable features of the persons addressed or of their social relations,‖ Searle‘s 
derivation would not seem to be a counterexample to the real IOP.
88   
More specifically, 
since institutional facts and the making of certain utterances or speech acts are 
themselves based on ―variable, escapable features of persons,‖ the Ought of Searle‘s 
derivation would seem to fail in regard to being categorical.   In short, this type of 
derivation would not be sufficient within the context of a theory of ethics—such as 
 
 
86  
This becomes even more apparent when considering the reformulation of the derivation on p. 
39 above. 
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natural law ethics—which makes the claim that there are actions that are impermissible 
regardless of whether the moral agent enters into an agreement or makes a speech act. 
Nor is it helpful merely to refer to the meaning of terms such as ―promise‖. 
The greatest problem inherent in Searle‘s derivation is that it does not seem to be 
 
a derivation of a moral Ought—which is not surprising given that Searle is not attempting 
to derive a specifically moral Ought.  In Speech Acts, Searle himself states: in 
I think, incidentally, that the obligation to keep a promise probably has no 
necessary connection with morality.  It is often claimed that the obligation to keep 
a promise is a paradigm case of a moral obligation.  But consider the following 
very common sort of example.  I promised to come to your party.  On the night in 
question, however, I just don‘t feel like going.  Of course I ought to go, after all, I 
promised and I have no good excuse for not going.  But I just don‘t go.  Am I 
immoral?  Remiss, no doubt.  If it were somehow very important that I go, then it 
might be immoral of me to stay home.  But then the immorality would derive 
from the importance of my going, and not simply from the obligation undertaken 
in promising.
89
 
 
Here Searle clearly acknowledges that if the Ought in this example is moral, it is so for 
some reason other than just that a promise was made.  The same would be true of Jones‘s 
obligation to pay Smith.  Only if there were some reason other than the mere fact that 
Jones promised to pay Smith would he have a moral obligation to do so. Moreover, given 
that it is easy to think of situations in which fulfilling a promise would be morally 
reprehensible, Searle seems to be right in concluding that his Ought is not necessarily 
moral.  For example, if it were the case that Jones knew Smith would use the five dollars 
to help supply a terrorist ring with ammunition, it would be clear that he certainly has no 
moral obligation to pay him.  In fact, he would seem to have a moral obligation not to 
pay him. 
 
 
 
 
 
89  
SA, 188. 
47 
 
 
This problem again surfaces Searle‘s ―Deriving ‗ought‘ from ‗is‘: objections and 
replies‖ and it is worth quoting him at length.  He states, 
There are two radically different ways of taking the phrase ‗commit oneself to 
(accept) the institution of promising‘.  In one way it means something like (a) 
‗undertake to use the word ‗promise‘ in accordance with its literal meaning, 
which literal meaning is determined by the internal constitutive rules of the 
institution‘.  A quite different way to take the phrase is to take it as meaning (b) 
‗endorse the institution as a good or acceptable institution‘.  Now, when I do 
assert literally that he made a promise I do indeed commit myself to the institution 
in the sense of (a): indeed, it is precisely because the literal meaning involves me 
in this commitment that the derivation goes through.  But I do not commit myself 
in the sense of (b).  It is perfectly possible for someone who loathes the institution 
of promising to say quite literally, ‗Jones made a promise‘, thus committing 
himself to the view that Jones understood an obligation.  …note that exactly the 
same distinction holds for geometry.  Someone who thinks the whole study and 
subject of geometry is evil still commits himself to the logical consequence of ‗X 
is a triangle‘ when he asserts ‗X is a triangle.90 
 
Numerous critics have pointed out that since Searle is concerned with the internal, 
logical, institutional, and definitional aspects of promising--rather than the question of 
whether the institution of promising is itself of value--his derivation does not provide us 
with a necessarily moral Ought. 
A.C. Genova is one of these critics. He claims that 
 
…Searle‘s deduction amounts to… deducing an institutional value from premises 
containing institutional values (or even, if you like, deducing an institutional 
value from institutional facts); but what he does not do (and cannot do) is validly 
to deduce a brute value from any set of premises expressing facts alone 
(regardless of whether they be brute or institutional facts)….91 
Genova‘s argument is that—by Searle‘s own admission-- speech acts such as promising 
are mere institutional facts and, as such, they are based on constitutive rules that take the 
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form ―X counts as Y in context C‖.92    Being bound by an Ought, then, takes the form: 
―being under an obligation counts as being bound by an Ought in contexts in which one 
utters the words, I promise to do Z.‖  This is analogous to winning a game of chess which 
takes the form: ―capturing the opponent‘s King counts as winning the game in the context 
of playing chess‖.  Winning the game of chess is based on the constitutive rules of the 
game just as being bound by an Ought is based on the constitutive rules of promising. 
Also, just as establishing that one has won the game requires nothing more than a 
reference to the context and rules of chess, so establishing that one ought to do Z requires 
nothing more than a reference to the context and rules of promising.  Outside the context 
of the institutions of chess and of promising, there would be no way to establish that the 
game was won or that someone was bound by an Ought.  Because the Ought is based on 
constitutive rules, Genova concludes that it is derived from institutional facts rather than 
brute facts or, in other words, it is dependent on ambiguously-created rules.  He also 
concludes that, for this reason, it is impossible to evaluate whether the institution of 
promising is itself good or whether the Ought is brute.  Thus, Genova‘s concern is that, 
although it is possible to establish that ―Jones ought to pay Smith,‖ this does not establish 
that ―morally-speaking, Jones ought to pay Smith‖. 
Another of Searle‘s critics is K. Witkowski.  He claims that since Searle appeals 
to internal constitutive rules and derives the Ought from the institution of promising and 
the mere meaning of the term ‗promise‘, he is not able to derive a moral Ought. 
Witkowski further claims that only if one were able to morally evaluate the institution of 
promising from an exterior standpoint could one justify a conclusion which stated: ―Jones 
morally ought to pay Smith‖.  Witkowski asserts, 
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For a person to justify the acceptance of the entire institution of ‗promise- 
keeping‘ he must endorse the institution by appealing to some additional, 
‗external,‘ moral (and not merely constitutive) rule.  The ‗ought‘ in Searle‘s 
deduction does not have, to borrow an Austinian term, the ‗force‘ of an ‗ought‘ 
when intended as a moral prescription.  …the obligation incurred by the act of 
promising—is not necessarily connected with morality (at all, I might add).93 
In supporting his claim, Witkowski points out that Searle fully acknowledges that 
―…whether the obligation undertaken in promising is good or evil… are questions 
external to the institution itself.‖94    He likewise points out that Searle himself admits that 
it would be possible for someone to object to the whole institution of promising without 
the Ought thereby being nullified.  In other words, according to Searle, even if someone 
were to object to the institution of promising from an external point of view, the 
derivation would nevertheless be binding in the sense that it would still be the case that 
Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.
95   
According to Witkowski, given that Searle‘s 
derivation works irrespective of whether or not the institution of promising is moral, it 
does not provide a moral Ought.
96
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4.  Searle‟s Derivation and Natural Law Theory 
 
It would seem that Searle‘s derivation would have nothing to offer a natural law 
theorist given that the Ought is not-- or at least does not appear to be-- moral and 
categorical.  Moreover, it would seem that since it is based on the institution of promising 
rather than facts about human nature, it would again have nothing to offer.  Since natural 
law seeks to ground moral obligation in human nature-- rather than the meaning of terms 
or internal constitutive rules of institutions such as promising-- and since it utilizes a 
categorical and moral Ought, Searle‘s derivation would seem to be thoroughly irrelevant. 
In short, there are numerous characteristics of Searle‘s derivation that would seem to be 
at odds with the Ought of natural law theory:  the Ought is not moral, categorical, 
determinate, or egalitarian, and it stems from the meaning of the term ‗promise‘, facts 
about the institution of promising, and speech acts rather than from human nature. 
In spite of these characteristics, however, it has been argued by E. Wall that 
Searle‘s derivation does have something to offer.  He claims that, just as Searle is able to 
derive an Ought regarding keeping a promise from the very meaning of the term 
―promise‖, so too can natural law theorists-- so long as they also rely on facts about 
human nature and deal with values that are moral.  In the course of doing so, he also 
objects to the claims of both Witkowski and Genova that Searle‘s Ought cannot be 
interpreted as moral. 
Wall‘s objection to Witkowski is that the distinction made between internal and 
external evaluation is faulty.  According to Wall, Witkowski fails to establish that moral 
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evaluation can only take place from an external point of view, that is, he fails to establish 
that it is impossible to evaluate institutional values from within the context of the 
institution itself.
97   
If we assume that some values are self-evidently or intrinsically 
valuable in a moral sense, it would be possible to accept or reject them on moral grounds 
without stepping outside the institution itself.  For example, if it is the case that we can 
accept promising as intrinsically and morally valuable, without stepping outside the 
institution of promising, then it would be possible to claim that Jones morally ought to 
pay Smith. Otherwise stated, if promising is accepted at the outset as entailing a moral 
value, then the conclusion can also be accepted as moral. 
Wall‘s objection to Genova‘s position is similar. He argues that Genova fails to 
realize that institutional values such as winning a game of baseball or chess are different 
from values such as keeping promises.
98   
It is obvious that a moral Ought could not be 
derived from rules regarding chess since there is nothing in the notion of winning a chess 
game that entails a moral value.  However, since the very notion of keeping a promise 
seems to be morally-charged, the Ought-conclusion which is derived from it would 
likewise seem to entail a moral value.  Wall also objects to Genova‘s position on the 
grounds that, like Witkowski, he assumes that it is not possible to evaluate the institution 
of promising without doing so from an external point of view.  Wall states, 
if there is a meaning of ‗ought,‘ which is to be explained in terms similar to 
Genova‘s institutional ought, that would not preclude, based on certain moral 
approaches, the term being morally charged.  …according to some moral 
approaches, promising, or some aspect(s) of it, can be intrinsically valuable, and 
thus a derived obligation to fulfill a promise could be a moral obligation.
99
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Here Wall is claiming that, at least within the context of ethical theories such as 
contractarianism and natural law theory, the obligation to fulfill a promise entails a moral 
value and obligation.  He is also pointing out that, within the context of such ethical 
theories, it would be absurd to claim that keeping one‘s promise is only of value given 
the meaning of the term ―promise‖ and the rules of the institution of promising. 
 
According to Searle, Witkowski, and Genova, keeping a promise (like winning a game of 
baseball) entails a value only in so far as they are in accord with institutional rules and 
irrespective of question concerning morality.  Wall‘s point is that, since keeping a 
promise (unlike winning a game of baseball) may be accepted as valuable in itself, rather 
than merely valuable in reference to constitutive rules, it may be possible to accept it also 
as morally valuable. 
After voicing his objections to Witkowski and Genova, Wall proposes two 
derivations which—although very vague—echo Searle‘s and which Wall claims can be 
accepted and imitated by natural law theorists. His first derivation begins with the 
definition and notion of friendship.  Wall notes that natural law theorists Grisez and Shaw 
identify friendship with harmony and peace between individuals and that Finnis similarly 
identifies friendship with sociability and ―acting for the sake of the purposes and well- 
being of the other individual(s).‖
100   
With this notion of friendship as a starting point, 
Wall asserts that friendship is, by definition, ―pursuing peace and harmony in [one‘s] 
relations with others.‖101   He also asserts that this definition, together with descriptions of 
human nature and constitutive rules, can be used to derive a conclusion regarding a moral 
 
100  
Wall, 246; Wall cites Finnis, NLNR, 88. 
 
101  
Wall, 247. 
53 
 
 
duty to place a friend‘s interest above the interests of others.  The premises would consist 
of purely factual statements regarding human nature (such as statements regarding 
biology and sociability), factual statements regarding friendship (including the definition 
of friendship), and possibly a ceteris paribus clause.  The conclusion would consist of a 
moral Ought. 
Wall‘s second derivation begins with the definition of knowledge as ―justified 
true belief.‖  Wall states, 
…if ‗knowledge‘ is to be defined in terms of justified true belief, we might also 
observe that, included in the very meaning of the institutional fact of ‗knowledge,‘ 
is the obligation to pursue truth and avoid undermining knowledge.  After all, if 
one is not seeing truth in the type of investigation in question, or if one is not 
attending to the justification of the belief under examination, then one is not 
seeking knowledge.  The conclusion that one has an obligation to pursue the truth 
would follow from a meaning rule within a system of constitutive rules, which 
would include rules related to basic human capabilities and inclinations.
102
 
 
Like the first derivation, Wall asserts that this derivation proceeds by way of a definition, 
a system of constitutive rules or institutional facts, and factual statements regarding 
human nature.  As with the first derivation, Wall does not say what the precise premises 
would be, but he clearly thinks that the conclusion would include a moral obligation to 
pursue truth and avoid undermining the attainment of knowledge.
103
 
Although Wall‘s position is insightful, there are several difficulties inherent in it. 
First, he is very vague regarding how the moral Ought-conclusions are reached.  He 
specifies what types of premises would be included but he does not provide a specific 
example for either of his derivations.  This makes it difficult to assess adequately the 
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usefulness of his approach.  This, of course, does not mean that his argument is 
necessarily faulty, but it does mean that it would need to be supplemented. 
Second, it could be argued that merely adding statements about human nature to a 
derivation like Searle‘s is not sufficient since one of the main claims of natural law is that 
the Ought has a grounding in human nature.  The sine qua non of Searle‘s Ought is the 
meaning of the term ―promise‖.  All that is necessary for the Ought-derivation is a 
definition of the term ―promise‖ and an empirical premise stating that someone has made 
a promise.  The Ought, therefore, can be said to be derived from the definition of 
―promise‖.   If natural law theorists wish to imitate Searle‘s argument, they will need to 
do more than merely add statements about human nature to the premises.  They will need 
to establish that the Ought-conclusion cannot be reached without those statements or, 
more specifically, they will need to establish that the statements regarding human nature 
are essential to the Ought-conclusion.
104
 
Third, if a derivation such as Searle‘s is to be imitated by natural law theorists, 
 
they will need to establish that the Ought is moral, egalitarian (in the sense that it is has 
some bearing on the common good), and categorical.  Since Searle‘s derivation is lacking 
in regard to fulfilling the criteria of being moral and categorical, and since it is 
underspecified in regard to being egalitarian, it is not clear how Searle‘s derivation could 
be used as a model. 
In order to make the gravity of some of these difficulties more apparent, it may be 
 
helpful to consider the following attempted imitation of Searle: 
 
 
 
104  
For example, if an ethicist did nothing more than add statements regarding human nature to 
Searle‘s derivation, the Ought-conclusion would not ipso facto have a grounding in human 
nature.  Only if the statement regarding human nature is a necessary component of the derivation 
can the Ought be said to have a grounding in human nature. 
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(1) Jones uttered the words, ―I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars.‖ 
(1a) Under certain conditions C anyone who utters the words (sentence) ―I 
hereby promise to pay you, Smith five dollars‖ promises to pay Smith five 
dollars. 
(1b) Conditions C obtain. 
 
(2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars. 
 
(2a) All promises are acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an obligation 
to do the thing promised. 
(3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. 
(3a) All those who place themselves under an obligation are (at the time when 
they so place themselves) under an obligation. 
(4)  Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. 
(4a)  If one is under an obligation to do something, then as regards that 
obligation one ought to do what one is under an obligation to do. 
(5) As regards his obligation to pay Smith five dollars, Jones ought to pay Smith five 
dollars.
105
 
(6) Humans in fact value promise-keeping and do not value the breaking of promises 
(as is evident by the fact that they dislike it when someone breaks a promise that 
was made to them).
106
 
(6a) If humans value promise-keeping, promise-keeping is morally-charged. 
 
(7) Promise-keeping is morally-charged. 
 
 
 
 
105  
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(7a) If Jones does not pay Smith five dollars, he will have failed to keep his 
promise. 
(8) Therefore, Jones morally ought to pay Smith five dollars. 
 
 
 
This derivation imitates Searle‘s at the outset and, insofar as it specifies that promise- 
keeping is morally-charged and includes a statement regarding human nature, it also 
differs from it in the ways prescribed by Wall.  Nevertheless, it is faulty in two respects. 
First, merely adding a premise about the morally-charged nature of promise-keeping does 
not in itself enable one to derive a moral Ought in a valid manner.  Even if we assume 
that premise (7) is true, it would not enable us to derive the conclusion that Jones 
necessarily morally ought to pay Smith five dollars.   Although many natural law 
theorists may admit that promise-keeping has moral connotations, it does not follow that 
they thereby also must hold that all promises morally ought to be fulfilled. Presumably, 
no natural law theorist who held that promise-keeping is morally-charged would also 
maintain that a man who promised to kill his wife morally ought to fulfill that promise. 
Second, merely adding a premise that contains a statement about human nature does not, 
in itself, mean that the Ought has a grounding in human nature.  Only if the statement 
about human nature has some essential place in the derivation, can the Ought-conclusion 
be said to have a genuine grounding in human nature. 
In response to these difficulties, the following counter-example could be 
proposed: 
(1) Jones uttered the words, ―I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars.‖ 
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(1a) Under certain conditions C anyone who utters the words (sentence) ―I 
hereby promise to pay you, Smith five dollars‖ promises to pay Smith five 
dollars. 
(1b) Conditions C obtain. 
 
(2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars. 
 
(2a) All promises are acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an obligation 
to do the thing promised. 
(3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. 
(3a) All those who place themselves under an obligation are (at the time when 
they so place themselves) under an obligation. 
(4)  Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. 
(4a)  If one is under an obligation to do something, then as regards that 
obligation one ought to do what one is under an obligation to do. 
(5) As regards his obligation to pay Smith five dollars, Jones ought to pay Smith five 
dollars. 
(6) Humans are inclined to pursue knowledge of the truth (as is evident by the fact 
that humans dislike being lied to and frequently strive to overcome their 
ignorance regarding many things). 
(7) By definition, good is that which humans are inclined toward; and, by definition, 
evil is that which is contrary to good.
107
 
(8) Failing to keep a promise is an act which is contrary to the pursuit of knowledge 
 
(and, as such, is contrary to the good) 
 
(9) Good (morally) ought to be done and evil (morally) ought to be avoided. 
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(10) If Jones does not pay Smith five dollars, he will have engaged in an act which is 
contrary to the pursuit of knowledge. 
(11) Therefore, Jones morally ought to pay Smith five dollars. 
 
This derivation would seem to avoid the difficulties inherent in the one above.  It contains 
a statement about human nature and this statement is an essential premise in the 
argument.  Likewise, assuming that premise (9) is true, it also enables us to derive a valid 
moral-Ought.  Nevertheless, it has a difficulty of its own, and a rather blatant one, viz., it 
is not a counterexample at all since premise (9) contains a moral ought.  In other words, it 
is not a derivation of an Ought from an Is but, rather, and Ought from a moral Good. 
Although this may be a means of bypassing the IOP which can be utilized by natural law 
theorists, it is not, as such, a counter-example. 
If natural law theorists are to solve the real IOP by means of a counterexample, 
then, they will need to find some means other than attempting to derive an Ought from 
mere speech acts.  In the next section, we will look at the question of whether Gewirth‘s 
counterexample might provide a better model for natural law theorists. 
 
 
B.  Gewirth‟s Counterexample 
 
The very purpose of Gewirth‘s article ―The Is-Ought Problem Resolved‖ is to 
establish that it is possible to derive a prescriptive, moral, egalitarian, determinate, and 
categorical Ought from descriptive premises.  If his derivation is successful on its own 
terms and if, in addition, it is sound and the premises are relevant to the Ought- 
conclusion, it might be a more useful model for natural law theorists.  In this section, I 
will provide a synopsis of his derivation, a discussion of why it seems to pertain to all the 
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aspects of the real IOP, and an account of why—in spite of possible arguments to the 
contrary—it seems that natural law theorists can utilize his derivation as a model. 
 
1.  A Synopsis of Gewirth‟s Derivation 
 
Gewirth‘s derivation proceeds from an analysis of basic features of human action 
and from the standpoint of the moral agent.
108   
Unlike Searle, Gewirth does not rely on 
institutional facts or speech acts and he claims that the Ought derived pertains to any 
sufficiently rational agent.
109    
The four steps of his derivation are as follows. 
In step one, Gewirth comments on the fact when we act, we do so for a purpose. 
From the perspective of the moral agent, doing X for purpose P entails that both X and P 
are good in at least some sense.  The very fact that the agent sees P as worthy of pursuit 
implies that P is of value to the agent.  It also implies that the agent sees X as being of 
value insofar it is the means of attaining P.  Gewirth admits that although X and P are not 
necessarily seen by the agent as morally valuable, the very fact that they are seen as 
worthy of pursuit implies that they are of value and therefore good in at least an 
instrumental sense.
110   
Since a moral agent would not choose to act if she did not see the 
 
goal of her action as worthy of pursuit, Gewirth concludes that it is a fundamental feature 
 
 
 
108  
IOPR, 46 and 52. 
 
109  
IOPR, 49-50. 
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IOPR, 51.  See also, Gewirth, Alan, ―The Normative Structure of Action,‖ in The Review of 
Metaphysics, 25 (Dec. 1971), 242. (Hereafter abbreviated as NSA.)  Here Gewirth states: ―…the 
agent… controls or directs his action for the sake of something he wants. And so long as  this 
wanting is not a case of forced choice in the sense mentioned above, it constitutes a valuing on 
the part of the agent so that, to this extent, he regards the object of his action as good, whatever be 
his further beliefs about the conformity of his action to moral, legal, or even prudential criteria. In 
such cases, the agent‘s judgment of the goodness of his immediate purpose is accompanied by 
further judgments of the badness of his action on some other criterion.‖ 
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of action that a free agent de facto sees the goal of action as being of value.  Furthermore, 
he concludes that, from the perspective of the agent, the Fact-Value distinction is already 
bridged at this point even though the Is-Ought gap is not.
111   
In other words, it is a fact 
that the agent sees the goal of her action as valuable even through she may not see it as 
morally obligatory. 
Before proceeding to step two, Gewirth adds that since the agent sees X and P  as 
being of value, and since freedom and basic well-being are necessary if she is to pursue P 
by means of X, the agent thereby also grasps that her freedom and basic well-being are 
good.
112   
Since this grasp of the goodness of freedom and well-being must be grasped by 
any rational and conscious agent, it is a necessary—rather than ―contingent or variable‖—
aspect of human action.  In other words, any agent who engages in purposive action de 
facto must realize that her freedom and basic well-being are goods.  By proceeding in this 
way, Gewirth avoids basing step one on a contingent or variable desire of the agent and 
thereby is able to claim that his derivation is categorical. 
In step two, Gewirth introduces justificatory and rights claims which he says are 
 
self-evident and follow from step one.
113   
Gewirth states: 
 
 
 
 
111  
Incidentally, Gewirth also claims that this approach bypasses the open-question argument of 
G.E. Moore.  Gewirth asserts: ―…the position here upheld bears on the relation between purpose, 
valuing or wanting and seeming good to the agent, not being good. This position is hence not 
subject to attack from the usual version of the ‗open question‘ test: even if x is someone‘s 
purpose, something he wants or values, it still makes sense to ask whether x is good.  For the test 
to apply here, it would have to make sense to ask whether x seems good to the person whose 
purpose it is.‖  NSA, 243 
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In explicating what he means by well-being, Gewirth states that it ―comprises certain physical 
and psychological dispositions ranging from life and physical integrity to a feeling of confidence 
as to the general possibility of attaining one‘s goals.‖ IOPR, 52. 
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IOPR, 52-53. 
61 
 
 
…since every agent regards as basic goods the freedom and basic well-being 
which are the proximate necessary conditions of his acting for the achievement of 
any of his purposes, and since the criterion of claiming justifications and rights, so 
far as the agent is concerned, consists in the first instance in such proximate 
necessary conditions, it follows that any agent must claim, at least implicitly, that 
he has a right to freedom and basic well-being.
114
 
 
In regard to the rights claim, the argument here is that in order for an agent to have a right 
to Y, she must grasp Y as something that is either directly or indirectly good and as 
something which is a basic good insofar as it is required for the pursuit of any other 
goods whatsoever.
115   
Since any rational human agent must at least implicitly recognize 
 
that her freedom and well-being are good and necessary for the pursuit of anything else 
that she sees as good, it follows—according to Gewirth—that she thereby grasps that she 
has a right to freedom and basic well-being.
116   
In regard to the justificatory claim, the 
argument here is that when the agent grasps Y as a good that is necessary for the pursuit 
of any other good, she has a justification (i.e., rationale) for pursuing or seeking to 
preserve Y.
117   
For example, provided that Jones recognizes that his freedom is a good 
that is necessary for the pursuit of other goods, he will have a rationale for seeking to 
preserve his freedom; and he will also recognize that he has a right to freedom and well- 
being. Even if other agents do not in fact recognize Jones‘s right, it would nevertheless be 
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By ―freedom‖, Gewirth means freedom from interferance.  Any agent who pursues something 
he sees as good must at least implicitly grasp that it is in some sense good not to have others 
interfere with the pursuit of that good. 
 
117  
Cf.: NSA, 244-248.  Gewirth uses the term ―justified‖ in the sense of ―having a rationale,‖ 
rather than in the sense of ―being morally justified.‖ 
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the case that Jones himself would believe that he has a right to freedom and that others 
ought to avoid interfering with his pursuit of what he values.
118
 
In step two Gewirth claims he is able to derive a normative Ought since, ―the 
normative concept of having a right either already is, or is directly translatable into, a 
deontic concept.‖119   It is important to realize, however, that he does not claim to have 
derived a moral Ought at this point. This is because his notion of rights is very broad and 
encompasses non-moral obligations such as obligations that stem from mere prudential 
judgments.  Since Gewirth claims that the notion of rights can be employed ―in 
connection with many kinds of justificatory criteria other than moral and legal ones,‖ in 
step two he only claims to have derived a generic Ought.
120
 
In step three, Gewirth continues to proceed from the perspective of the moral 
agent and attempts to generalize the rights claim of the preceding step so that it applies to 
all persons.  In so doing, he relies on the logical Principle of Universalizability which 
reads:  If some predicate P belongs to some subject S because S has the property Q 
(where the „because‟ is that of sufficient reason or condition), then P must also belong to 
all other subjects… which have Q.121   Gewirth points out that rational agents realize that 
they have a right to freedom and well-being precisely because they also realize that (i) 
they are prospective agents who have purposes they want to fulfill and (ii) they cannot 
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Cf.: Gewirth, Alan, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 71-73. 
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IOPR, 54. 
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Gewirth, Reason and Morality, 69. Gewirth asserts that non-moral contexts in which the notion of rights 
can be utilized include prudential, aesthetic, logical and legal ones. 
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IOPR, 54.  Although Gewirth does not assert that his principle is self-evident there is no 
reason to suppose that it is not. 
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fulfill these purposes if they do not have the requisite freedom and well-being.
122 
Gewirth 
then points out that any rational agent who employs the principle of universalizability, 
will be left having to conclude that other persons also have a right to freedom and well 
being. In short, any rational agent will be left with the following thoughts: I have a right 
to freedom and basic-well-being precisely because (i) I act for purposes that I regard as 
good and (ii) freedom and basic well-being are necessary in pursuing these purposes. 
Since others also act for purposes that they regard as good and since freedom and basic 
well-being are necessary if they are to act for those purposes, they too must have a right 
to freedom and basic well-being.  Gewirth concludes, therefore, that any rational agent 
must—on pain of contradiction—admit that others have the same rights. 
Finally, in step four, Gewirth derives moral Oughts which oblige the agent both to 
avoid inflicting harm on other agents and to preserve the well-being of such agents. 
Gewirth states: 
…since the agent logically had to admit [in step three] that ‗All prospective 
purposive agents have a right to freedom and basic well-being,‘ he must also 
logically accept the ‗ought‘-judgment, ‗I ought to refrain from interfering with the 
freedom and basic well-being of all prospective purposive agents,‘…. 123 
In this step, Gewirth links the rights-claim regarding other agents, which are derived in 
step three, to moral Oughts which follow from those claims.  Since in step three the 
rational agent realizes that others have the same right to freedom and well-being as she 
herself does, and since she also realizes that—in accordance with her own rights—others 
have a duty to refrain from interfering with her freedom and well-being, she must 
conclude that she too has a duty to refrain from interfering with the freedom and well- 
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IOPR, 55. 
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IOPR, 57. 
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being of others.  Thus, in this step, two duties or moral Oughts are derived.  First, the 
agent has a ―negative duty not to inflict serious gratuitous harm on other persons.‖ 
Second, the agent has a ―positive duty to perform such actions as rescuing drowning 
persons or feeding starving persons, especially when this can be done at relatively little 
cost….‖124 
 
2. The Characteristics of the Ought Derived in Gewirth‟s Counterexample 
 
Before looking at the question regarding whether Gewirth‘s derivation can be 
imitated by natural law theorists it will be helpful first to consider whether he has 
provided a counter-example in which a moral, prescriptive, determinate, categorical, and 
egalitarian Oughts have been derived. 
In explicating his counter-example and establishing that the Oughts derived have 
all of these characteristics, Gewirth notes that this derivation can be expressed by the 
Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) which reads: Apply to your recipient the same 
generic features of action that you apply to yourself.
125   
Since this Principle requires 
equal distribution of basic rights, Gewirth is able to claim that the Ought-statements 
which are derived from it are egalitarian.  Since Gewirth defines moral Oughts as ones 
that ―take positive account of the interests of other persons as well as the agent or 
speaker, especially as regards the distribution of what is considered to be basic well- 
being,‖ he is able to claim that the Oughts derived from the PGC are moral.126   Since 
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moral Oughts seek to guide actions, he is also able to conclude that these Ought derived 
is prescriptive.
127   
Moreover, since the positive and negative duties derived in step four 
rule out coercion and harm, and since it would not be possible to derive the contrary, he 
is able to conclude that the Oughts are determinate. 
In establishing that the Oughts are categorical, Gewirth admits that—at first 
blush—the Oughts in this derivation may appear to be dialectical rather than categorical 
since they are derived by proceeding from the point of view of the agent.  It would seem, 
in other words, that the Oughts would only apply if a particular agent proceeded through 
the dialectical exercise of thinking through each of the above steps in the way explicated 
and—even then—they would only apply to that particular agent rather than absolutely.
128
 
 
Gewirth responds to this seeming difficulty in two ways.  First, he argues that the 
reasoning involved in the above steps necessarily applies to all rational agents on pain of 
contradiction.  Since the reasoning involved is reasoning which any rational acting person 
must accept, and since moral Oughts only apply within the context of rational acting 
persons, the Oughts are categorical.  Although it is true that the moral Oughts would not 
apply to non-rational individuals or individuals who are not capable of action, this is of 
no consequence since, in order for Oughts to be categorical, it is sufficient that they apply 
only to all rational agents.  Second, he points out that the moral Oughts are categorical 
insofar as they ―cannot be removed or evaded by variable, escapable features….‖129   In 
short, since the reasoning involved in deriving the moral Oughts is not escapable but is 
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based on generic features of all rational action, the Oughts again must be categorized as 
categorical. 
 
3.  Gewirth‟s Derivation and Natural Law Theory 
 
Assuming that a moral Ought-conclusion is successfully derived from Is-premises 
in the above steps, we are still left with the question as to whether this derivation—at 
least in part—can be imitated by natural law theorists.
130   
Although it would be 
 
impossible to definitively answer this question given the limits of this dissertation, I will 
look at two reasons why it might be argued that it cannot be so imitated and then provide 
a response.  In this response I will attempt to show that natural law theory and Gewirth‘s 
approach have more in common than is evident.  Subsequently, I will discuss the specific 
differences and similarities between Gewirth‘s approach and what a natural law approach 
would require. 
First, then, it could be argued that Gewirth‘s derivation is far too Kantian to be 
useful to natural law theorists since the Ought does not explicitly stem from facts about 
human nature but rather from the principle that one ought to avoid contradicting oneself. 
More specifically, Gewirth appears to derive the moral Ought by relying on logic alone 
rather than facts about human nature.   To make this more evident it will be helpful to 
consider his own summary of his derivation at some length.  He states: 
A crucial move in my argument for the PGC is the step from (3) ‗My freedom and 
well-being are necessary goods,‘ to a right-claim that logically must be made or 
accepted by every agent.  This step is accomplished as follows.  First, I argue that 
by virtue of accepting (3), every agent has to accept (4) ‗I must have freedom and 
well-being.‘ This ‗must‘ is practical-prescriptive in that it signifies the agent‘s 
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Many criticisms leveled against Gewirth and his response to them can be found in: Gewirth‟s 
Ethical Rationalism, edited by Edward Regis Jr., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). 
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advocacy of this having what he needs in order to act either at all or with general 
chances of success in achieving he purposes for which he acts.  Now by virtue of 
accepting (4), every agent has to accept (5) ‗I have rights to freedom and well- 
being.‘  For, if he denies (5), then, because of the logical correlativity of claim- 
rights and strict ‗oughts,‘ he also has to deny (6) ‗All other persons ought at least 
to refrain from removing or interfering with my freedom and well-being.‘  By 
denying (6), he has to accept (7) ‗Other persons may… remove or interfere with 
my freedom and well-being.‘  And by accepting (7) he has to accept (8) ‗I may 
not … have freedom and well-being.‘  But (8) contradicts (4).  Since every agent 
must accept (4), he must reject (8).  And since (8) follows from the denial of (5), 
every agent must reject that denial, so that he must accept (5) ‗I have rights to 
freedom and well-being.
131
 
 
If one asked Gewirth why the agent should believe that others have rights and, hence, why 
the agent ought to avoid inflicting harm on anyone, his response would have to be 
something like, ―Because if the agent did otherwise, she would fall into a logical 
contradiction and this is something she ought to avoid doing.‖  For this reason it seems 
that the Ought in Gewirth‘s derivation is not based on facts about human nature but rather 
on the logical principle that one ought to avoid contradicting oneself. 
In a similar vein, it could be argued that Gewirth‘s derivation is not grounded in 
facts about human nature but in the notion of rights.  This is evident since Gewirth clearly 
admits that it is his notion of rights that enables him to bridge the Is-Ought gap. 
Commenting on the second step in which he introduces the notion of rights, he says ―this 
second step is, of course, crucial for the ‗is-ought‘ derivation, since the normative 
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Gewirth, Allen, ―Replies to My Critics,‖ in Gewirth‟s Ethical Rationalism, edited by Edward 
Regis Jr., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 205-206.  Emphasis mine.  See also 
Reason and Morality, 157: ―… the logical transition from (2) [‗Every agent ought to act in accord 
with the generic rights of his recipients as well as of himself‘] to (3) [‗Every agent ought to act in 
accord with the generic rights of his recipients as well as of himself‘] is obvious, given the 
premise that agents ought to do what they logically must accept that they ought to do. This 
premise is also obvious; for what stronger ground can be given for someone‘s having a duty than 
that he logically must accept that he has the duty. For since he logically must accept that he has 
the duty, he contradicts himself if he denies that he has the duty.  And from this it follows that he 
necessarily has the duty…‖  Emphasis mine.  Paul Allen criticizes Gewirth for relying on the 
premise that ―agents ought to do what they logically must accept that they ought to do.‖   See 
Paul Allen III―A Critique of Gewirths‘s ‗Is-Ought‘ Derivation‖ in Ethics, 92 (Jan., 1982), 222. 
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concept of having a right either already is, or is directly translatable into, a deontic 
concept.‖132   Although some natural law theorists introduce the notion of rights in their 
theories of natural law, the Ought is not grounded in rights but, rather, in human nature. 
Their arguments are not that rights provide a grounding for the Ought but that the 
Ought—which is grounded in some way in human nature—provides a grounding for 
natural rights.  Moreover, even if natural law theorists were to use a notion of rights to 
ground the Ought, they would still need to demonstrate that the Ought had a grounding in 
human nature as well.  A derivation that did not have a grounding in human nature could 
not properly be categorized as a natural law derivation.  Since Gewirth‘s derivation seems 
to lack this grounding, it is not clear that natural law theorists could imitate it without 
first substantially revising it. 
In response to these arguments it is necessary to consider whether it is accurate to 
claim that Gewirth‘s Ought has no grounding in human nature.  If it can be shown that it 
has at least an implicit grounding in human nature, this would nullify the force of both of 
the above arguments.  More specifically, although Gewirth‘s derivation utilizes both a 
notion of rights and the implicit principle one ought to avoid contradicting oneself, so 
long as it also has at least some ontological and epistemological grounding in human 
nature, it could successfully be imitated by natural law theorists. 
Given that Gewirth utilizes generic features of human action as a starting point for 
 
his derivation, and given that human action is an aspect of human nature, his derivation 
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has an implicit ontological grounding in human nature.
133   
In step one, he proceeds by 
considering the fact that all rational human agents de facto value both that which they 
pursue and the means by which they attain it.  He begins not with principles or a notion 
of rights but with a fact about human agency.  Even though he proceeds from within the 
perspective of the agent herself, he nevertheless implicitly begins with a fact about 
human nature.  Moreover, even though he relies on explicit and implicit principles, as 
well as a notion of rights, the derivation begins with the fact that human agents value that 
which they pursue and the means by which they pursue it.  Thus, the Ought has an 
ontological grounding in human nature and the only way to argue that it does not would 
be to argue that one‘s own experience of being a human agent has no relation to one‘s 
nature as a human being. 
In addition, Gewirth‘s derivation also has an implicit epistemic grounding in 
human nature insofar as the agent‘s knowledge of her own nature as a human agent is the 
starting point.  It is not sufficient for the agent to have knowledge of the various 
principles utilized in the derivation and an understanding of Gewirth‘s notion of rights, 
she must—before all else—have an understanding that she—as a human agent—values 
that which she pursues.  Since, knowledge of one‘s own human nature ultimately enables 
one to have knowledge about what she ought to do, the Ought-conclusion of Geiwrth‘s 
derivation can be said to have an epistemic grounding in human nature. 
Since it is not an essential claim of natural law theory that the Ought has a 
 
grounding only in facts about human nature--or that it can have no grounding whatsoever 
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―human nature is the necessary condition of human action….‖ 
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in self-evident principles, a broad notion of rights, or generic features of human action-- 
there is no reason to conclude that Gewirth‘s derivation cannot be imitated by natural law 
theorists.
134   
In order to successfully establish that Gewirth‘s derivation cannot be 
imitated by natural law theorists, one would have to show either that Gewirth‘s Ought- 
 
conclusion has no ontological and epistemic grounding in human nature or that it is an 
essential tenet of natural law theory that the Ought can only be grounded in facts about 
human nature.  And it is far from clear that this can be done. 
To be sure, since Gewirth does not suscribe to all the claims of natural law theory, 
he cannot properly be categorized as a natural law theorist.  Unlike natural law theorists, 
he does not claim that human law must participate in or be congruent with natural law in 
order to be authentic and binding; nor does he claim that acting in accord with what one 
ought to do leads to flourishing.
135   
He clearly lacks both the jurisprudential and the 
sanctions claims discussed in Chapter One.  Nevertheless, given that there is nothing in 
his derivation that is antithetical to these claims, this lack would not preclude the 
possibility that his derivation could be imitated by natural law theorists. 
In principle, then, it would be possible for natural law theorists to imitate 
Gewirth‘s derivation by imitating his methodology of starting from the perspective of the 
agent and relying on self-evident principles.  Upon deriving a robust Ought, the natural 
law theorist could then discuss the relation of the Ought to human law and also discuss 
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If it is asserted that the Ought of natural law theory can have a grounding only in facts about 
human nature, then it would follow that Aquinas is not a natural law theorist since he relies not 
merely on such facts but also on the self-evident principle ―Good ought to be done and evil ought 
to be avoided‖.  See ST I-II, 94, 2. 
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the sanctions claim.  Since the jurisprudential and sanctions claims do not pertain to the 
grounding of Ought itself but merely to how it relates to human law and flourishing, there 
is no reason to suppose that these aspects of natural law would need to play an explicit 
role in the derivation itself.  These claims could be tacked on, as it were, after 
establishing that the Ought of natural law need not fall prey to the IOP. 
 
 
 
 
In this Chapter we have seen why it would be a formidable task for natural law 
theorists to imitate a derivation such as Searle‘s.  Searle‘s derivation is based on 
institutional facts and proceeds by way of speech acts and definitions.  As a result, the 
Ought which is derived cannot be said to have a grounding in human nature.  In this 
Chapter, we have also seen that it would be possible for natural law theorists to imitate 
Gewirth‘s methodology in order to derive a robust Ought which has an ontological and 
epistemological grounding in human nature and which avoids the IOP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 
…we call complete without qualification that which is always 
desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. 
Now such a thing happiness, above all else, 
is held to be; for this we choose always for itself 
and never for the sake of something else. 
 
Aristotle
136
 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapter shows that it is possible to solve the IOP by starting from 
the perspective of the agent.  But it does not adequately consider whether doing so is 
consistent with the claims of natural law; nor does it adequately consider the methods 
actually utilized by natural law theorists.  In the first section of this Chapter we will 
consider a method utilized by numerous natural law theorists which entails beginning 
with the desires of the agent in order to arrive at an Ought.  In the second section we will 
consider whether or not this method can be used to derive a moral, prescriptive, 
determinate, categorical, and egalitarian Ought.  It is important to note that this approach 
is not meant to be an attempt at providing a counterexample; it is merely meant to 
provide a route to epistemically and ontologically grounding an Ought in facts about 
human nature.
137   
I will ultimately argue that it can but only within certain parameters and 
 
if certain assumptions are made. 
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In other words, the question addressed in this chapter is not whether a counterexample can be 
provided—in which all the premises are non-Ought statements and the conclusion is an Ought- 
statement.  The question addressed, rather, is whether it is possible to ground an Ought in facts 
about human nature without doing so invalidly. 
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A.  The Method Used 
One of the most common approaches taken by natural law theorists in attempting 
to establish that a specific type of act is-- or is not-- in accord with natural law is to begin 
with the desires of the agent and then provide statistics in order to establish that the act 
fulfills-- or fails to fulfill--those desires. In taking this approach it is implicitly, and 
sometimes explicitly, argued that acts that lead to human flourishing are in accord with 
human nature, and therefore ought to be pursued, and acts that lead to the contrary are not 
in accordance with human nature and therefore ought to be avoided. Although this 
approach is frequently utilized by natural lawyers, little has been said about whether it 
avoids the IOP.  To my knowledge this method has never been proposed as a means of 
surmounting the IOP but it is worth exploring whether it could be, especially since it is so 
commonly utilized. It would seem that this approach could be a path toward combining 
Gewirth‘s approach of beginning from the perspective of the agent with the natural law 
claim that the Ought has a grounding in human nature. 
One of the clearest examples of this approach is found in the work of J. Smith.
138
 
Although it is by no means the only approach she takes in attempting to establish that 
certain acts ought to be avoided, it is certainly one of the approaches she takes.
139    
In 
―Humanae Vitae a Generation Later,‖ for example, Smith claims that there is a moral 
difference between using natural family planning (NFP) and artificial contraception, and 
that couples ought to avoid using artificial contraception.
140   
In the course of attempting 
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I am focusing on the work of J. Smith because it is a very clear example of this type of 
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to substantiate these claims, she points out the following: (1) the divorce rate among 
couples who use artificial contraception is over 50 percent whereas divorce is extremely 
rare for couples who use NFP; (2) there is evidence that the increase in the divorce rate in 
the mid-seventies can be attributed to the use of contraception; (3) the use of NFP can 
lead to an improvement of communication between married couples; (4) the use of NFP 
can lead to an increase in respect for women and a lowering in objectification of women; 
(5) the self-mastery gained by couples using NFP can lead to greater harmony in one‘s 
relationships both in and outside the home; and (6) when couples are motivated and well- 
informed, NFP is as effective as artificial contraception as a method of family planning. 
Smith also provides a testimonial of a woman who used various types of artificial 
contraception and found the results to be far less desirable than the results of using 
NFP.
141   
Smith‘s general assertion is: If you want to increase your chances of having  a 
 
long-lasting and healthy marriage, you ought to avoid using artificial contraception. 
 
Although Smith‘s derivation may seem to be consequentialist insofar as she 
focuses on the consequences of artificial contraception versus those of using NFP, she 
elsewhere asserts that ―[artificial] contraception is [not] wrong because it has bad 
consequences, but … because contraception is wrong, it will have bad consequences.‖142 
She likewise claims that artificial contraception is wrong because it violates the dignity of 
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the human person rather than merely because it has bad consequences.
143    
Assuming acts 
that violate the dignity of the human person can be equated with acts that damage or go 
against human nature, Smith‘s specific assertions can be formulated as follows: 
Contraception is wrong because it damages or goes against human nature.  Because it 
damages or goes against human nature, it leads to bad consequences.  If you want to 
avoid these bad consequences, you ought to avoid using it. 
These specific assertions can be understood as instantiations of both the 
ontological and sanctions claims of natural law theory, which were discussed in Chapter 
One.  They are instantiations of the former insofar as human nature is the grounding for 
the Ought; and they are instantiations of the latter insofar as it relies on the principle that 
acting contrary to the way one ought leads one away from flourishing.  If one were to ask 
―Why ought I to avoid artificial contraception?‖ the answer would be: ―Because doing so 
results in undesirable consequences.‖  In turn, if one were to ask ―Why does it have 
undesirable consequences,‖ the answer would be: ―Because it is contrary to your nature 
and, hence, it is damaging.‖ 
Smith‘s assertions would be analogous to the following:  Drinking arsenic is 
wrong because it damages or harms the physiological nature of the human person. 
Because it damages the physiological nature of the human person, it leads to undesirable 
consequences (such as pain and death).  If you want to avoid these undesirable 
consequences, you ought to avoid drinking arsenic.
144
 
 
 
 
143  
Ibid. 
 
144  
Another formulation is: Drinking arsenic leads to suffering and death. (This is a fact about 
human physiology.) Agents in fact desire to avoid suffering and death.  (This is a fact about 
human psychology.) When we say ―You ought to do X‖ we mean ―You will fulfill your desire or 
goal if you do X.‖ (This is a fact about the meaning of ―You ought to do X‖ rather than a 
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Although this approach relies on the hypothetical form if you want to avoid X, you 
ought to avoid Z—and is clearly hypothetical in a sense—there are ways in which this 
approach can be used to derive a categorical Ought.  Provided that X is something that all 
human agents want, the Ought which stems from X would pertain to all human agents.
145
 
Moreover, provided that the specific want did not pertain to variable features of agents 
but to wants that are ingrained in human nature, the Ought would not be hypothetical in 
the Gewirthian sense (i.e., it would not be based on variable features of agents).
146   
For 
example, if it is the case that all human agents want to flourish, and if this desire to 
flourish is not based on variable features of particular agents, the Ought which stems 
from the desire to flourish could be interpreted as categorical.  Moreover, if it is also the 
case that there are some actions that always lead away from flourishing and some that 
always foster flourishing, or that there are some actions that are necessary if one is to 
attain flourishing,
147  
the Ought could be interpreted as categorical for this reason as 
 
 
 
 
normative statement.) Therefore, agents ought to avoid drinking arsenic. (This is a normative 
Ought-conclusion.) 
 
145  
Cf. Grant, W. Matthews. ―The Naturalistic Fallacy and Natural Law Methodology.‖ In Truth Matters: 
Essays in Honor of Jacques Maritain, edited by John G. Trapani, Jr., 168-181. Washington, D.C.: CUA 
Press, 2004, 172-173. I am here assuming that the human agents in question are not seriously 
compromised, that is, they are not mentally handicapped, suffering from dementia, too young to engage in 
practical reasoning, unconscious, etc.  As discussed in Chapter One, an Ought can be categorical even 
though it may not be binding for persons who are incapacitated.  In order for an Ought to be categorical, it 
is sufficient that it pertain to those who are not compromised. 
 
146  
Gewirth denies that this method can be used to derive a categorical Ought.  However, his 
claim would only hold if the X stands for a want which is not common to all agents.  See: 
Gewirth, IOPR, 46. 
 
147  
For a discussion of the claim that some actions are necessary if one is to attain flourishing and 
are, hence, categorical or absolute see: Mary Hayden, ―Natural Inclinations and Moral Absolutes: 
A Mediated Correspondence for Aquinas,‖ in Proceedings of the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association 64 (1990), 130-150. 
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well.
148   
The full argument would then be:  X is wrong because it is contrary to human 
nature.
149   
Because X is contrary to human nature, it always leads to bad consequences, 
that is, it is inimical to human flourishing. If all agents desire to flourish, all agents ought 
to avoid X.
150   
All agents desire to flourish.  Therefore, all agents ought to avoid X.   And, 
of course, it could also be formulated as:  X is right because it is in accordance with 
human nature.  Because X is in accordance with human nature, it leads to good 
consequences, that is, it leads to flourishing.  If all agents desire to flourish, all agents 
ought to pursue X.  All agents desire to flourish. Therefore, all agents ought to pursue X. 
 
151 
 
One possible objection to these formulations might be that it does not derive an 
Ought from statements about human nature but, rather, from the notions of  ―right‖ and 
―good‖ which contain implicit Oughts.  If this is conceded, it would also have to be 
 
148  
One could argue that Smith‘s Ought-conclusion regarding the use of artificial contraception 
(which is provided above) would not be categorical since the statistics she provides do not prove 
that it is always the case that contraception has undesirable consequences but merely that it is 
often the case.  Nevertheless, provided that there are some actions that always lead away from 
long-term flourishing, it would be possible to derive categorical Oughts regarding such actions 
via this method of derivation.  It would also seem to be possible to derive a categorical Ought 
regarding actions that so frequently lead away from long-term flourishing that it would be 
unreasonable to take the risk.  For example, since using cocaine so frequently leads to addiction 
and, hence, to long term undesirable consequences, it could be argued—using this method of 
derivation—that agents have a categorical obligation to avoid using it even though it does not 
always lead to addiction. This issue overlaps with the question of whether this method of 
derivation can be used to derive a determinate Ought and will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
149  
In this context and in what follows, I will be assuming that acts that are inimical to human 
well-being are equivalent to acts that go against human nature. Just as pouring gasoline on plants 
is inimical to their well-being because it is contrary to the nature of plants to attain hydration 
through such a substance, so too, performing (or failing to perform) a certain act could be 
inimical to human well-being if it were contrary to human nature. 
 
150  
It is at this point in the argument that the hypothetical Ought is derived.  It is in the remaining 
statements where a specifically categorical Ought is derived. 
 
151  
To say that agents Ought to do X is another way of saying that they will attain their desire if 
they do X. 
78 
 
 
conceded that this approach does not avoid the IOP but clearly falls into it.  Moreover, 
even if the notions of ―right‖ and ―good‖ are not considered to contain implicit Oughts, 
one could object to this method since it does not bridge the broader fact-value gap (of 
which the Is-Ought gap is just one instance) which is the foundation of the IOP. 
In response to these objections, the derivation could be reformulated to read: 
 
(1) X is contrary to human nature.  (2) If X is contrary to human nature, it leads to 
undesirable consequences, that is, it leads away from flourishing.  (3) All human 
agents de facto believe that they ought to avoid that which leads to undesirable 
consequences.
152   
(4) Therefore, all humans ought to avoid X.
153
 
 
Assuming that premise (3) is read as a factual statement regarding what humans believe, 
rather than a normative statement, this argument would be a valid derivation of an Ought 
from statements of fact. Since this formulation avoids using the terms ―right,‖ and 
―good,‖ it would seem to bypass the objection above; and since it involves the desires of 
the agent, it would seem to be in accord with the basic method considered above. 
Although this formulation does not explicitly indicate that X is wrong because it is 
inimical to human well-being or goes against human nature, it would be possible to 
argue that the Ought still has a grounding in human nature.   Since the first two premises 
are statements about human nature, since the third premise concerns the beliefs of human 
agents, and since the Ought-conclusion is dependent on these premises, the Ought of this 
argument can itself be said to have a grounding in human nature. 
 
 
 
152  
I am assuming that this is a belief which all agents who are capable of rational thought would 
accept and, hence, would be and adequate premise from which to derive a categorical or universal 
Ought. 
 
153  
The positive formulation would be: X is conducive to human well-being or is in accord with 
human nature.  Because X is conducive to human well-being or in accord with human nature, it 
leads to desirable consequences, that is, it leads to flourishing.  All human agents de facto believe 
that they ought to do that which leads to desirable consequences. Therefore, humans ought to 
avoid X. 
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B.  The Type of Ought Derived Via This Method 
Assuming that this approach can be used to derive a categorical rather than 
merely hypothetical Ought, we still need to explore whether the Ought is moral, 
determinate, prescriptive, and egalitarian.  In this section, we will explore whether it is. 
 
 
1. Is the Ought Moral? 
 
Although it would seem that the Ought derived by this approach is clearly moral 
since it takes the interests of agents into account, it could be argued that it is merely 
prudential.  One could argue, for instance, that although it is true that certain acts are 
contrary to human nature—and therefore damaging to human nature—and although it 
may be prudent to avoid these acts given their undesirable consequences, this does not 
establish that it is necessarily immoral to engage in such acts.  For example, it may be 
true that given the nature of human physiology, humans tend to get sick when exposed to 
extreme cold, and it may also be true that it is therefore prudent to avoid wearing shorts 
in Alaska in December, but these facts would not necessarily establish that it is immoral 
to wear shorts in Alaska in December or that one has a moral obligation to avoid doing 
so.  Even if that which is prudential is always prudential for all humans—and therefore 
categorically prudential—this would not necessarily entail a moral Ought.   It would 
seem, then, that this approach would only be useful if it is the case that moral Oughts are 
types of prudential Oughts. 
Although natural law theorists do not claim that all prudential Oughts are moral 
 
Oughts, it does seem that they claim—or at least ought to claim—that all moral Oughts 
80 
 
are prudential since this claim is implicit in the sanctions claim. As mentioned in Chapter 
One, the sanctions claim is the claim that natural law has sanctions insofar as to act in 
accordance with natural law leads to flourishing and to act contrary to it leads to a failure 
to flourish.  Again, as Cicero puts it, ―…he who does not obey it flies from himself, and 
does violence to the very nature of man.  And by so doing he will endure the severest 
penalties even if he avoids the other evils which are usually accounted punishments.‖154 
 
So long as natural law theorists wish to hold this, they will implicitly be committing 
themselves to the claim that it is always prudent for the agent to act in accord with the 
moral Ought and, hence, that all moral Oughts are also prudential.  Thus, even though it 
is possible to derive a non-moral prudential Ought using this approach, there is no reason 
to suppose that in principle it cannot also be used to derive a moral Ought that is 
acceptable within the context of natural law theory.
155 
 
Is the Ought Prescriptive? 
This approach would seem to be a stellar means of deriving a prescriptive Ought 
since the premises which support it are based on well-being, flourishing, and the desire of 
the agent to attain flourishing.  Although agents may desire many different things, all 
agree that flourishing is worthy of pursuit.
156   
As noted above, if an agent were to ask a 
proponent of this approach ―Why ought I to do X?‖ the answer would be: ―Because doing 
 
 
154  
Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Republic, Charles Duke Yonge, trans. (London: G.G. Bohn, 
183), III, 22.  Quoted by Howard Kainz, Natural Law: An Introduction and Re-examination, 
(Chicago: Open Court, 2004), 11. 
 
155  
To be sure, natural law theorists need to be able to show what it is that distinguishes Oughts 
which are merely prudential from those which are both prudential and moral, but this is not a task 
that needs to be taken up within the context of attempting to establish that a moral-prudential 
Ought can be validly derived from statements about human nature. 
 
156  
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b20. 
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so results in desirable consequences.‖ As such, this approach would be an effective way 
to derive an Ought that is capable of guiding action, of explaining why the Ought is 
mandatory,
157 
and of leading subjects to their proper virtue.
158
 
Nevertheless, it could be objected that, in order to be authentically prescriptive, 
 
the agent would have to be capable of recognizing that acting in accord with the proposed 
Ought in fact leads to long-term flourishing.  For example, in order for the Ought- 
conclusion in the following argument to be capable of guiding action, the agent would 
have to recognize (or at least come to recognize through an added argument) that acting 
in accord with the Ought in fact leads to flourishing: 
 
Seeking to know the truth is right because it is in accordance with human nature. 
Because it is in accordance with human nature, it leads to good consequences, that 
is, it leads to flourishing.  If all agents desire to flourish, all agents ought to seek 
to know the truth.  All agents desire to flourish. Therefore, all agents ought to 
seek to know the truth. 
 
If we suppose that a particular agent did not recognize that seeking to know the truth 
leads to good consequences, it is doubtful that this Ought would be capable of guiding 
action and, hence, of being prescriptive.  More likely such an agent would claim that no 
real reason or motive has been provided which explains why he ought to seek to know the 
truth. 
In response to this difficulty, it could be argued simply that although not every 
 
Ought that is typically proposed by natural law theorists could necessarily be derived 
 
 
 
157  
As stated in Chapter One, Oughts are prescriptive, according to Gewirth, ―in that their users 
advocate or seek to guide or influence actions which they set forth as required by the facts 
presented in the antecedents.‖  Gewirth, IOPR, 35. 
 
158  
Aquinas claims that the effect of law is ―to lead its subjects to their proper virtue.‖ ST I-II, 
92,1.. He also defines law as ―a rule and measure of acts, by which man is induced to act or is 
restrained from acting.‖  ST I-II, 90, 1. 
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using this approach, many such Oughts could.  For instance, although it would not be 
clear to all agents that acting in accord with reason leads to flourishing, it would be clear 
to all mentaly healthy agents that smoking crack every day and going on killing rampages 
would be inimical to flourishing.  Thus, this method of derivation could still be utilized 
by natural lawyers as a method of deriving many prescriptive Oughts. 
It could also be argued that, even when there are ambiguous cases, this method 
could still be successfully utilized to derive prescriptive Oughts provided that a sufficient 
number of relevant facts are added to the derivation.  For example, although it would not 
be clear to all agents that seeking to know the truth leads to flourishing (a claim often 
made by traditional natural law theorists) it might be possible to make this clear to all 
agents by adding more facts and statistics to the premises.
159   
Such facts might include 
the following: (1) those who seek to know the truth are much more likely to come to 
know the truth than those who do not; (2) those who come to know the truth are able to 
discern true goods from merely apparent goods and are therefore more equipped to make 
choices which lead to flourishing than those who do not; (3) those who seek to know the 
truth come to be more educated than those who do not; and (4) those who are more 
educated are better able to find happiness and avoid misery.  This is not to say that all 
claims typically made by natural law theorists could necessarily rely on this approach.  It 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
159  
Smith seems to be attempting to do just this when she lists numerous facts in support of her 
claim that the use of artificial contraception is inimical to flourishing.  She seems to realize that 
her claim is controversial and not easily accepted and precisely for this reason provides more 
facts and statistics. 
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is possible that some claims would remain controversial.
160   
Nevertheless, it seems that at 
least in principle this approach could be used to derive numerous prescriptive Oughts. 
 
Is the Ought Determinate? 
 
It has been argued by numerous philosophers that this method of derivation 
cannot be used to derive a determinate Ought.  The basic argument is that, since different 
agents have different notions about what good consequences and flourishing consists in, 
contradictory Ought-conclusions could be derived from premises that are based on such 
notions.   For instance, a secular humanist might think that in order for humans to 
flourish, they must strive to avoid pain, seek health, develop the talents they wish to 
develop, and do what they can to help others do the same.  On the other hand, a member 
of a new-age cult might think that humans can flourish only if they spend their days 
fasting and their nights sleeping on beds of nails while awaiting the arrival of the mother 
ship.  Both could, in principle, hold that these notions of flourishing pertain to all human 
agents and that there are no other means to attaining authentic flourishing.  Hence, both 
could claim to be deriving a categorical Ought.  However, the secular humanist would be 
able to derive the conclusion that agents ought to avoid sleeping on beds of nails while 
the cult member could derive the opposite.
161
 
 
 
 
160
For example, many natural law theorists claim that using in vitro fertilization (IVF) is contrary 
to the natural law.  But since it would be difficult to establish that use of IVF necessarily leads 
away from the fulfillment of the desires of agents and leads away from flourishing, it would not 
be possible to use this approach to derive the Ought conclusion you ought to avoid using IVF. 
161  
For example, the secular humanist could propose: ―Sleeping on a bed of nails is contrary to 
human nature. Because it is contrary to human nature, it leads to bad consequences (i.e., it is 
inimical to human flourishing).  If all agents desire to flourish, all agents ought to avoid sleeping 
on beds of nails.  All agents desire to flourish. Therefore, agents ought to avoid sleeping on beds 
of nails.‖  On the other hand, the cult member could propose:  ―Sleeping on a bed of nails is in 
accordance with human nature.  Because it is in accordance with human nature, it leads to good 
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In ―On Morality‘s Having a Point,‖ D.Z. Phillips and H. Mounce make a similar 
argument.
162   
They argue that there can never be a universal consensus regarding what is 
desirable and that one‘s view of the human good is dependent on and determined by 
one‘s moral beliefs and traditions. They also argue that ethicists who hold that it is 
possible to arrive at an agreement merely by coming to know the relevant facts are naïve 
and unable to account for the fact that there is moral disagreement even among those who 
know the relevant facts.
163
 
Gewirth also advances a similar argument.  In commenting on the attempt to 
derive an Ought from the desires of agents, he states: 
This mode of derivation is… circular because it premises about what constitutes 
human well-being or harm, far from being straightforwardly factual or 
descriptive, represent moral commitments about what is worth striving for or what 
interests of persons other than the agent are worth  promoting.  Consider for 
example, the moral disagreement between religionists and secularists, between 
pacifists and militarists, between romantics and practical-minded persons, and so 
forth….  Because of such disputes, the eudaemonist derivation does not yield 
determinate „oughts‟.164 
Gewirth‘s claim here is that even though there may at times be a general consensus about 
what human flourishing consists in, and hence about what human agents desire, there is 
no universal consensus and, as a result, any Ought that is derived from a notion of 
flourishing is bound to be indeterminate. 
 
 
 
consequences (i.e., it leads to flourishing).  If all agents desire to flourish, all agents ought to 
sleep on beds of nails. All agents desire to flourish. Therefore, all agents ought to sleep on beds 
of nails.‖ 
 
162  
D.Z. Phillips and H.O. Mounce, ―On morality‘s having a point,‖ in The Is—Ought Question, edited by 
Deal Hudson, 228-239 (London: MacMillan, 1969). Hereafter I will abbreviate this as: MHP. 
 
163  
MHP, 234. 
 
164  
IOPR, 45-46.  The emphasis is mine. 
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In spite of the fact that these objections may seem insurmountable, there are 
several possible responses to them.  First, it could be claimed that by making a distinction 
between ends and purposes of human agents, and limiting ourselves to the latter, it is 
possible to find common ground.  R. Sokolowski makes just this claim.  He defines 
―purposes‖ as the wishes of human agents which can be deliberated about; and he defines 
―ends‖ as the natural telos of human beings which is present regardless of such wishes 
and which cannot be deliberated about.
165 
The examples he gives of purposes are: the 
 
wish to become a lawyer, to support one‘s family, and to go on vacation.  Such desires 
are not found in all human agents and have no extra-mental existence.   Examples he 
gives of ends are: the natural telos of human thinking (i.e, rationality) and human 
sexuality (i.e., procreation).  Such ends are not based on mere human conventions or 
traditions, are found in all healthy adult humans, and exist regardless of whether they are 
wished for.  With this distinction as a backdrop, Sokolowski locates the Ought in ends 
and states, ―Natural law is shown to us when we recognize that there are ends in things 
and that our purposes and choices must respect their priority. ....Only ends can make us 
accountable; our purposes have nothing obligatory about them.  Ends are not just an 
aesthetic alternative to our purposes but a ‗law‘ in the nature of things.‖
166   
His argument, 
 
then, is that while mere purposes would not be an adequate starting point for deriving a 
 
 
 
 
 
165  
Sokolowski, Robert, ―What is Natural Law? Human Purposes and Natural Ends,‖ in The 
Thomist 68 (2004): 508-509.  Cf. Slade, Francis, ―On the Ontological Priority of Ends and Its 
Relevance to the Narrative Arts,‖ in Beauty, Art, and the Polis, ed. Alice Ramos (Washington, 
D.C.: CUA Press, 2000), 58-69; and ―Ends and Purposes,‖ in Final Causality in Nature and 
Human Affairs, ed. Richard Hassing (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 1997), 83-85.  Slade is cited 
by Sokolowski. 
 
166  
Sokolowski, 521-523. 
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determinate Ought, ends would be since purposes vary from person to person whereas 
ends are universal and common to all. 
A similar claim is made by R. Hayden who asserts that natural human inclinations 
do not directly correspond to moral absolutes (i.e., determinate, categorical Oughts) 
without mediation.  She acknowledges that, 
A non-universal natural inclination cannot suffice of itself for a universal moral 
absolute.  So, if the natural law prohibitions, for example against suicide…were 
based solely upon opposing natural inclinations and if these natural inclinations 
were truly lacking in some, then any individual lacking those natural inclinations 
could not be obligated in that regard, e.g., to abstain from suicide….167 
The mediating notion which Hayden says is essential for grounding an absolute Ought is 
the notion of the final end.
168    
Her argument is based on the claim that ―even though one 
might not personally experience the suitability of a certain good… one could still 
discover that it is perfective of human beings [and hence necessary for attainment of the 
final end]….  For one could consider the nature of any good and its contrary 
independently of one‘s own inclinations.‖ In short, her claim is that even if a particular 
agent is not inclined to a particular good (such as life), he can still be obligated to pursue 
that particular good if the good is necessary for the attainment of his final telos.  Thus, 
both Sokolowski and Hayden respond to the determinacy problem by claiming that, 
 
 
 
167  
Hayden, R. Mary, ―Natural Inclincations and moral Absolutes: a Mediated Correspondence for 
Aquinas,‖ in Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 64 (1990), 134. 
The emphasis is mine. 
 
168  
Hayden cites ST I II, 99, 1 in which St. Thomas claims that ―since a precept of law is binding, 
it is about something which must be done: and, that a thing must be done arises from the 
necessity of some end.  Hence it is evident that a precept implies, in its very idea, relation to an 
end, insofar as a thing is commanded as being necessary or expedient to an end.  Now many 
things may happen to be necessary or expedient to an end; and accordingly, precepts may be 
given about various things a being ordained to one end.‖  She also cites ST I II, 91, 4;  1, 5; 3, 5; 
1, 7; 90, 2; 231, 1 ad. 2; and II II 44, 3 ad 3. 
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although a determinate Ought cannot be derived merely from the wishes or inclinations of 
human agents, a determinate Ought can be derived if the notion of an ultimate human 
telos is included in the derivation.  Acts that are necessary for the attainment of this telos 
are determinately and categorically prescribed; and those acts that are incompatible with 
the attainment of this telos are determinately and categorically proscribed. 
The main difficulty with this response is that it would seem to involve a change in 
approach.  Although Sokolowski and Hayden claim that the desires of the agent play a 
role in deriving an Ought, they fail to establish that wishes play an essential role in 
deriving a determinate Ought.  This difficulty is present in Hayden‘s article insofar as she 
maintains that it is possible to derive a determinate Ought even if there are no universal 
human inclinations.  It is present in Sokolowski‘s article insofar as he claims that a 
determinate Ought can be derived from ends but not purposes.  Since they maintain that a 
determinate Ought can be derived even if there are no universal desires, there is no 
essential role for such desires.   It is the notion of a final telos, rather than the desires of 
the agent that is the sine qua non of the derivation.  The derivation, then, is not derived 
from the desires of the agent but rather from a teleological concept.
169
 
Another difficulty with this response is that it begs the question since it does not 
establish that there is agreement as to what the final telos is but merely assumes that there 
is such agreement or that such agreement is possible.  Although it is clear that if there is 
 
 
169  
A derivation in accord with the claims of Sokolowski and Hayden is: X is good because it is in 
accord with human nature. Because X is in accord with human nature, it enables humans to 
attain their final telos.  Some agents desire to attain their telos but some do not. All agents are 
capable of coming to know that X enables them to attain their final telos.  Therefore, all agents 
ought to pursue X.  Since the Ought-conclusion is derived regardless of whether agents desire the 
end, this derivation is not an example of deriving an Ought from the desires of agents. (The 
unstated premise, here, is: All agents ought to pursue that which enables them to attain their final 
telos). 
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universal agreement regarding what the final end is, it would be possible to derive a 
determinate Ought from it, it is not at all clear that there is in fact universal agreement. 
Hayden, for instance, says that the final end is human perfection, yet she does not specify 
what human perfection consists in.
170    
As a result, her approach would not provide an 
adequate response to Phillips‘ claim that one‘s view of the human good is dependent on 
and determined by one‘s moral beliefs and traditions.171 
A second possible response to the determinacy objection is that, if this method is 
 
restricted to apply only to very basic desires, it would be possible to find common ground 
and, hence, to derive a determinate Ought.  Although there are many areas of 
disagreement in regard to what flourishing, the final telos, or human perfection consists 
in, all would agree that in some way it consists in the attainment and preservation of basic 
goods such as knowledge, life, and freedom.
172   
In addition, there is reason to suppose 
that it is possible for all agents to agree that some actions are inimical to the attainment 
and preservation of such goods.  For instance, both secular humanists and new-age cult 
members would be able to agree that freedom is a human good and is necessary for 
flourishing.  The secular humanist might think that freedom is a good insofar as it enables 
 
 
 
170  
Hayden states, ―…the end of natural law is the self‘s last end, i.e., his natural last end.  And 
this last end is the self‘s perfection, culminating in both contemplative and practical acts of virtue 
ordered to the common good of all within a community.  More specifically, the natural last end 
consists of altruistic love of God above all and neighbors as self.‖  (142)  Only if we assume that 
this notion of the final end is universal and that there is universal agreement regarding what is 
necessary for the attainment of this end, could it be used to derive a determinate Ought. 
Obviously, there is no universal consensus that the last end ―consists of altruistic love of God 
above all.‖ 
 
171  
MHP, 234. 
 
172  
This response parallels Aquinas‘s claim that the basic principles of practical reason are the 
same for all people and are known equally by all.  We read: ―…as regards the common principles, 
whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally 
known by all.‖  ST I-II, 94, 4 
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agents to seek to develop the talents they wish to develop, and the new-age cult member 
might argue that freedom is a good insofar as it enables agents to sleep on beds of nails. 
However, both would agree that freedom is a good which is necessary for the attainment 
of human flourishing and therefore part of such flourishing.  Both would also be able to 
agree that whatever is inimical to freedom is inimical to human flourishing. 
An example of a derivation which is based on the basic good of freedom, 
incorporates the desires of agents in an essential way, and is in accord with Smith‘s 
approach would be as follows: 
Freedom is a basic good insofar as it is necessary if humans are to flourish.  If all 
agents desire to flourish, all agents ought to seek to preserve their freedom and 
ought to avoid that which is inimical to freedom.  All agents desire to flourish. 
Therefore all agents ought to seek to preserve their freedom and ought to avoid 
that which is inimical to freedom. 
Since any agent, regardless of his or her view of what flourishing consists in, would 
presumably be able to grasp that freedom is necessary for the pursuit of anything 
whatsoever (be it sleeping on beds of nails or developing one‘s talents) the Ought would 
presumably be determinate.  Moreover, any good that is so basic as to be required for the 
pursuit of any desire whatsoever could also be used as a starting point for deriving 
determinate Oughts.  Since all agents would presumably be able to grasp that good such 
as knowledge and life are also required for the pursuit of any desire whatsoever, these 
goods could also be used to derive a determinate Ought.
173
 
 
Although there is no explicit premise regarding human nature in the above 
derivation, it can be said to have an implicit grounding in human nature since freedom is 
a basic human good which is necessary for the attainment of human flourishing.  It would 
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This approach parallels that of Gewirth insofar as it stems from goods that are necessary for 
the pursuit of anything whatsoever. It also in some ways parallels the approach of Finnis which 
will be the topic of Chapter Five. 
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also be possible to make this grounding more explicit by formulating the derivation as 
follows: 
The preservation of freedom is right because it is in accordance with human 
nature. Because freedom is in accordance with human nature, it leads to good 
consequences (i.e.,   freedom enables humans to seek that which leads to 
flourishing).  If all agents desire to flourish, all agents ought to seek to preserve 
freedom.  All agents desire to flourish.  Therefore, all agents ought to seek to 
preserve freedom. 
 
It seems possible, then, to derive an Ought that has a grounding in human nature and that 
relies on the desires of the agent.  Provided that the desires pertain to goods that are basic 
and can be grasped by all agents, such an Ought would also be determinate. 
 
4.  Is the Ought Egalitarian? 
The most difficult issue for this approach is that of establishing that the Ought is 
egalitarian in the sense that it fosters the common good.
174 
Obviously, any moral 
philosopher who wishes to derive an egalitarian Ought concerning the common good 
from the desires of agents, must find a way to respond to Thrasymachus‘s assertion in 
The Republic that it is more profitable and desirable to be unjust than to be just or, in 
other words, that it is more desirable to seek one‘s own good rather than the common 
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Matthews Grant makes a similar statement.  He says, ―The challenge for such a natural law 
theory… would be to show that it could generate precepts proscribing all those things that we 
know to be unjust.  On an ethics comprised of strictly conditional oughts, the only reason I ought 
to do or refrain from doing anything is because it is a necessary means or obstacle to my 
happiness, which I desire.‖ The emphasis is that of Matthews Grant.  NLM, 173. 
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good.
175    
Moreover, the very fact that his assertion is so difficult to disprove would seem 
to indicate that it would be impossible simultaneously to derive a categorical, 
determinate, and egalitarian Ought regarding the fostering of the common good using this 
approach.  Since not all agents admit that fostering the common good is in his or her own 
interest, how could it possibly be argued that an egalitarian and determinate egalitarian 
Ought can be derived from the desires of agents? 
In spite of the fact that there has been little agreement about whether or not 
seeking the fulfillment of one‘s own desires can lead to the fostering of the common 
good, many philosophers have tried to establish that it can.  P. Foot, for example, tries to 
establish that it is in the interest of all agents—and hence in accord with their authentic 
desires—to act justly.  She points out that an unjust person who never fostered the 
common good would need to be a very good deceiver.  In order for such a person to 
function well in society, for example, she would have to spend a great deal of effort 
trying to appear to be just and –in the end—her relations with others would become 
depersonalized to such an extent that her own life would become impoverished.
176   
Foot 
also points out that, ―The reason why its seems to some people so impossibly difficult to 
show that justice is more profitable than injustice is that they consider in isolation 
particular just acts.‖177   Her point is that although it may be possible to establish that it is 
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Plato, The Republic 343d ff .Gewirth objects to this approach to deriving an Ought from the 
desires of agents for precisely this reason.  He claims that this type of approach, ―fails to cope 
with the crucial moral problem of distribution, of whose well-being ought to be promoted and 
whose harm avoided.‖ (IOPR, 46. The emphasis is that of Gewirth) See also Phillips and 
Mounce, MHP, 228ff. 
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Philippa Foot, ―Moral Beliefs,‖ in Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1978), 128-129.  Hereafter this is abbreviated: MB. 
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Foot, MB, 129-30. 
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more profitable for the agent to engage in self-seeking acts on occasion or in particular 
circumstances, it is not possible to establish that it is more profitable for the agent to 
engage only in such acts.  The more self-seeking an agent is, the less she will be able to 
flourish in society since, in order to flourish in society, a certain amount of give-and-take 
is necessary.  Certainly it is difficult—if not impossible—to imagine a purely self- 
seeking agent having the things that are ordinarily accepted as being part of a life of 
flourishing: having friends, being trusted by others, being considered by others as being a 
decent person, etc. 
Although insightful, Foot‘s argument has been subject to criticism.  W.D. 
 
Hudson, for example, criticizes Foot for failing to acknowledge that being unjust does not 
 
necessarily lead to an impoverished life.  Hudson states: 
 
[Foot] seems to assume that, once people catch [the unjust man] lying or cheating, 
they will regard him with suspicion for ever; and, consequently, that he will have 
to go in for more and more lying and cheating once he has started.  But is this so? 
Two facts at least should be taken into account.  One, that people are prepared to 
tolerate a certain amount of injustice in others because they know that they are not 
innocent of it themselves; and the other, that a certain amount of lying and 
cheating is sometimes necessary to keep personal relationships harmonious. 
178
 
Although Hudson admits that an agent who is always unjust will likely end up with an 
impoverished life, his point is that an agent who is sometimes unjust could very well live 
a fulfilled life in which she attains her desires.  His point is also that—even though the 
unjust agent may at times have to lie or cheat—a certain amount of lying and cheating 
may be necessary for the attainment of harmonious relationships.  According to Hudson, 
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ed., (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1983), 320. 
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then, being unjust and self-serving can be the best means to fulfilling one‘s desires even 
though it may require lying and cheating down the road. 
The difficulty with Hudson‘s criticism is that it relies on an uncharitable reading 
of Foot.  Foot fully acknowledges that an agent might occasionally be unjust.  Her claim 
is not that it never pays to be unjust but, merely, that it never pays to be unjust at all times 
or even to be unjust most of the time.  Moreover, Hudson is only able to establish that it 
can more profitable to be unjust by considering unjust actions in isolation, that is, by 
prescinding from the question of whether unjust actions in general, and within the context 
of living in society, lead to the fulfillment of the agent‘s desires.  Foot would 
undoubtedly agree wholeheartedly with Hudson that there can be instances in which 
occasional unjust acts can enable the agent to attain her desires.  What Foot would insist 
on, however, is that an agent who frequently engages in such actions would not in fact 
attain her desires.  In short, Foot could respond to Hudson by pointing out that he is only 
considering unjust actions in isolation—which is precisely what she warns against.179 
 
 
Is the Egalitarian Ought Also Categorical and Determinate? 
Assuming that there is an adequate basis for concluding that is in the best interest 
of the agent to avoid being unjust, at least for the most part, it might still be asked 
 
 
179  
Aquinas makes a claim which is somewhat similar to Foot‘s.  He states: ―…there is in man an 
inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him; thus man 
has a natural inclination…to live in society.  And in this respect, whatever pertains to this 
inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance… to avoid offending those among whom one 
has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.‖ (ST I II, 94, 2.)  Provided that 
(1) acting justly and seeking to foster the common good are necessary aspects of avoiding 
―offending those among whom one lives,‖ and (2) acting in accord with and attaining that which 
one has an inclination toward, is equivalent to attaining one‘s desire, this passage can be 
interpreted as an implicit claim that it is in the agent‘s best interest to seek to foster the common 
good. 
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whether this egalitarian Ought is simultaneously also categorical and determinate.
180   
If it 
can only be established that the agent ought to avoid being consistently unjust for the 
most part or in most situations, it could be argued that this is not an absolute, categorical 
Ought but one which depends on particular circumstances.  And, since there seem to be 
agents who have no desire for sociability and friendship, and therefore have no reason to 
avoid being unjust as a means to such goods, it would seem impossible to claim that 
determinate, egalitarian Ought can be derived from the desires of agents. 
This question is of particular importance given that traditional natural law 
theorists typically maintain that the fostering of the common good is an essential aspect 
of law in general and natural law in particular.  Their claim is not that some mention of 
the common good should be made in the context of natural law but that the binding 
aspect of the Ought of natural law stems from its relation to the common good.  For 
example, Aquinas defines law as ―an ordinance of reason for the common good ….‖
181
 
 
He also states:  ―since the law is chiefly ordered to the common good, any other precept 
in regard to some individual work, must be empty of the nature of a law, save in so far as 
it regards the common good.  Therefore every law is ordered to the common good.‖182 
And Grotius similarly states, ―maintenance of the social order… is the source of law 
 
180  
I am assuming that it is fairly obvious that an egalitarian Ought is moral since (i) it clearly 
takes the interests of agents into account, (ii) it is clear that the statement ―agents ought to foster 
the common good‖ can be used in ordinary language to mean ―agents have a moral obligation to 
foster the common good,‖ and (iii) he Ought in ―agents ought to foster the common good‖ cannot 
be reduced to an mere Ought of likelihood or adequacy.  I am also assuming that it is fairly 
obvious that an egalitarian Ought that is based on the desires of agents is prescriptive since it not 
only seeks to guide or influence action but even provides a motivation for doing so.  Thus, in 
what follows Iwill not deal with the question of whether the specifically egalitarian Ought is also 
moral and prescriptive. 
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properly so called.‖183   Since the Ought of traditional natural law theory has a necessary 
grounding in the common good, then, unless a solution to the IOP can establish that it is 
possible to derive validly an egalitarian Ought that is also categorical and determinate, it 
would be inadequate.  In other words, if the egalitarian Ought of a theory of natural law 
were not determinate and categorical, there would be no guarantee that the agent‘s acting 
in accord with the precepts of natural law would necessarily foster or even safeguard the 
common good.  As such, it would not be sufficient. 
In regard to the question regarding whether a validly-derived, egalitarian Ought 
can also be categorical and absolute, it could be argued that—at least in principle—it 
could be.  For example, it could be argued that the desire to live peaceably in society and 
to have friends is a basic desire of all non-incapacitated human agents and, therefore, that 
the Ought which stems from this desire pertains to all agents.
184    
In addition, it could be 
argued that having at least some friends or peaceful social interactions is necessary if 
agents are to attain flourishing and, further, that the desire for flourishing is not itself 
based on variable features of agents or their social situations.  If (1) all non-incapacitated 
agents desire to flourish, (2) friendship and peaceful social interactions are necessary if 
 
 
 
183  
Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, trans. Francis Kelsey (New York: Oceana, 
1964), Prolegomena §§ 6-9. The emphasis is mine.  Cicero makes a similar claim.  His rationale 
for positing that human law is not sufficient is that, if it were, injustice and tyranny could be 
considered to be legitimate. He states, ―If the will of the people, the decrees of the senate, the 
adjudications of magistrates, were sufficient to establish rights, then it might become right to rob, 
right to commit adultery, right to substitute forged wills, if such conduct were sanctioned by the 
votes or decrees of the multitude….  Are the laws of tyrants just, simply because they are laws? 
Suppose the thirty tyrants of Athens had imposed certain laws on the Athenians? or, suppose 
again that these Athenians were delighted with these tyrannical laws, would these laws on that 
account have been considered just?‖  Cicero, On the Laws, Charles Duke Yonge trans. (London: 
H.G. Bohn, 1853), I, 12, 18. 
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As mentioned in Chapter One, an Ought can be categorized as ―categorical‖ even if 
incapacitated agents are not obligated to follow it due to their incapacity. 
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agents are to attain flourishing, and (3) it is necessary to contribute to the common good 
(or at least avoid diminishing it) in order to have friendship and peaceful social 
interactions, it would be possible to conclude that the obligation to contribute to the 
common good (or at least avoid diminishing it) is categorical.
185
 
Even if one were only to admit that acting justly and contributing to the common 
 
good are only for the most part or usually necessary for attaining flourishing, the 
egalitarian Ought could be said to be categorical.  If the risk involved in engaging a 
certain act is unreasonable to take, it would be possible to conclude that people always 
ought to avoid such acts.  For example, if ACME parachute company sold parachutes 
which had a twenty percent failure rate, it would be possible to conclude that--if people 
wish to live more than they wish to skydive--they always ought to avoid using parachutes 
made by ACME. In addition, it would be possible to claim that this Ought pertains to all 
mentally-healthy, adult agents and, hence, is binding to all such agents.  Analogously, if 
it could be established that engaging in acts which do not contribute to the common good 
often times does not enable people to attain their desire to live peaceable in society and 
have friends, it would be possible to claim that the egalitarian Ought is categorical.  In 
addition—as in the case of the parachute example—it would be possible to claim that this 
Ought pertains to all mentally-healthy, adult agents and, hence, is binding to all such 
agents. 
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The following is an example of a derivation of a categorical and egalitarian Ought:  Seeking to 
foster the common good and/or avoiding that which is detrimental to the common good is 
necessary if agents are to flourish. If all agents desire to flourish, all agents ought to avoid that 
which is detrimental to the common good.  All agents desire to flourish.  Therefore, all agents 
ought to seek to foster the common good and/or avoid that which is detrimental to the common 
good. 
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Regarding the question of determinacy, it could easily be argued that the 
egalitarian Ought is not determinate since it seems to be possible to derive the conclusion 
―I ought to act justly,‖ as well as ―I ought to act unjustly,‖ by relying on the desires of 
agents.  Even though most human agents are capable of grasping the connection between 
acting justly and attaining their desire to live peacefully in society, have friends, and 
flourish, some agents are not.  There are, for instance, wealthy agents who have no need 
of being just toward others as a means to attaining ends which are necessary for most 
agents (such as employment) and who in addition have no desire for friendship or to live 
peacefully in society as an end in itself.  Although most agents could derive the 
conclusion ―I ought to act justly‖ from premises concerning their desires, agents who 
desire to be unjust and avoid fostering the common good could derive the conclusion ―I 
ought to be unjust‖ from premises concerning their desires.  Thus, it would seem to be 
difficult—if not impossible—to derive a specifically determinate egalitarian Ought by 
relying on the desires of agents. 
In response to this difficulty, one could argue that agents of this latter type could 
be considered to be incapacitated and, hence, not bound by the egalitarian Ought.  As 
discussed in Chapter One, even though there are some agents who are not capable of 
seeking to know the truth, it is still possible to claim that the natural law precept 
regarding truth-seeking is categorical and absolute in the sense that it pertains to all 
agents who have the capacity to grasp the precept and follow it.  Just as a severely 
mentally handicapped person or a child would not be obligated by the precept ―you ought 
to seek to know the truth‖ so too, it could be argued, the hard-core recluse would not be 
obligated by the precept ―you ought to seek to foster the common good.‖   In short, it 
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could be argued that the egalitarian Ought is categorical even though some agents are not 
bound by it.
186
 
By way of summary, then, there is reason to suppose that it is possible to derive a 
robust Ought—which has all five of the requisite characteristics—from the desires of 
agent provided that: (1) we limit ourselves to basic desires which all non-incapacitated 
human agents have in common; (2) we concede that non-incapacitated agents are all 
capable of grasping the premise that acting unjustly, and therefore diminishing the 
common good, is at least usually not in accord with their most authentic desires; (3) we 
―live by probabilities‖ in that we acknowledge that certain acts will (or will not) lead to 
attainment of desires; (4) we do not look at unjust acts in isolation; and (5) we concede 
that incapacitated agents are not bound by the egalitarian Ought-precepts if they are not 
capable of grasping them. 
One of the questions which might be asked by opponents of this method, 
however, is whether or not it has an adequate grounding in human nature or whether it 
would be better categorized as a version of utilitarianism with a statement about human 
nature randomly tacked on.  To be sure, Smith asserts that proscribed acts are not wrong 
because they have bad consequences but they have bad consequences because they are 
wrong.  Moreover, in specifying what constitutes ―wrongness,‖ Smith makes reference to 
human dignity and human nature.  It is for this reason that the above example of this type 
of derivation has, as its first premise, the statement:  ―X is wrong because it is contrary to 
human nature.‖  Nevertheless, this premise seems to be tacked on, as it were.  Nothing is 
said about what human nature is or how it relates to the agent‘s desires, nor is the premise 
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One could, for example, argue that agents who truly cannot grasp the connection between 
fostering the common good or even of avoiding diminishing it have a disorder (such as anti-social 
personality disorder) and are therefore incapacitated. 
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necessary for the Ought derivation. Unlike Aquinas, Smith does not discuss the basic 
aspects of human nature and then discuss how inclinations or desires stem from that 
nature; and it is assumed, rather than established, that acts which lead away from the 
agent‘s desires are not in accord with human nature.  Although addressing this issue in 
detail would far surpass the limits of this Chapter, it is worth noting that—while this 
method can be used to solve the IOP—if natural law theorist qua natural law theorists 
wish to utilize it, more work needs to be done. 
In the next Chapter we will consider the solution which involves returning to an 
Aristotelian, teleological understanding of human nature.  Since it has a much more 
explicit grounding in human nature than does the present one, it could turn out to be a 
better solution for natural law theorists. 
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CHAPTER IV: 
 
STARTING FROM THE NOTION OF 
 
THE FUNCTION OR TELOS OF THE HUMAN PERSON 
 
 
 
…to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude 
and a clearer account of what it is is still desired. 
This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain 
the function of man. For just as… for all things 
that have a function or activity, the good and the „well‟ 
is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to 
be for man. 
 
Aristotle
187
 
 
 
 
Veatch and Rautenberg have both asserted that the problem with attempting to 
derive an Ought from the desires of the agent is that it leaves the Euthyphro question 
unanswered.  It is only if we assume that things are good because they are desired that we 
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are justified in claiming that acting in accord with what agents most desire is what is 
moral.
188   
But such an assumption is unwarranted; and it is for this reason that Veatch and 
many others recommend returning to a functional and teleological understanding of the 
human person as a means of providing an adequate starting point for deriving an Ought. 
Veatch further argues that if we attempt to derive an Ought from the desires of the agent, 
we will be left with relativism since the moral good would have then have no objective 
foundation.  He states: 
On the basis of the more traditional natural law theory (Aquinas), all human duties 
and human rights may be reasonably adjudged to be duties and rights only in so 
far as they can be justified, and thus shown to be duties or rights, in the light of 
man‘s natural end and perfection.  Take away, then, this notion of a natural end or 
natural perfection of human life, and there would no longer be any ground on the 
basis of which rights or duties of any kind might be rationally justified.
189
 
 
Otherwise stated, if we equate the moral good with that which we desire, then we will be 
left with only a subjective bedrock for the Ought; but, on the other hand, if we equate the 
moral good with the natural telos which exists independently of our desires, then we have 
an objective bedrock. 
In this chapter, we will explore in more detail the claims of those who argue in the 
same vein as Veatch.  We will consider in some detail the claims of Geach, MacIntyre, 
McInerny, and Lisska and how they contribute to the development of the approach of 
returning to a functional account of nature.  Subsequently, we will explore whether this 
approach can be used to derive a robust Ought which is moral, prescriptive, categorical, 
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Veatch, ―Natural Law‖ Dead or Alive?‖, in Swimming Against the Current in Contemporary 
Philosophy (Washington, DC, 1990), 265.  Quoted by Lisska, 181. Cf. Veatch, ―Telos and 
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determinate, and egalitarian.  I will ultimately argue that there are difficulties in deriving 
an Ought that is simultaneously moral and categorical but that it is otherwise possible to 
derive a robust Ought using this approach.  I will also point out that one version of this 
approach cannot be used to derive a prescriptive Ought but that the other versions can. 
 
 
A. The Teleological-Functional Method 
 
1.   Geach: 
 
In his article ―Good and Evil,‖ Geach attempts to establish that it is not possible to 
understand what a ―good‖ human being is without first understanding the essence of the 
human being.
190   
He begins by distinguishing between attributive and predicative 
adjectives.  An example of the former is the word ―small‖ in the sentence: ―Bruno is a 
small lagomorph.‖  An example of the latter is the word ―red‖ in the sentence: ―This is a 
red book.‖ Although it is possible to know whether an object is red without knowing 
what it is, this is not the case with attributive adjectives such as ―small‖.   In order to 
determine whether a lagomorph that is three inches long is ―small‖, one must know what 
a lagomorph is.  It is only when we know that a lagomorph is a rabbit that we can 
intelligently answer the question ―Is Bruno, who is three inches tall, a small lagomorph?‖ 
With this distinction as a backdrop, Geach asserts that the terms ―good‖ and ―bad‖ 
are attributive adjectives.  In order to know if a knife is good, we must know what a knife 
is, that is, we must know its function, essence, or final cause.  Once we know that a 
knife‘s function is to cut things, we can determine whether a particular knife is ―good‖. 
 
If a given knife is capable of fulfilling its function, it is good; if not, it is bad.  Likewise, 
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P.T. Geach, ―Good and Evil,‖ in Theories of Ethics, ed. Philippa Foot, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), 64-82.  [Reprinted from Analysis 17 (1965), 33-42.]  Hereafter this will 
be abbreviated as GE. 
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in order know if a particular person is good, we must know what a person is.  Geach‘s 
claim here is that unless we know the function, essence, or telos of the human person—or 
human nature—we cannot determine whether a given person is good.  His claim is also 
that once we know the function or telos of the human person, it is possible to know what 
people ought to do in order to be ―good‖.   Particular humans who fulfill their function— 
or who are in the process of doing so—are ―good‖, and those who do not are ―bad‖. 
With this distinction between attributive and predicative adjectives as a backdrop, 
Geach is able to substantiate his conclusion that although the term ―good‖ does not 
satisfy one specific condition and does not have one set definition, it is not—as Moore 
claims—a hopelessly ambiguous term.  In some cases the term ―good‖ might mean 
―pleasurable,‖ in another, it might mean something else, but it does not follow that it is 
therefore an indefinable, non-natural attribute.  The meaning of good in the phrase ―good 
knife‖ does not correspond to the same set of properties as it does when used in the 
phrase ―good human being.‖  Nor does the meaning of ―small‖ in the phrase ―small egg‖ 
correspond to the same height as it does when used in the phrase ―small elephant‖. 
Nevertheless, neither the term ―good‖ nor ―small‖ are hopelessly ambiguous or altogether 
indefinable. Moore claims that ―good‖ expresses an indefinable, non-natural property. 
Geach responds by pointing out that, regardless of the way the term is used, it 
corresponds to the fulfillment of the function, essence, or telos of the object which it 
specifies. 
Although Geach is not concerned explicitly with the term ―ought‖, his claim here 
is relevant to the IOP insofar as both ―good‖ and ―ought‖ are normative.  If it is possible 
to grasp what a ―good‖ human being is by considering human nature and the function of 
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the human person, it will be possible to grasp what humans ought to do.  What humans 
ought to do in this scheme is fulfill their function qua human beings.  Although Geach is 
primarily concerned with the naturalistic fallacy and the term ―good‖, his insights are 
relevant to questions about the Ought and the IOP.  If it is possible to bridge the fact- 
value gap of the naturalistic fallacy by returning to a functional notion of things in 
general and human beings in particular, presumably it would be possible to bridge the 
Is—Ought gap by the same method.  If it is possible to derive a ―good‖ from facts about 
human nature, and if the Ought relies on the notion of the good, it will be possible to 
derive an ―ought‖ from such facts. 
 
2. McInerny: 
 
Ralph McInerny echoes Geach‘s claim and develops it by drawing upon 
Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Ethics.  McInerny agrees with Geach that once we grasp the 
function or telos of the human person qua human, we can determine what constitutes 
good human action and, hence, what a person ought to do.  He states, 
The judgment that something is good presupposes and depends upon theoretical 
knowledge of the thing judged to be good and of the one for whom it is judged to 
be good.  Far from being a fallacy, an erratic boulder, a vitiating element, the 
dependence of the judgment that ‗X is good‘ on some theoretical knowledge of X, 
is all but definitionally true.  This is the sense of the insistence that evaluative 
judgments are based upon nature and knowledge of nature.
191
 
Thus, it is in no way fallacious to start with a theoretical or factual knowledge about the 
human person and then conclude what constitutes good human behaviour.  In addition to 
claiming that knowledge of the function of a thing enables us to know whether or not it is 
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good, McInerny also attempts to show what the function of the human person is.  Like 
Aristotle, he identifies the function of the human qua human as being rational.  The 
functions of growth, nutrition, and sensation are not specifically human functions since 
they are functions that all species of animals have.  Since rationality is the only function 
that humans do not have in common with other animals, it is rationality that is identified 
as the function of humans qua humans.
192
 
The general conclusion McInerny reaches is that humans ought to be rational; yet 
he is aware that this is overly-vague and attempts to provide a more detailed account. 
Again like Aristotle, he identifies the ultimate human good with ―an activity of soul in 
accordance with virtue, and, if there is more than one virtue, in accordance with the best 
and most complete.‖193   In turn, McInerny makes a distinction between intellectual and 
moral virtues and asserts that, although the moral virtues take precedence over the 
theoretical in terms of temporal priority or expedience, the theoretical virtues are the best 
and most complete.  McInerny clearly recognizes that the ultimate end consists in ―a 
plurality of virtuous activities‖ while still asserting that contemplation or ―the task of 
metaphysics‖ is the highest of such activities.194   However, McInerny does not claim that 
contemplation or ―the task of metaphysics‖ is the ultimate end or function of the human 
person.  Rather, he concludes that it is part of the ultimate end in combination with other 
virtuous activities.  Since the function of the human person is to practice the moral and 
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theoretical virtues, and since the telos is reached by engaging in such activity, the 
conclusion McInerny reaches is that humans ought to engage in such activity. 
McInerny‘s point here is that there is no real Is—Ought or fact—value gap. 
According to McInerny, it is a fact that humans have a telos and an essential function, 
and thus it is nonsensical to presume that the Ought is distinct from facts about human 
nature.  For example, it is a fact that a good car is a car that is capable functioning as a 
car and thereby realizing its final telos which is to provide transportation.  This is why 
cars that run are called ―good.‖  Analogously, it a fact that humans have a function and a 
telos.  Those persons who function properly (i.e., rationally and virtuously) and thereby 
realize their telos are ―good‖ and are doing what they ―ought‖ to do.  The Ought is 
thereby founded on the facts or the Is of human nature.  Like Geach, McInerny claims to 
be able to bridge the supposed Is—Ought gap by returning to a functional account of 
human nature. 
 
3. MacIntyre: 
 
Alasdair MacIntyre adds to this discussion in three ways:  (1) by providing an 
historical account of how moral philosophers came to presume that there is an 
unbridgeable Is-Ought gap; (2) by attempting to establish that this presumption is 
doomed to lead to failure in moral philosophy; and (3) by proposing a solution.  He 
claims that moral philosophers came to presume that no Ought can be derived from an Is 
because they abandoned the Aristotelian tradition in which the human person was thought 
of as having a function and telos.  His solution, of course, is to return to the Aristotelian 
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tradition and its corresponding teleological understanding of human nature.
195   
According 
to MacIntyre, once we make a distinction between ―man-as-he-happens-to-be‖ and ―man- 
as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature,‖ it becomes possible to understand 
what humans ought to do.  He asserts that, within the context of this distinction, ―to say 
what someone ought to do is at one and the same time to say what course of action will in 
these circumstances as a matter of fact lead toward a man‘s true end.‖196   It is only when 
we attempt to do moral philosophy without a functional concept of human nature and 
without a concept of the human telos—as Enlightenment philosophers did—that the 
supposed Is-Ought problem even emerges. 
Using terminology similar to that of Geach and McInerny, MacIntyre claims that 
once we know the function of a thing, we can know what it ought to do.  He states: 
From such factual premises as ‗this watch is grossly inaccurate and irregular in 
time-keeping‘ and ‗This watch is too heavy to carry about comfortably‘, the 
evaluative conclusion follows that ‗this is a bad watch‘.  From such factual 
premises as ‗He gets a better yield for this crop per acre than any farmer in the 
district‘, ‗He has the most effective programme of soil renewal yet known‘ and 
‗His dairy herd wins all the first prizes at the agricultural shows‘, the evaluative 
conclusion validly follows that ‗He is a good farmer‘.  Both of these arguments 
are valid because of the special character of the concepts of a watch and of a 
farmer.  Such concepts are functional concepts; that is to say, we define both 
‗watch‘ and ‗farmer‘ in terms of the purpose or function which a watch or farmer 
are characteristically expected to serve.  It follows that the concept of a watch 
cannot be defined independently of the concept of a good watch nor the concept 
of a farmer independently of that of a good farmer
197
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MacIntyre‘s claim in this passage is that facts about a particular type of thing, which 
enable us to know the function of that particular thing, must be known before one can 
determine whether that particular thing is ―good‖ or doing what it ―ought‖ to do. 
Although he believes there may be a bona fide problem in deriving an Ought from facts 
when dealing with things that do not have functions, he believes that this is not the case 
with things that do have functions.  And since in the Aristotelian-Thomistic (A-T) 
tradition human beings are understood as having a function, MacIntyre claims that—if 
we return to this tradition—the supposed Is-Ought gap will disappear.
198
 
 
Immediately after making this claim, MacIntyre goes on to assert that we can 
validly derive an Ought from an Is provided that we do so within the context of the A-T 
tradition.  He states, 
…any argument which moves from premises which assert that the appropriate 
criteria are satisfied to a conclusion which asserts that ‗That is a good such-and- 
such-‗, where ‗such-and-such‘ picks out an item specified by a functional concept, 
will be a valid argument which moves from factual premises to an evaluative 
conclusion.  Thus we may safely assert that, if some amended version of the ‗No 
―ought‖ conclusion from ―is‖ premises‘ principle is to hold good, it must exclude 
arguments involving functional concepts from its scope.
199
 
MacIntyre is essentially showing that if we make the innocuous assumption that a thing 
that fulfills its  function is ―good‖ and, in turn, make the innocuous assumption that a 
thing ought to fulfill its function, then it is possible validly to derive an Ought-statement 
from factual statements. Although he does not  provide a syllogistic example of such a 
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derivation, he would presumably agree that following derivation would work precisely 
because it begins with a functional concept:  This watch keeps time accurately and can be 
worn on my wrist.  The function of a watch is to keep time accurately and to be worn on 
one‟s wrist.  When we say “X ought to be Y” we mean “the function of X is to be Y”. 
Therefore,  this  watch  is  doing  what  it  ought  to  do. Since,  within  the  Aristotelian 
tradition,  the  human  person  is  seen  as  having  a  function,  MacIntyre  would  also 
presumably  agree  that—within  the  A-T  tradition—the  following  derivation  would 
likewise work:  Socrates is a human being who is rational and virtuous.  The function of 
a human being is to be rational and virtuous.  When we say “X ought to be Y” we mean 
“the function of X is to be Y”.200    Therefore, Socrates qua human being is doing what he 
ought to do. 
 
 
 
4. Lisska: 
Anthony Lisska is another proponent of this approach and he too adds to the 
discussion.  In so doing, he emphasizes the fact that—in the Aristotelian tradition— 
essences or natures are dispositional insofar as they tend toward a telos.
201   
He also insists 
that a metaphysical understanding of human nature must precede any attempt to 
understand what humans ought to do and avoid and that—once we acquire such an 
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understanding of human nature—both the IOP and naturalistic fallacy objections 
disappear. 
By emphasizing the dispositional aspect of essence within the Aristotelian 
tradition, Lisska is able to provide a response to G.E. Moore‘s naturalistic fallacy 
objection which is a version of the ―no Ought from Is‖ objection.   One of Moore‘s 
objections to ethicists who rely on the notion of or term ―good‖ is that such a notion or 
term cannot be reduced to or defined by reference to natural properties.   According to 
Moore, since it always makes sense to ask, ―Is natural property x good?‖, it is not 
possible to equate natural property x with goodness or to define the term ―good‖ by 
simply referring to property x.  For example, since it makes sense to ask, ―Is pleasure 
good?‖,  we cannot conclude that pleasure is necessarily one and the same thing as 
goodness.
202   
Moore‘s complaint is that naturalistic ethicists assume that there is some 
 
natural property that is expressed by the term ―good‖. 
 
According to Lisska, what fuels Moore‘s naturalisic fallacy objection is the 
metaphysical assumption that essences, including the essence of the human person, are 
non-dispositional rather than dispositional.  The assumption that essences are non- 
dispositional was embraced by those philosophers who—following in the wake of 
psychological atomists such as Berkeley and Hume—embraced an ontology of simple 
properties.  Lisska states: 
In considering the ontology underpinning the naturalistic fallacy…it appears that 
the fact/value dichotomy assumes as a theoretical presupposition, an ontology of 
simple, discrete, complete properties.  …Given this ontology, a ‗fact‘ is reducible 
fundamentally to a complex of ‗simples‘.  If a ‗simple‘ is complete in and of 
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itself, there is no sense theoretically that can be made of the concept of a 
disposition or of a potentiality.
203
 
 
Such an assumption is what follows when the Aristotelian scheme is rejected and 
replaced with an ontology of simples.  Lisska maintains that once we grasp the human 
person as having a dispositional nature, which tends toward a natural telos, it becomes 
evident that humans ought to strive to attain that natural telos. 
Although Lisska is somewhat vague here, his point seems to be that if it is 
assumed that there is no telos to which we are inclined, it makes sense to conclude that 
there is a fact-value gap.  If things have no natural dispositions or inclinations but are at 
all times fully what they are, there is no point in claiming that those things ought to 
become what they already are.  But if things must strive to attain their essence which they 
have only potentially, then—and only then—does it make sense to claim that they ought 
to strive to attain their essence.  In relation to the human person, if humans must 
intentionally do certain things in order to fully act in accord with their essence, it would 
make sense to claim that they ought to do those things.
204   
Lisska‘s point is that if 
essences are non-dispositional, it is indeed nonsensical to claim that they ought to be 
what they are, but if—as Aristotle claims—things are capable of acting in accord with 
their teleological essence or contrary to it, it is in no way nonsensical to claim that they 
ought to strive to fulfill their essence. 
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Returning to the notion of the ―good‖, Lisska is able to provide a framework for 
responding to Moore because he insists on adopting Aristotle‘s concept of essences. 
Lisska asserts that, in the context of a theory of essences as dispositional, 
the ‗good‘ is the terminal point, however construed, which is the end of the 
process of development common to the natural process in the dispositional 
property itself.  There is no fact/value dichotomy because the ‗value‘—in this 
case, the ‗end‘ of the natural process—is the result of the normal development of 
the ‗fact‘—in this case, the dispositional property.‖205 
 
In identifying the good as the end, he is able to bypass the problem inherent in trying to 
identify the ‗good‘ with a particular property of things.  The good is not identified with 
pleasure or any other particular accidental property.  Rather, the good is identified with 
the end or fulfillment of the essence of a thing.  In this way, Lisska implicitly agrees with 
Moore that there is no particular property that corresponds to ‗goodness‘, while providing 
a new approach to establishing that there can still be some objective ‗good‘ for human 
beings.  The good of the human person is the fulfillment of the essence—a fulfillment 
which is equivalent to the attainment of the person‘s telos— rather than a simple 
property. 
Given that Lisska embraces Aristotle‘s theory of essences as dispositional, it is no 
surprise that he also insists that a theoretical understanding of human nature must precede 
any attempt to understand what humans ought to do and avoid.  Once it is admitted that 
the good of the human person is the fulfillment of the human essence, it must also be 
admitted that is only if we have an understanding of the essence of the human person that 
we can understand what humans ought to strive to become.  He states, ―in attempting to 
resolve this fact/value issue, one must…recall that moral philosophy in the 
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Aristotelian/Aquinian tradition is a second order activity.  It is based upon the concept of 
 
a human nature, which is dependent upon a theory of ontological essence.‖206   Without an 
understanding of human nature, it is impossible to understand the Ought.
207
 
According to Lisska, then, the IOP and naturalistic fallacy objection only arise 
when we assume that essences are non-existent, non-dispositional, or fully actualized at 
all times.  If we are already fully what we are, it makes no sense to claim that we ought to 
be or become what we are.  If we are already fully what we are, there is also no room for 
claiming that the good is the attainment of a telos; and, in turn, it becomes enormously 
difficult to provide a definition for the term ‗good‘.  But, if we return to an Aristotelian, 
dispositional theory of essences, these difficulties are surmounted. 
 
 
5. Strong and Weak Versions: 
 
Before moving on to a consideration of whether this proposed solution to the IOP 
can be used to derive a robust Ought, it will be helpful to distinguish between two basic 
versions of this solution. The first, I will call the ―strong version‖ and the second, the 
―weak version.‖ 
The weak version relies on statements regarding both the essence, function, or 
telos of the human person and the inclinations, wants, or desires of the agent.  In this 
version abstract knowledge of our essence, function, or telos is necessary but not 
sufficient for deriving the Ought.  What is also necessary is an understanding of the 
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human agent‘s inclinations, desires, or wants.  Proponents of this version incorporate the 
method discussed in the previous chapter insofar as they claim that the desires of the 
agent are relevant to the Ought; but they go beyond it insofar as they also incorporate an 
Aristotelian understanding of essences. 
It is somewhat difficult to categorize Geach but it is possible to interpret him as a 
proponent of this weak version.  It seems at first glance that he could be categorized as a 
proponent of the strong version since, in regard to human action, he claims that there is 
usually but not always a connection between the desires of agents and identifying a thing 
as ―good‖.  He states, ―normally, and other things being equal, a man who wants an A 
will choose a good A….‖
208 
Given the ceteris paribus clause it would seem that he 
 
cannot be interpreted as claiming that there is a necessary link between the agents wants 
and the ‗good‘.  Nevertheless, he elsewhere admits the following: 
an action‘s being a good or bad human action is of itself something that touches 
the agent‘s desires.  Although calling a thing ‗a good A‘ or ‗a bad A‘ does not of 
itself work upon the hearer‘s desires, it maybe expected to do so if the hearer 
happens to be choosing an A.  Now what a man cannot fail to be choosing is his 
manner of acting; so to call a manner of acting good or bad cannot but serve to 
guide action.
209
 
Since in this passage he admits that the agent ―cannot fail to be choosing in this manner‖ 
he thereby implicitly admits that there is a necessary correlation between the desires of 
the agent and the ‗good‘.  Moreover, Geach also elsewhere admits that certain types of 
wants (viz., wants that are also needs) are an essential aspect of his teleological- 
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functional concept of morality.
210   
It therefore reasonable to interpret Geach as holding to 
the weak version. 
It is also somewhat difficult to categorize McInerny, but it is reasonable to 
interpret him as a proponent of the weak version as well.  Although at times he seems to 
propose that an understanding of the function and telos of the human person is sufficient 
for determining what a ―good‖ person is—and hence what a person ought to do—he 
admits that, ―The good is the desirable.‖211   In explicating this claim, he makes a 
distinction between ―desirable1‖ which pertains to desire in the descriptive sense (and 
which corresponds to anything that happens to be desired), and ―desirable2‖ which 
pertains to desire in the prescriptive sense (and which corresponds to things that ought to 
be desired).  That which is desirable1  may be truly perfective of the human agent or may 
be a mere apparent good.  That which is desirable2, is only that which is truly perfective 
of us (but may or may not be actually desired by a particular agent).   Since McInerny 
claims that we ought to do that which is truly perfective of us qua human beings, and 
since he admits that that which is truly perfective of us is desirable2, he thereby implies 
that we ought to do that which is truly desirable as opposed to merely apparently 
desirable.  In this way, he admits that there is an essential correlation between authentic 
desire and the Ought.  He states, ―To say that we ought to desire what is truly perfective 
of us is not to introduce something that is not already present in any given desire, some 
new motive, some factor coming from we know not where.  Any action assumes that 
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desireable1 is desirable2. If we learn that desirable1  is desirable2, we already have a 
motive for desiring what truly is desirable, desirable2.‖
212 
Thus, insofar as McInerny 
claims that that which we ought to do is in fact desirable, he can be interpreted as holding 
that there is a necessary link between the desires of the agent and the Ought. 
 
Unlike the weak version, the strong version relies only on statements concerning 
the telos and function of the HP.  The Ought is not derived from the desires of human 
agents but only from facts about the nature of the human person and abstract notions such 
as the attainment of the human telos and acting in accord with human nature.  In the 
strong version there is epistemologically no need to have an understanding of the desires 
of the agent in order to come to have knowledge of what humans ought to do and avoid. 
Lisska‘s treatment of the grounding of the Ought is an example of this version 
since he claims that the grounding is not related to the wants of the agent, that the 
disposition (inclinatio) toward the telos is not necessarily conscious or based on what we 
are conscious of,
213 
and that ―a knowledge of the essence of a human person is all that is 
necessary for understanding the concept of natural law….‖214   Given that he insists that 
the Ought is grounded in the dispositional essence of the human person and that we need 
not be conscious of our own essential dispositions, he leaves no room for claiming that a 
knowledge of our own dispositions, inclinations, or desires for a telos is necessary for 
knowing what we ought to do.   His fear is that if a theory of ethics relies on the 
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subjective desires of the agent, we will be left with a subjective ethical theory.  As he 
succinctly puts it: ―the metaphysics of finality…argues that an end is to be attained, not 
because of a subjective desire or wish on the part of the agent, but because the end itself 
determines the well-functioning of the human person.‖215   If we assume that the good is 
good merely because it is desired, then we are—according to Lisska—left with subjective 
relativism.  It is only if we adopt an ethical theory that grounds the good and the Ought in 
something other than the desires of the agent that we can avoid this difficulty.  Thus, 
Lisska concludes that regardless of whether human agents desire their essential telos, 
they have a moral obligation to pursue it. 
 
 
 
B. Does this Approach Bypass All Aspects of the IOP? 
In spite of the fact that many Thomists are convinced that returning to a 
functional, teleological concept of human nature is the best solution to the IOP and 
related problems, this solution itself leaves us with unanswered questions.  MacIntyre‘s 
fundamental concern is that historically-speaking the emergence of the IOP is a result of 
the fact that moral philosophers have been engaging in moral enquiry without an 
adequate understanding of the history of moral philosophy.  He draws an analogy 
between the current state of moral philosophy and what the state of the hard sciences 
would be like if those engaging in scientific enquiry had nothing but fragments from the 
past to draw from.  If science texts were partially destroyed and later generations tried to 
piece the remaining texts together, without an adequate understanding of the theoretical 
and historical contexts in which they were written, they would find much of what they 
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read to be incoherent and conclude that there was no objective means for determining 
whether one theory is better than another.  Just as such a situation would lead to a great 
deal of confusion, so too our lack of understanding of the context in which ethical 
theories were written has led to a great deal of confusion.
216
 
Although returning to the A-T tradition—and the notion of human essence found 
 
therein—might be an appealing solution, it needs to be asked whether doing so would be 
akin to trying to return to a pre-Copernican view of the universe in order to resolve some 
of the present difficulties in astronomy.  It may be tempting to return to an earlier 
paradigm, but before doing so, it needs to be asked whether doing so could create more 
problems than it solves.  In other words, it needs to be asked whether simply striving to 
have a better understanding of the historical and theoretical contexts in which Aristotle 
discussed ethics—and subsequently adopting that world-view—will really solve the 
problems we think it will solve.  If the purported solution leaves us with more questions 
than answers, we will need to reconsider whether we should accept it.   Otherwise stated, 
it needs to be asked whether MacIntyre is naïve in his seeming belief that the problems 
we have inherited from modern moral philosophy are so easy to solve.  In what follows I 
will consider this issue by asking the question: Can returning to an Aristotelian-Thomistic 
understanding of the essence of the human person—in the way suggested by the 
philosophers discussed above—enable us to derive a moral, prescriptive, determinate, 
categorical, and egalitarian Ought?  As discussed in Chapter One, there is reason to 
conclude that this is the type of Ought that is implemented by traditional natural law 
theorists such as Aquinas and Cicero.  Thus, to ask this question is simultaneously to ask 
 
 
 
216
MacIntyre, AV, 1-5. 
119 
 
 
whether traditional natural law theorists are successful in their own right and within their 
own context.  It is not anachronistic to ask whether such an Ought can be derived from 
human nature given that traditional natural law theorists themselves claimed to uphold 
this type of Ought (even though the specific terms they used are in some instances 
different than the terms I am using here). 
 
1. Is the Ought Moral? 
 
Let us begin by considering whether or not this approach provides us with a moral 
Ought.  As mentioned in Chapter One, the Ought implemented by traditional natural law 
theorists is moral in the sense that (1) it pertains to moral obligation rather than merely to 
Oughts of likelihood or adequacy and (2) it pertains to leading its subjects to their proper 
virtue and goodness.
217 
It is important to note that in the A-T tradition, an Ought only 
pertains to moral obligation if the agent to whom it applies is capable of having 
knowledge of the Ought.   An agent who is ignorant of the moral Ought and who is not 
herself responsible for this ignorance cannot act in a morally praiseworthy or 
blameworthy manner.  In the A-T tradition, it is also the case that only voluntary action 
can be categorized as morally praiseworthy or blameworthy.  Acts done under 
compulsion and which are contrary to the will of the agent are not, strictly speaking, 
human acts and hence are not subject to moral evaluation.
218   
In commenting on this, 
Aquinas states:  ―it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, 
together with some knowledge of the end.  …Knowledge of the end consists in not only 
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apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, 
and the relationship of the means to that end.‖219   He likewise states that 
a man may be ignorant of some circumstance of his act, which he was not bound 
to know, the result being that he does that which he would not do, if he knew of 
that circumstance; for instance, a man, after taking proper precaution, may not 
know that someone is coming along the road, so that he shoots an arrow and slays 
a passer-by.  Such ignorance causes involuntariness simply.
220
 
 
Thus, in order for an Ought to be categorized as moral it must pertain to action that is 
voluntary and, hence, in order for an Ought to be categorized as moral it must be possible 
for the agent to have knowledge of the Ought. 
Given these criteria, there are several difficulties that emerge for those who 
propose that merely returning to a functional and dispositional understanding of human 
essence is a viable solution to the IOP.   The first difficulty is that proponents of this 
solution claim that knowledge of the essence of the human person is necessary for 
knowing what humans ought to do but they simultaneously admit that, in the A-T 
tradition, it is not possible to fully understand what the human essence is.  Lisska, for 
example, admits that ―Aquinas was almost agnostic about this possibility of knowing 
essences….‖
221 
What this seems to suggest, then, is that the Ought which is being derived 
by proponents of this solution cannot be categorized as moral, given Aquinas‘s own 
description of moral action and obligation and given Aquinas‘s own claim that it is 
 
 
 
 
219  
ST I-II, 6, 2. 
 
220  
ST, I-II, 6, 8.  Aquinas cites Aristotle NE iii, 1. 
 
221  
Lisska, 151. Lisska cites the following passages from Aquinas: ―The essential principles of 
things are unknown to us.‖ (De Anima I lec. 13) ―Essential differences are unknown to us.‖  (De 
Veritate, q. 4 a. I ad. 8)  ―We are ignorant of many of the properties of sensible things, and in 
many cases we are unable to discover the proper nature even of those properties that we perceive 
by the senses.‖  (Summa contra Gentiles, I, 3) 
121 
 
 
enormously difficult at best to know essences.  For Aristotle and Aquinas, it is 
nonsensical to claim that an agent is morally obligated to do X, but the agent lacks the 
ability to know that she is obligated to do X, and the agent is not responsible for her lack 
of ability to know he is obligated to do X.   Thus, anyone who proposes a return to the A- 
T tradition needs to address this. 
One possible response to this difficulty is to claim that it is possible for agents to 
acquire enough knowledge about human nature that they can know the Ought.  It could 
be claimed, for example, that although it is not possible for agents to fully comprehend 
human nature, it is possible for them to know something about it and that this partial 
knowledge is sufficient for deriving a moral Ought.  Lisska himself attempts to do just 
this; and he points out that Aquinas claims merely that it is difficult but not impossible to 
know essences.
222 
It is for this reason that Lisska insists that metaphysical enquiry must 
precede ethical enquiry and that ethics is a second-order enquiry.  According to Lisska, 
moral philosophy for Aristotle and Aquinas… is a second order philosophical 
inquiry.  …In other words, first Aquinas expects the metaphysical account of 
essence to be developed.  Only then, as a second order inquiry, is the philosopher 
ready to develop a normative theory.  The normative issues are developed from 
and dependent upon the ontological issues.‖223 
Lisska‘s claim in this passage is that by first engaging in metaphysical enquiry it is 
possible to develop an understanding of human essence; and his implication is that this 
understanding can subsequently be used to come to understand the Ought.  But the 
conclusion that follows from this is that unless an agent is a metaphysician, he cannot be 
bound by a moral ought.  If knowledge of the Ought is only possible after engaging in 
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metaphysical inquiry, and if knowledge of the Ought is necessary in order to be morally 
obligated to follow it, then it would follow that the Ought is only moral for those who are 
capable of such enquiry.   Strictly-speaking, this solution enables us to derive a moral 
Ought but it is a moral Ought with limitations insofar as since only metaphysicians— 
rather than all non-incapacitated humans who have reached the age of reason—would be 
bound by it.  If the Ought is truly moral it would seem to lack the criterion of being 
categorical or universal. 
In addition to this difficulty, D.Z. Phillips and H.O. Mounce have argued that this 
solution does not enable us to derive a moral Ought since moral concepts are not based 
merely on the notion of functions or essences.  In their article ―On Morality‘s Having a 
Point‖ they claim that ―moral concepts are not functional.‖224   In the context of making 
this claim, they make numerous references to the knife and farmer analogies which are 
utilized by MacIntyre and subsequently by other proponents of this solution to the IOP. 
Phillips and Mounce ask: ―…when a thing has a function the main criterion for its 
goodness will be that it serves that function well.  Clearly, then, not anything can count as 
a good knife.  But how does this help our understanding of moral goodness?‖225    Part of 
their concern is that simply knowing the facts about the function of a thing cannot help us 
in moral reasoning since it is not possible to know which facts to consider without first 
adopting a certain point of view on ethical matters.
226   
Unless one first has some ideas 
about the Ought before considering facts about functions and essences, one will not know 
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which facts to consider; and so simply knowing facts about human nature is not sufficient 
for deriving a specifically moral Ought. 
In illustrating this claim, Phillips and Mounce point out that a scientific rationalist 
and a Catholic housewife may know the exact same facts regarding birth control but still 
come to vastly different conclusions regarding what course of action to take.  The 
scientific rationalist might argue that the housewife ought to use birth control given the 
facts that she might wind up with a larger family than she can manage if she does not use 
it.  The housewife on the other hand might argue that the honor of bringing children into 
the world outweighs the fact that she could wind up in a less than desirable situation. 
Both the scientific rationalist and the housewife would know the same facts but come to 
different conclusions precisely because facts are not sufficient.  It is the normative point 
of view that the rationalist and housewife have before considering the facts that 
determine the conclusions they come to and that guide them in their consideration of the 
facts.
227   
Phillips and Mounce argue that it is our initial views about value that determines 
 
which facts we consider to be relevant and so it is not facts alone that enable us to make 
moral conclusions.
228
 
With this as a backdrop, it could be argued that proponents of this solution to the 
IOP fail to establish that knowledge of facts about human nature is sufficient for deriving 
a moral Ought since knowledge of the facts about function is not in itself what enables us 
to make conclusions about what morally ought to be done.  In other words, it could easily 
be argued that even if we know what the function of the human person is, this knowledge 
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would not automatically enable us to know what humans ought to do, morally-speaking. 
Although knowledge of the function of a knife enables us to know what a knife ought to 
do—and knowledge of the function of a farmer enables us to know what a farmer ought 
to do—knowledge of the function of a human being does not by itself enable us to know 
what humans ought to do.  What is necessary in addition to such knowledge is a 
presupposition that humans have a moral obligation to fulfill their essences.
229   
From the 
premises (1) human beings are rational by nature, or (2) part of the function of the 
human person is to be rational, we cannot validly conclude (3) humans have a moral 
obligation to be rational.  Only if we assume at the outset that humans have a moral 
obligation to fulfill their function or act in accord with their nature is it possible validly to 
derive (3) from (1) or (2). 
One forceful way of responding to this objection would be to claim that, provided 
we remain within the A-T tradition, this objection does not apply.  Since MacIntyre and 
other proponents of this solution to the IOP do not claim merely that we must return to a 
functional understanding of human nature but also that we must return to the whole A-T 
approach to ethics, and since within the A-T scheme it is granted that humans have a 
moral obligation to fulfill their function, this objection is impertinent.  In other words, a 
proponent of this solution could acknowledge that by returning to the A-T tradition, they 
are adopting the presupposition that saying ―Agent X morally ought to do Y‖ is 
equivalent to saying ―Y fulfills the nature of agent X‖.  Thus, although it is not clear that 
 
 
 
229  
Paterson makes a similar argument.  He points out that the statement (a) ―I ought to do X‖ 
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this solution to the IOP can be used to derive an Ought that is simultaneously moral and 
categorical, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot be used to derive an Ought that is 
moral.
230
 
Although this response may be an adequate way of responding to the objection of 
 
Phillips and Mounce, it does not resolve the previous objection.  Even if we agree to 
adopt the A-T tradition and hence agree to adopt this functional understanding of the 
moral Ought, we would nevertheless still need to address the question of whether it is 
possible, in the A-T tradition, to arrive at an adequate understanding of the function of 
the human person.  Even if saying ―Agent X ought to do Y‖ simply means ―Y is in 
accord with the nature of agent X‖, it would only be possible to know precisely what 
agent X ought to do if we know something about the agents nature.  And if knowing 
about the agent‘s nature requires metaphysical inquiry, the agent would need to be a 
peculiar type of agent—namely an agent with the capacity and time to engage in such 
metaphysical inquiry—if he were to be morally obligated to do Y. 
 
2. Is the Ought Prescriptive? 
It could be argued that this solution also fails in regard to providing us with a 
prescriptive Ought.   This solution begins with the notion of the function or telos of the 
human person and yet, even if agents can come to know what this function is, such 
knowledge will not guide or influence the actions of agents unless they already happen to 
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126 
 
 
have a desire to fulfill that function.
231   
This is perhaps the biggest hurdle for the strong 
version of this approach and Geach himself admits this.  He says, 
calling a thing a good A does not influence choice unless the one who is choosing 
happens to want an A; and this influence on action is not the logically primary 
force of the word ‗good‘.  ‗You have ants in your pants‘, which obviously has a 
primarily descriptive force, is far closer to affecting action than many uses of the 
term ‗good‘.232 
 
In this passage, Geach himself acknowledges that simply to call something ―good‖ does 
not, in itself, provide motivation to pursue it.
233 
Just as calling a can of sardines ―good‖ 
will not induce agents to eat them unless they already desire to eat them, so calling 
certain traits ―good‖ and ―part of the essence of the human person‖ will not induce agents 
to seek to attain those traits unless they already have a desire to do so.
234
 
The easiest way of responding to this difficulty is to abandon the strong version 
and retain the weak version.  Since proponents of the weak version of this solution to the 
IOP admit that the desires of the agents are relevant and play some role in the derivation, 
there is no reason to suppose that the weak version of this solution would fail to provide 
us with a prescriptive Ought.  In line with this response, one could also make the claim 
that it is precisely when human agents act in accord with their essence—and thereby 
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fulfill their natural function qua humans—that they attain their most authentic desires. 
Otherwise stated, a natural law theorist who wished to take this approach could 
emphasize the sanctions claim which, as discussed in Chapter One, is one of the basic 
claims made by traditional natural law theorists. 
In his attempt to bypass the Euthyphro question, Lisska embraces the notion that 
it is possible to discover what humans ought to do without considering their desires.  He 
wants to avoid claiming that things are good merely because they are desired.  But he 
ends up going to the opposite extreme by asserting that the desires of agents are 
irrelevant.  Thus, his version of the solution, i.e., the strong version of the solution, 
cannot provide us with a prescriptive Ought.  Nevertheless, there is no reason to suppose 
that the weak version also fails in this respect. 
3. Is the Ought Categorical?
235
 
The first question that needs to be asked, especially if we accept the weak version 
of this approach, is whether the Ought derived thereby is categorical in the sense that it 
is not based on contingent aspects of agents.
236   
Again, the Ought of traditional natural 
law theory is categorical in the sense that it is universal, non-relativistic, pertains to all 
non- 
 
235  
I have already argued that there are difficulties in deriving an Ought that is simultaneously 
moral and categorical.  Here I will focus merely on the question of whether there are difficulties 
in deriving an Ought that is merely categorical. This will be helpful in trying to identify precisely 
what the strengths and weakness of this approach are and—in turn—will enable us to provide a 
more precise comparative analysis of the various solutions in Chapter Six. 
 
236  
The question of whether this method enables us to derive a categorical, non-hypothetical 
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incapacitated agents, and is not merely hypothetical.   Once we accept the weak version 
and admit that desires or inclinations play a role in the derivation of the Ought, it 
becomes necessary to establish that these desires are not changeable and hence do not 
leave room for a non-universal, relativistic, or merely hypothetical Ought.  Moreover, 
since both versions of this solution rely on the A-T notions of human nature and the 
human telos, it also becomes necessary to ask a second question, viz., whether these 
notions are such that a categorical Ought can be derived from them.  If human nature is 
contingent and variable, in the A-T tradition, then the Ought which stems from this nature 
would also be contingent and variable rather than universal and categorical. 
In addition to these issues, if one wishes to establish that the Ought derived via 
 
this approach is categorical in the sense that it applies to all persons, in all cultures, and at 
all times, one will have to address the objection that this solution only works within a 
particular tradition.   If this solution only works within the context of the A-T tradition, it 
would seem to follow that the Ought derived would not necessarily be categorical.  Since 
addressing this objection adequately would far surpass the limits of this chapter, I will 
address it in Chapter Six.  In this present chapter, I will consider only whether this 
solution works within the context of the A-T tradition within which it is developed. 
In regard to the first question above, it should be noted that Gewirth‘s objects to 
the approach of Aquinas because he speaks not only of human nature but also of the 
inclinations which stem from and are a consequence of human nature.  Gewirth argues 
that since the inclinations which humans have differ and are therefore not universal, the 
129 
 
 
Ought of Aquinas‘s theory of natural law is not categorical.237   Gewirth states that in the 
thought of Aquinas, 
…the things that constitute man‘s good are the things to which man has a natural 
inclination.  And to this the rationalistic thesis makes no independent 
contribution, for [Aquinas] says simply that reason apprehends, as the criterion of 
the things that constitute man‘s good, than man has a natural inclination to 
them.
238
 
 
Gewirth‘s concern here is that natural inclinations could in principle lead one person to 
apprehend X as good but another person to apprehend X as not good; and since, in 
Aquinas‘s theory of natural law, there is ―no independent contribution‖ made by reason, 
there is no way to remedy this problem.  For example, even though Aquinas claims that 
all persons are sentient by nature, one person‘s sentient nature could incline her toward 
gluttony while another person‘s sentient nature could incline her toward a more moderate 
diet.  Therefore, according to Gewirth, merely acknowledging that all persons are sentient 
by nature would not in itself leave us with a categorical Ought which pertains to all 
persons.  Even if we remain within the A-T tradition, then, it seems that it would be 
possible to claim that the Ought would vary from person to person.  Though human 
nature is held to be universal in this tradition, the tradition itself seems to rely not just on 
human nature but also on variable inclinations that stem from that nature. 
Although insightful, Gewirth‘s objection seems to be based on a 
misunderstanding of Aquinas.  Aquinas does not claim that natural law is based on any 
and all inclinations of humans but only on some inclinations.  These inclinations include 
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the inclinations to: preserve one‘s being, procreate, educate one‘s offspring, know the 
truth, and live in society.
239    
Given that these inclinations are basic and given that there is 
no reason to suppose that they are inclinations that are not shared in some way by all non- 
incapacitated humans, there is no reason to suppose that Gewirth‘s objection applies. 
Since there is no reason to suppose, for example, that some non-incapacitated humans 
lack the natural inclinations to know the truth or to self-preserve, there is no reason to 
suppose that Ought‘s derived from these inclinations would differ from person to person, 
culture to culture, or time to time.
240
 
In regard to the second question above, viz., the question regarding whether 
 
human nature itself could change from time to time, it is important to note that, in the A- 
T tradition, human nature and the human telos are not said to be merely universal, but 
also unchanging.  For example, in response to Empedocles‘s claim that species are not 
eternal, Aristotle says, ―the world is a whole, perpetual and eternal, and has never ceased 
to produce animals and plants and all their species.‖241   Similarly, in explaining the final 
cause of the generation of individuals in a species, Aristotle states: 
These, then, are the reasons of the generation of animals. For since it is 
impossible that such a class of things as animals should be of an eternal nature… 
that which comes into being is eternal in the only way possible. Now it is 
impossible for it to be eternal as an individual—for the substance of the things 
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that are is in the particular; and if it were such it would be eternal but it is possible 
for it as a species.
242
 
 
For Aristotle, the human species—and hence human nature—does not change from time 
to time but is eternal. 
Aquinas too believes that there are aspects of human nature that are unchanging. 
For example, although he acknowledges that it is possible for humans to become more 
rational
243 —and hence change in regard to the degree to which they exhibit rationality— 
he claims that the rational feature of human nature is itself unchanging and is the very 
essence or form of the body.
244 
It is the intellectual soul, that is, it is the rational aspect of 
human beings that makes humans what they are.  It is not the sensate or vegetative 
aspects of the human person that can be said to make a human specifically human.  Thus, 
in Aquinas, although it would be possible for a person to change in some way in regard to 
those aspects he or she has in common with animals, it would not be possible for a person 
to change in regard to the intellective component.
245   
To change in regard to this 
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244  ―Of one thing there is but one  substantial being. But the  substantial form gives  substantial being. 
Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form. But the  soul is the  substantial form of  man. 
Therefore it is impossible for there to be in  man another  substantial form besides the  intellectual soul.‖  (ST 
I, 76, 4) 
 
245  
K. Flannery interprets Aquinas as holding that precepts that proceed from inclinations which 
humans have in common with animals admit of exceptions unlike other more general precepts.  If 
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precepts are categorical even though others are not. Thus, there are two ways of responding to 
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component would not be to change in regard to qualities but, rather, to cease to be 
human.  Since Aquinas equates being human with having a rational soul, it would be at 
odds with his thought to claim that human nature can change or evolve in regard to this 
component.  Although he acknowledges that individual human beings are different from 
each other in some respects, he maintains that they do not differ in regard to having a 
rational soul.
246
 
Although there is much contemporary debate regarding whether there can be said 
to be a static and universal human nature, within the A-T tradition this is not something 
that is debated.  Thus, so long as we agree to remain within this tradition, there is no 
reason to suppose that we cannot derive a categorical ought by starting with the notion of 
human nature.  Since the rational or intellective soul is equated with human nature, this 
component cannot change without humans ceasing to be human.  Any Oughts that stem 
from this aspect of human nature would therefore also be unchanging.
247
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246    ―We must assert that the  intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the 
human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be 
attributed: for instance, that whereby a body is primarily healed is health, and that whereby the  soul knows 
primarily is knowledge; hence health is a form of the body, and  knowledge is a form of the  soul. The 
reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in act; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in 
act.‖  (ST, 76, 1) 
 
247
It would be possible to claim that there is room within the thought of Aquinas to claim that 
those precepts of natural law that stem from the non-rational aspect of human nature could 
change, there is not room to claim that those precepts that stem from the rational aspect of human 
nature could change. This will be discussed in more detail below. 
133 
 
 
4. Is the Ought Determinate? 
 
Even if the aspects of human nature and the types of desires that this method 
relies on are not contingent and are universal, it could still be argued that it would be 
possible to derive opposite conclusions regarding what humans ought to do and, hence, 
that there is a lack of determinacy.  Gewirth makes just this objection. We read: 
if man‘s good is identified with or derived from his nature in the sense of his 
distinctive mode of functioning, then…we get very different and indeed 
incompatible contents for man‘s good….  The Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of 
natural law seems to incur [this failing] …because the concept of human nature as 
[a] distinctive mode of functioning, on which it tries to ground its precepts, is too 
diffuse and varied to provide a determinate set of contents for natural law‖ 248 
 
Aristotle claims that rationality is a function which only humans have; but Gewirth points 
out that ―using an opposable thumb‖ and ―being capable of lying, cheating and stealing‖ 
are also distinctive functions.
249  
Since there are a great many functions that humans have 
but that other animals lack, the Oughts that—in theory—could be derived from a 
consideration of these functions are ―too diffuse and varied to yield such determinacy.‖250 
Gewirth‘s concern here is that the methodology Aristotle uses would leave us with 
indeterminate Oughts.  By using this methodology and starting with a specifically human 
function one could, for example, derive the conclusion that—since humans qua humans 
are social by nature—humans ought to seek to live peacefully in society.  And, since 
lying is not conducive to living peacefully in society, one could also derive the 
conclusion: lying ought to be avoided.   However, by using this methodology, one could 
also derive the conclusion that, since human qua human are capable of lying, humans 
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ought to lie.  Thus, since it would be possible to derive potentially contradictory 
conclusions by merely starting with specifically human functions, according to Gewirth, 
this approach cannot provide us with a determinate Ought. 
Gewirth takes this objection a step further by claiming that even if we limit 
ourselves to a consideration only of the social aspect of human nature, there is still room 
for indeterminacy.  Gewirth thinks that the precept Aquinas derives regarding avoiding 
offending those one must live with is valuable;
251 
and yet Gewirth also thinks that it is by 
starting with the social aspect of human nature, that Aquinas is able to derive the 
conclusion that killing heretics and upholding slavery is morally permissible.
252   
Here 
Gewirth‘s concern is not merely that Aquinas is able to justify something that should not 
be justified but that Aquinas is able to derive contradictory Oughts by starting with the 
fact that humans are social by nature.   In one case, Aquinas is able to derive the 
conclusion that one ought to avoid offending others; and in another case--according to 
Gewirth--he is able to derive the conclusion that it is morally permissible to slay heretics. 
Gewirth thus concludes that, ―even if we agree that men have a natural inclination to live 
in society, this inclination can be satisfied in very diverse ways….‖253 
In regard to Gewirth‘s concern above about the methodology utilized by Aristotle, 
it is important to note that although Aristotle‘s methodology could in theory lead to the 
derivation of different and indeterminate Oughts, Aristotle does not in fact derive such 
Oughts.  Aristotle indeed focuses on the rational capacity in distinguishing humans from 
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other animals, as Gewirth points out, but Aristotle does not focus on capacities such as 
having opposable thumbs or the capacity to lie.   In the Aristotelian scheme, such 
capacities are not the starting point of ethics, nor are they equated the human good.  In his 
Nicomachean Ethics, for instance, Aristotle argues that the specifically human good is an 
―activity of soul in conformity with excellence‖ and he carefully distinguishes bodily 
excellence from the excellence of the soul.
254   
He is not concerned with what 
 
distinguishes us from animals in a bodily sense—such as the type of thumbs we have— 
nor does he say that any use of the rational faculty—such as lying—constitutes an 
excellence of the soul. Not just any use of the rational faculty fulfills the Ought of 
Aristotles‘ ethics, only a proper use does; and this proper use involves practicing the 
intellectual virtues which would, it seems, preclude lying.
255   
Gewirth‘s objection to 
Aristotle thus appears to be based on a superficial reading of Aristotle‘s position and so 
his objection would not suffice to prove that this solution to the IOP fails in regard to 
determinacy—provided that we agree at the outset to remain within the A-T tradition. 
In regard to Gewirth‘s concern that Aquinas has in fact derived indeterminate, 
contradictory Oughts, it should be noted that Gewirth has failed to provide adequate 
textual support that this occurs within Aquinas‘s discussion of natural law theory.  The 
discussion of heresy which Gewirth cites occurs within Aquinas‘s treatment of the 
theological virtue of faith.  Moreover, Aquinas does not draw on any natural law precepts 
in this discussion but, rather, on quotations from Scripture.  For this reason, there is no 
reason to suppose that this aspect of Gewirth‘s objection can be used to establish that 
Aquinas‘s theory of natural law as such is indeterminate.  This is not to say that 
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Aquinas‘s approach to divine law and the theological virtues is determinate.  If a 
theologian wished to establish that Aquinas‘s theory of divine law is determinate, much 
work would need to be done.  Nevertheless, there is no reason to suppose that the Oughts 
that Aquinas derives from the rational nature of the human person—within the context of 
his theory of natural law—are indeterminate.   Thus, so long as we consider only 
Aquinas‘s theory of natural law rather than his theory of divine law and the theological 
virtues, there is no reason to suppose that it would not be possible to derive determinate, 
natural-law-based Oughts. 
 
5. Is the Ought Egalitarian? 
In discussing the question of whether an egalitarian Ought can be derived using 
this method, it will again be helpful to begin with Gewirth.  Just as Gewirth objects to the 
approach of starting with the notion of human nature because he thinks cannot provide us 
with a categorical and determinate Ought, so too, he objects to it because he thinks it 
cannot provide us with an egalitarian Ought.  He argues that since humans by nature have 
a tendency to violence, it follows that—if we attempt to derive an Ought from the notion 
of human nature—it will be possible to derive an Ought that is non-egalitarian.256   In 
other words, since acts of violence do not foster the common good or the well-being of 
others, and since it would be possible to derive the conclusion ―Humans ought to be 
violent‖ from the premise ―Humans are have a natural tendency to violence,‖ this method 
will not work. 
 
 
 
256  
As noted in chapter one, by ‗egalitarian,‘ Gewirth means that the Ought must ―require that at least 
basic well-being be distributed equally as between the agent addressed and his potential recipients, or as 
among members of a society.‖  Gewirth, IOPR, 35-36. 
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Gewirth further argues that this objection is amplified by the fact that in his 
 
treatise on natural law Aquinas ―…moves from man‘s animal inclinations [directly] to the 
rational apprehension of the goodness of their object, and from this to the precepts 
whereby those objects are to be secured.‖257   Thus, Gewirth‘s concern is that Aquinas in 
fact leaves room for such a derivation.   More specifically, Gewirth‘s concern is that, 
since in Aquinas‘s treatment of natural law there is ―no independent place for a rational 
moderation of the inclinations,‖258 Aquinas himself leaves room for deriving a conclusion 
such as ―You ought to be violent.‖   Only if Aquinas claimed the inclinations were 
rationally considered and evaluated before the corresponding Oughts were derived from 
them, would there be room for claiming that an Ought prescribing acts of violence could 
not be derived from the human inclination towards violence.
259   
According to Gewirth, 
then, Aquinas has no ground for excluding the violent tendencies of human nature from 
consideration when deriving an Ought from the notion of human nature.
260
 
There are several problems with Gewirth‘s claim.  First, in discussing this 
difficulty, Gewirth relies explicitly on Spinoza‘s concept of human nature rather than on 
Aquinas‘s.  Gewirth asks the rhetorical question, ―on what ground can Aquinas exclude 
from this biologically-based segment of natural law the violence which ‗nature has taught 
all animals,‘ including Spinoza‘s observation that in the sea the big fish eat the little fish, 
 
 
257  
Gewirth, NLHA, 83. 
 
258  
Ibid. Gewirth cites ST I-II 94, 2. 
 
259  
For example, Aquinas states, ―because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in 
accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substance; that is, every substance 
seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature.  And by reason of this inclination, 
whatever is a means of preserving human life and of warding off its obstacles belongs to the 
natural law.‖  ST I-II, 94,2.  Here Aquinas proceeds from the human inclination to self-preserve 
directly to a statement about what belongs to the natural law. 
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and so forth?‖261   Since it is Spinoza‘s claim that humans are naturally inclined to 
violence, not Aquinas‘s claim, it is far from clear that Gewirth‘s concern is substantiated. 
Moreover, since the solution to the IOP which we are here considering presupposes that 
we remain within the A-T tradition, in order for Gewith‘s concern to be substantiated in 
this context he would have to establish that in the A-T tradition it is in fact accepted that 
humans are inclined to violence by nature.  Since this solution to the IOP involves 
precinding from non A-T traditions, and since Spinoza‘s view of human nature is at odds 
with the view found in the A-T tradition, Gewirth‘s objection would not hold. 
Another difficulty with Gewirth‘s objection is that Aquinas clearly states that one 
of the precepts of the natural law is to avoid offending others.  We read: 
…there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, 
which nature is proper to him; thus man has a natural inclination to…live in 
society.  And in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the 
natural law; for instance…to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, 
and other such things regarding the above inclination.
262
 
Since an act of violence would be a prime example of an act that offends others, it would 
be inaccurate to claim that there is any room whatsoever in Aquinas‘s discussion of 
natural law for deriving an Ought that prescribes violence.  Aquinas does not claim that 
humans are naturally inclined to be violent but, on the contrary, that they are naturally 
inclined to seek to live peacefully. 
 
 
 
 
261  
Gewirth, NLHA, 83. The emphasis is that of Gewirth. In this passage Gewirth is quoting: B. 
de Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, ch.16, para.2. 
 
262  
ST I-II, 94, 2.  Since Aquinas claims that the social inclination of human nature stems from the 
rational faculty, and since—like Aristotle—he also holds that this is an essential and unchanging 
aspect of human nature, it would follow that the egalitarian precept regarding living well in 
society is also unchanging.  Thus, it is possible to derive an Ought that is simultaneously 
egalitarian and categorical within the A-T scheme. 
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In response to Gewirth‘s concern it is also worth noting that Aquinas explicitly 
leaves room for deriving a positive prescription regarding the fostering of the common 
good.  In discussing law in general, Aquinas claims that law is always directed to the 
common good.  He says, ―since the law is chiefly ordered to the common good, any other 
precept in regard to some individual work, must be empty of the nature of a law, save in 
so far as it regards the common good.  Therefore every law is ordered to the common 
good.‖263  Moreover, in discussing natural law in particular, Aquinas claims that anything 
that is part of living well in society can be considered to be a natural law precept.  He 
says that avoiding offending others belongs to the natural law, but he also says that other 
such things (et cetera huiusmodi) regarding the social aspect of human nature also belong 
to the natural law.
264  
Assuming that fostering the common good can be considered to be 
conducive to living in society, it could be argued that a specific precept regarding the 
fostering of the common good would be appropriate given Aquinas‘s own comments. For 
these reasons, then, it would be proper to conclude that the Ought of Aquinas‘s theory of 
natural law can be properly categorized as egalitarian.
265
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ST I-II, 90, 3. 
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ST I-II, 94, 2. 
 
265  
In addition to the fact that Aquinas bases natural law on the common good—and does not leave room 
for deriving a non-egalitarian Ought—it is important to realize that proponents of this solution to the IOP 
themselves claim that the Ought derived from the notion of the function or essence of the human person 
pertains to the common good. Geach, for example, claims that it is a false dichotomy to distinguish 
between moral virtue for its own sake or for selfish, non-egalitarian reasons.  In commenting on human 
nature, he says,  ―men…do care what happens to others…that is the way men‘s inclinations go.‖ (Geach, 
The Virtues, 17.) MacIntyre also makes a similar claim and states: ―on the traditional Aristotelian 
view…what education in the virtues teaches me is that my good as a man is one and the same as the good 
of those others which whom I am bound up in human community.  There is no way of my pursuing my 
good which is necessarily antagonistic to you pursuing yours because the good is neither mine peculiarly 
nor yours peculiarly—goods are not private property.‖ (After Virtue, 229)  Here MacIntyre claims that 
within an Aristotelian context it does not make sense to claim that living a virtuous life would be egoistic or 
non-egalitarian. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
By way of summary, it is possible to utilize this teleological-functional solution to 
the IOP to derive an Ought that is determinate, categorical, and egalitarian.  Provided that 
we limit ourselves to the weak version of this solution—and thus acknowledge that the 
desires of the agent play a role in the derivation—it is also possible to derive a 
prescriptive Ought.  Nevertheless, it is not clear that this overall solution can be utilized to 
derive an Ought that simultaneously moral and categorical.  In order to establish that such 
an Ought could be derived, it would have to first be shown that all non-incapacitated 
agents are capable of doing the metaphysical enquiry necessary for coming to know the 
essence of the human person.  This is because in the A-T tradition it is held, first, that an 
Ought only pertains to moral obligation if it is possible for the agent to come to know the 
Ought and, second, that coming to know essences is very difficult at best (even when 
agents are able to engage in metaphysical enquiry).  Thus, those who propose this 
solution would either have to (1) settle for an Ought that is only binding to diligent 
metaphysicians rather than to all non-incapacitated humans, or (2) establish that it is 
consistent to claim—within the A-T tradition—that it is not necessary to engage in 
diligent metaphysical enquiry in order to come to an understanding of the human essence. 
Since proponents of this solution do not seem to be willing to do the latter, they need to 
ask themselves if they would be content to do the former.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
141 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
NEW NATURAL LAW THEORY AND 
 
THE UNDERIVED OUGHT 
 
 
―…Aquinas asserts as plainly as possible that the first principles of 
natural law, which specify the basic forms of good and evil and which 
can be adequately grasped by anyone of the age of reason (and not just 
by metaphysicians), are per se nota (self-evident) and indemonstrable.   
They are not inferred from facts.‖ 266 
 
 
Another solution to the IOP is to argue that Ought-conclusions are not derived 
invalidly from Is-premises because they are not derived at all but, rather, are self-evident. 
This is the solution put forth by new natural law theorists such as  Finnis, Grisez, R. 
George, and C. Paterson.  New natural law theorists claim that just as principles of 
speculative reason are not derived from other principles but are per se nota, so too is the 
first principle of practical reason. In addition, they claim that since there are self-evident 
goods, it is possible to grasp the basic precepts or Oughts of natural law without deducing 
them from facts about human nature.  In this chapter, I shall provide a brief overview of 
this new natural law solution to the IOP and defend it against the accusation that it is 
either not properly categorized as a theory of natural law theory or that it implements two 
non-co-assertable claims.  Subsequently I will consider whether or not this approach can 
be used to uphold a robust Ought.  I will ultimately argue that it can but that new natural 
law theorists would do well to do more to show that the basic, self-evident goods are in 
fact self-evident to all non-incapacitated agents.
267
 
 
266  
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 33.  Finnis 
cites: Aquinas, in Eth. V, lect. 12 para. 1018; ST I-II, 94, 2; and 91, 3c. 
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Due to the limits of this dissertation I will not address the question of whether new natural law 
theorists interpret Aquinas correctly.  Nevertheless, I will consider some of the commentaries on 
Aquinas offered by new natural law theorists. 
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A.  The New Natural Law Solution 
1.  Finnis and Grisez 
Grisez admits that most Thomists interpret Aquinas as holding that Ought 
conclusions are deduced from Is premises.  More specifically, he claims that most 
Thomists hold that a conclusion such as (1) You ought to avoid stealing can be deduced 
from: (2) the first principle of practical reason (FPPR) which is sometimes formulated as: 
Do good and avoid evil, and (3) the premise: stealing is not in accord with human 
nature.
268   
According to Grisez, however, in the thought of Aquinas, the principle of 
practical reason is not derived but, like the principle of non-contradiction, is ―…given to 
us by our most primitive understanding.‖269   Aquinas does not claim that the Ought is 
derived but that it is contained within underived, self-evident principles. In order to 
engage in theoretical reasoning, it is necessary first to have a grasp of the principle of 
non-contradiction.  It is not the case that, in the course of engaging in theoretical 
reasoning we deduce this principle from other principles or from facts about the world. 
Analogously, when we engage in any form of practical reasoning, it is necessary first to 
have a grasp of the first principle of practical reason.
270   
It is not the case that in the 
course of engaging in practical reasoning we deduce this principle from other principles 
or from facts about human nature.  Only when we have a grasp of this principle are we 
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Germain G. Grisez, ―The First Principle of Practical Reason: A commentary on the Summa 
theologicae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2‖, in Natural Law Forum 10 (1965): 169-201. Hereafter 
this will be abbreviated as: FPPR 
 
269  
FPPR, 175. 
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FPPR, 170-175.  Grisez cites: ST I-II, 94, 2.  In this passage, Aquinas claims that the role the 
principle of practical reason plays in practical reasoning is like the role the principle of 
contradiction plays in theoretical reasoning.  In this passage, Aquinas also claims that both of 
these principles are self-evident.  Because Aquinas says that they are self-evident, Grisez 
concludes that they are not derived or deduced from other principles. 
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capable of engaging in practical reasoning.  Thus, according to Grisez, Aquinas does not 
claim that our notion of the good or the Ought is derived from facts. 
In explicating this position, Grisez and Finnis deny that Aquinas claims that the 
other precepts that pertain to natural law are derived.  It is not only self-evident that good 
is to be done and pursued and evil avoided, it is also self-evident that things we have an 
inclination toward are good.  Since the very meaning or intelligibility of good is ―that 
which each thing tends toward‖, and since it is self-evident that we tend toward certain 
ends, it is self-evident that these ends are good.
271   
Thus, in order to grasp a precept such 
 
as knowledge is a good to be pursued, it is not necessary to deduce it from other precepts 
or from statements about human nature.  Grisez‘s and Finnis‘s main point here is that we 
do not need to determine whether an act is in accord with human nature in order to grasp 
that it is a good to be pursued.  For example, we need not come to an understanding that 
humans are rational by nature in order to reach the understanding that knowledge is good 
and worthy of pursuit.  On the contrary, all we need is an understanding that we in fact 
desire knowledge. 
In expounding upon what it is that we have basic inclinations toward, Finnis 
speaks at length about knowledge and points out that claiming that knowledge is not a 
self-evident good involves inconsistency.   In turn, he points out that knowledge must be 
considered to be an example of a self-evident good.  By ―knowledge‖ he means 
speculative knowledge or ―knowledge for its own sake‖ as opposed to mere instrumental 
knowledge which is sought as a means of acquiring something else.
272   
He argues: 
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FPPR, 178.  Grisez cites: ST I-II, 94, 2. 
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NLNR, 59. 
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the skeptical assertion that knowledge is not a good is operationally self-refuting. 
For one who makes such an assertion, intending it as a serious contribution to 
rational discussion, is implicitly committed to the proposition that he believes his 
assertion is worth making, and worth making qua true; he thus is committed to the 
proposition that he believes that truth is a good worth pursuing or knowing.  But 
the sense of his original assertion was precisely that truth is not a good worth 
pursuing or knowing.  Thus he is implicitly committed to formally contradictory 
beliefs.
273
 
 
Since uttering the proposition ―knowledge is not a good worth pursuing‖ implies that it is 
true that ―knowledge is not a good worth pursuing‖, the proposition also implies that 
truth is of value.
274   
In turn, since the proposition implies that truth is of value, it also 
 
implies that knowledge is of value and hence good.  Because it is not possible 
consistently to argue that knowledge is not a good, Finnis concludes that it is self-evident 
that it is indeed good.  In regard to the relation of this self-evident good to the Ought, 
Finnis‘s point is that if we grant that the FPPR is self-evident and—in addition—that 
knowledge is a self-evident good worthy of pursuit, it is possible to grasp the precept 
―knowledge ought to be pursued‖ without relying on non-self-evident statements 
regarding metaphysics or facts about human nature. 
In addition to knowledge, Finnis claims that we also have basic inclinations 
toward the following: life, play, aesthetic experience, sociability or friendship, practical 
reasonableness, and religion.   And since we have inclinations toward these, we are 
capable of grasping that they too are goods worthy of pursuit.  Thus, according to Finnis, 
it is likewise possible to grasp the proposition that ―life, play, aesthetic experience, etc. 
ought to be pursued‖ without having to deduce the proposition from statements or facts 
regarding human nature.   In short, his claim is that we do not need to conduct studies 
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NLNR, 74-75. 
 
274  
Finnis also says that the proposition ―I do not exist‖ is operationally inconsistent since, by 
uttering it, one thereby implies that he or she exists.  See NLNR, 74. 
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regarding facts about human nature—or study metaphysics and philosophical 
anthropology—before being able to grasp propositions such as: ―I ought to preserve my 
life‖ and ―I ought to refrain from being unreasonable when pursuing things that I see as 
worthy of pursuit‖.275 
Although Grisez and Finnis hold that the FPPR and the basic precepts of natural 
 
law concerning basic goods are not derivable—and that we must have a grasp of them if 
we are to engage in practical reasoning at all—it is important to note that they do not hold 
that these precepts are innate, that no experience whatsoever is necessary to grasp them, 
or that theoretical reasoning plays no role in coming to a deeper understanding of them. 
Grisez states, ―of course, one cannot form these principles if he has no grasp upon what is 
involved in them, and such understanding presupposes experience.‖276   Similarly, in 
commenting on deepening our understanding of the basic goods, Grisez and Finnis state, 
―theoretical reflection deepens [one‘s] understanding of the basic goods, and knowledge 
about facts bearing on their instantiation is necessary to pursue them effectively.‖277 
Thus, neither Grisez nor Finnis claim that these principles can be fully grasped without 
any experience whatsoever of the world.  All they claim is that these principles are not 
deduced or derived from other premises or from an understanding of human nature that is 
attained through theoretical reasoning.
278
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This latter proposition pertains to the self-evident good of practical rationality. 
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FPPR, 195.  The emphasis is mine.  See also Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, 
―Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends‖ in American Journal of Jurisprudence 99 
(1987): 106.  Hereafter this will be abbreviated as: PPMT. 
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It is also important to note that Grisez and Finnis acknowledge both that the 
specifically moral Ought does not emerge until a consideration of all the basic goods is in 
place and that the FPPR is relied upon even in faulty moral reasoning.  They should not 
be interpreted as claiming that the single precept ―knowledge ought to be pursued‖ is in 
itself moral in nature.   The principle of practical reason and the basic goods considered 
individually merely provide us with ―pre-moral goods‖.   In order to attain a specifically 
moral good, all of the basic goods and all of the principles of practical knowledge must 
be considered.  We read, 
…the ought to be which calls for morally right choice represents the full 
directiveness of the principle of practical knowledge while the is to be which 
commends the morally wrong choice represents only a fragment of that 
directiveness operating in isolation from the whole.  …only morally right choices 
respond fully to all of the principles of practical knowledge.  Thus, only morally 
right choices respond perfectly to the first principle of practical knowledge.
279
 
Thus, according to Grisez and Finnis, the pre-moral Ought corresponds in some way to 
the FPPR and to a basic good or set of basic goods, but it does not correspond fully to all 
of the basic goods.  The moral Ought, on the other hand, corresponds fully to the FPPR 
and to all of the basic goods; and as such, the moral Ought pertains to integral human 
fulfillment rather than only to partial human fulfillment.
280    
An agent who sought the 
good of aesthetic experience while acting contrary to the good of friendship or any of the 
other basic goods, for example, would utilize the FPPR and would necessarily grasp that 
aesthetic experience is a basic good, but she would nevertheless fail to act in accord with 
the moral Ought.  Likewise, a scientist who sought to learn more about human reflexes 
by killing human subjects would grasp the FPPR and the good of knowledge, but would 
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still fail to abide by a moral Ought since killing human subjects would involve acting 
contrary to the basic good of life.  According to Grisez and Finnis, the moral Ought only 
emerges when all the basic goods and integral human fulfillment are preserved; yet they 
still maintain that, since the basic goods can be grasped without first considering the 
metaphysics or anthropology, the moral Ought can be grasped without deriving it from 
facts about human nature. 
In regard to the IOP, Grisez specifically argues that natural law theorists who 
claim that we must begin with facts about human nature and then derive the Ought- 
conclusion—including theorists who interpret Aquinas as making such a claim—must 
respond to the objection that this derivation is invalid. He states, 
if one supposes that principles of natural law are formed by examining kinds of 
action in comparison with human nature and noting their agreement or 
disagreement, then one must respond to the objection that is impossible to derive 
normative judgments from metaphysical speculations.
281
 
 
Grisez‘s contention, then, is that those who wish to begin with non-normative premises 
about the essence of the human person and derive normative conclusions about what 
humans ought to do and avoid—such as the philosophers discussed in chapter four—must 
explain how it is possible to bridge the gap.  But those who begin with self-evident 
normative premises are capable of bypassing this difficulty since there is no fact—value 
gap to bridge. 
In line with this general thesis regarding the IOP, Grisez and Finnis elsewhere 
argue that any attempt to derive an Ought from facts about human nature ends up being 
enthymematic.  For example, McInerny attempts to derive the Ought-conclusion ―Joe 
ought to go on a diet‖ from the Is-premises ―Joe weighs two hundred and fifty pounds 
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[which means he is overweight]‖ and ―It is not healthy to be overweight.‖282 But Grisez 
and Finnis are quick to point out that such a derivation is invalid as such and relies on the 
more basic premise ―Health is a good to be pursued and protected.‖ Since Grisez and 
Finnis think this more basic premise is a self-evident specification of the FPPR, rather 
than a truth of metaphysics or anthropology, they think that McInerny fails to establish 
that it is possible to derive an Ought conclusion merely from factual premises.  Only if 
we rely on self-evident Ought principles such as ―Health is good‖ and ―Good ought to be 
done and pursued‖ is it possible validly to conclude that ―Joe ought to go on a diet.‖ 
Grisez elsewhere comments specifically on the naturalistic fallacy and in so doing 
he gets to the heart of the new natural law response to the IOP.  He says, 
the point of saying that good is to be pursued is not that good is the sort of thing 
that has or is this peculiar property, obligatoriness—a subtle mistake with which 
G. E. Moore launched contemporary Anglo-American ethical theory.  The point 
rather is to issue the fundamental directive of practical reason.  ‗Is to be‘ is the 
copula of the first practical principle, not its predicate; the gerundive is the mode 
rather than the matter of law.  To know the first principle of practical reason is not 
to reflect upon the way in which goodness affects action, but to know a good in 
such as way that in virtue of that very knowledge the known good is ordained 
toward realization.
283
 
 
To know that something is good and that it ought to be done does not involve discovering 
that a particular thing has a particular quality—in a way analogous to discovering that a 
particular banana has the quality yellowness—rather, it simply involves being aware that 
a particular thing is worthy of pursuit in some way. To know that knowledge is good and 
 
ought to be pursued, for example, it is not necessary first to investigate whether humans 
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Ralph McInerny, ―The Principles of Natural Law‖, in American Journal of Jurisprudence 25 
(1980), 1-12.  This work of McInerny‘s is cited by Grisez and Finnis, in ―The Basic Principles of 
Natural Law: A Reply to Ralph McInerny,‖ in American Journal of Jurisprudence 21 (1981), 24. 
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are rational by nature.  It is only necessary to know—from a first person perspective— 
that one in fact finds knowledge to be worth pursuing.  As such, it is not necessary to 
know human nature from a theoretical or second-person point of view; it is sufficient to 
know one‘s nature via an experience of one‘s own inclinations.  And since, in addition, it 
is possible to grasp that ―good ought to be pursued‖ without deducing it from some other 
proposition, it is possible to grasp that ―knowledge ought to be pursued‖ without 
deducing it from some non-Ought premise. 
         2.  Is This Really a Version of Natural Law Theory? 
Before asking whether the new natural law solution to the IOP can uphold a robust 
Ought, it will be helpful first to consider whether new natural law is appropriately 
categorized as a theory of natural law insofar as it incorporates the main claims of natural 
law theory.  One of the most common objections to Grisez‘s and Finnis‘s solution to the 
IOP is that it is not an authentic theory of natural law since it does not have an adequate 
grounding in human nature.  As stated in Chapter One, one of the basic claims of natural 
law theory is that there is an ontological and epistemological grounding of the Ought in 
human nature.  Since new natural law theorists prescind from overt considerations of 
human nature when discussing our grasp of the precepts of natural law, it would seem 
that they fail to implement and acknowledge these basic claims.  If it is the case that facts 
about human nature are not an essential element of their theory, their theory cannot 
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properly be categorized as a theory of natural law and hence their solution to the IOP 
 
could not be considered a viable solution for natural law theorists. 
 
Veatch is among those who make this type of objection.
284   
In doing so, he 
accuses Finnis of the following: (i) denying that morals and ethics have a basis in nature 
or the facts of nature, (ii) believing that there is a stringent separation between Is and 
Ought and between facts and values, (iii) insisting that ethical principles can have no 
grounding in fact and nature, and (iv) supposing that ethics is absolutely independent of 
metaphysics and the knowledge of nature.
285   
It is for these reasons he concludes that 
Finnis‘s theory is natural law without nature and that ―new natural law theory‖ is a 
misnomer.
286
 
Given many of Finnis‘s claims, it is easy to sympathize with Veatch.  Finnis 
clearly rejects the ―perverted faculty argument‖, i.e., the argument that actions are always 
morally impermissible if they involve using a faculty in a way contrary to its natural 
purpose.
287   
Moreover, as we have seen, Finnis also clearly asserts that moral concepts 
―…are not inferred from metaphysical propositions about human nature… or about ‗the 
function of a human being‘, nor are they inferred from a teleological conception of nature 
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or any other conception of nature.‖288   Veatch‘s criticism thus seems to be substantiated, 
at least at first glance. 
Although it is easy to understand why natural law theorists might make this 
overall objection to new natural law theory, it nevertheless seems to be based on a poor 
interpretation of Finnis and Grisez.   In his response to Veatch, Finnis unequivocally 
states, ―my thesis does not for a moment deny that the understanding thus attained can be 
integrated into a general account of human nature, i.e. of human potentialities and their 
various forms of fulfillment‖.
289   
He also bluntly advises Veatch to ―read what [I] have 
 
written, strictly and fully.‖290   Both Finnis and Grisez—in their response to McInerny— 
 
also state, 
 
we have never said that one cannot pass from metaphysical and/or factual truths 
together with principles of practical reasoning to normative conclusions.  Our 
point rather was that there can be no valid deduction of a normative conclusion 
without a normative principle, and thus that first practical principles cannot be 
derived from metaphysical speculations.
291
 
 
Therefore, it is misguided to object to new natural law theory merely on the pretext that 
Grisez and Finnis leave no room for asserting that the Ought has a grounding in human 
nature. 
Even if one considers these added claims of new natural law theorists, however, it 
could still be argued that the following two claims of Finnis are not simultaneously 
justifiable:  (1) the first principles of natural law are self-evident and not derived from 
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facts about human nature, and (2) the first principles of natural law are grounded in 
human nature insofar as facts about human nature explain why that which is a human 
good is a true human good.  This is precisely the objection that has been made by M. 
Murphy and it deserves consideration.
292
 
Murphy‘s concern is not that these two statements are contradictory but that they 
are non co-assertable, by which he means that if claim (1) can be justifiably asserted then 
claim (2) cannot; and if (2) can be justifiably asserted then claim (1) cannot.
293 
In other 
words, Murphy‘s concern is that, if the first principles of natural law are truly self- 
evident, it does not make sense simultaneously to claim that facts about human nature 
explain why we ought to pursue a particular good.  If we are justified in holding that ―it is 
self-evident that x is to be pursued‖, then, it does not seem that we can also be justified in 
claiming that ―facts about human nature are necessary to explain why x is to be pursued‖. 
Analogously, if we are justified in asserting that the principle of non-contradiction is self- 
evident and cannot be validly deduced from other statements, we could not also be 
justified in asserting that the principle of non-contradiction can be deduced from certain 
statements or facts.  Thus, even if Finnis is interpreted as an authentic natural law 
 
theorist, his theory might be problematic in other ways. 
Murphy‘s concern here is also that unless we can interpret new natural law 
theorists as being proponents of claim (2), we cannot properly categorize them as natural 
law theorists. Murphy acknowledges that Finnis and Grisez hold (3) that the first 
principles of natural law are grounded in human nature in that if human nature were 
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different, certain goods would no longer be available for humans.  Nevertheless, Murphy 
quickly points out that even non-natural law theorists suscribe to such a claim.  He argues 
that if a theory asserts only claim (3), then it is ―indistinguishable in relevant respects 
from any other moral theory (such as that proposed by G.E. Moore, for example) that 
asserts the existence of objective goods.  For no moral theorist could reasonably deny that 
if human nature were sufficiently different, certain goods would be inaccessible to us.‖294 
It is for this reason that Murphy concludes that, regardless of the fact that Finnis 
acknowledges claim (2), it is not clear that he can properly be categorized as a natural 
law theorist. 
It does indeed seem that Finnis would accept (2).  As Murphy points out, Finnis 
clearly states: ― the basic goods are basic reasons for acting because they are aspects of 
the fulfillment of persons, whose action is rationally motivated by these reasons.‖295    As 
Murphy has also pointed out, Finnis also claims that ―human nature determines ‗why the 
[self-evident practical] principles are principles of natural law.‖296   Thus, it is not my 
intention to argue against Murphy‘s interpretation of Finnis in this regard. 
Nevertheless, while Murphy indeed seems to be justified in maintaining that 
Finnis asserts (2), it is not at all clear that he is justified in maintaining that Finnis makes 
non co-assertable claims by proposing (1) and (2).  One of the problems with Murphy‘s 
argument is that he fails adequately to consider the contexts in which Finnis makes these 
two claims.  As a result, it seems that Murphy fails to realize that when Finnis speaks of 
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derivability in (1), there is indication that he is speaking of a different type of derivability 
than when he speaks of derivability, or groundedness, in (2).  As stated above, Murphy 
interprets Finnis as claiming that principles of natural law are self-evident and 
underivable as well as claiming that the principles of natural law are in no sense derivable 
from human nature.   It is for this reason that he also interprets Finnis as making non co- 
assertable claims.  However, if Finnis‘s first claim pertains to a different type of 
derivability than in his second claim, there is no reason to suppose that his claims are non 
co-assertable. 
Before considering this in more detail, it is important to note that Finnis explicitly 
asserts that there are multiple types of derivability.  In Natural Inclinations and Natural 
Rights, he claims that in an epistemological sense we cannot derive an Ought from an Is. 
We read: ―. . . propositions about primary (secundum se) human goods are not derived 
from propositions about human nature or from any other propositions of speculative 
reason. . . . In this sense, ought is not derived from is.‖ After making this statement, he 
immediately adds the following: 
but. . . if we shift from the epistemological to the ontological mode, the same 
methodological principle, in its application to human beings, presupposes and 
thus entails that the goodness of all human goods. . . is derived from (i.e. 
dependent upon) the nature which, by their goodness, those goods perfect.  For 
those goods– which as ends are the rationes of practical norms or oughts– would 
not perfect that nature were it other than it is.  So, ought ontologically depends 
on– and in that sense may be said to be derived from– is.297 
In these passages, Finnis is claiming that in an epistemological sense, an Ought cannot be 
derived from an Is since we do not need to know propositions about human nature in 
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order to know that certain things are good and hence ought to be pursued. For example, 
we do not need to accept the premise that humans are rational by nature in order to know 
that knowledge is a good worth pursuing.  In these passages, Finnis is also claiming that, 
in an ontological sense, the Ought depends on the Is since goods—which provide the 
foundation for the Ought— are only genuine goods if they perfect human nature.  Life 
and friendship, for example, are only genuine goods if they perfect human nature.  With 
this as a backdrop, then, let us return to a consideration of the allegedly non co-assertable 
claims. 
As mentioned above, when Finnis discusses (1), he does so within the context of 
trying to show that a theory of natural law—in spite of appearances— does not 
necessarily fall into the IOP.  He is claiming that a natural law theory need not be accused 
of deriving an Ought from an Is if the theory asserts that first principles of natural law are 
self-evident.   Thus, when Finnis asserts (1), he does so within the context of showing 
that it is not necessary to deduce principles of natural law from statements about human 
nature in order to know or understand those principles. 
Given this context, it seems safe to interpret (1) as an epistemological claim about 
the first principles.  His claim is that one need not know that certain statements about 
human nature are true in order to know the first principles are true.  For this reasons we 
can reformulate (1) as follows: 
(1R): The first principles of natural law are self-evident and thus not 
epistemologically deduced from statements about human nature 
(i.e., it is not necessary to know that certain statements about 
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human nature are true in order to know that first principles of 
natural law are true).
298
 
 
The claim here is not that there is no ontological link between first principles of natural 
law and human nature. 
Although (1R) is addressed within the context of an epistemological concern, it 
seems that both (2) and (3) are addressed within the context of other concerns.  As a 
result of this, it also seems safe to assume that (1R) and (2) are co-assertable.  Before 
considering this in more detail, let us first explore the texts that Murphy points to when 
arguing that Finnis asserts that there is some grounding of principles of natural law in 
human nature.
299
 
 
One of these texts is found within the context of Finnis‘s response to the 
criticisms of Veatch.  Again, Veatch‘s accusation is that Finnis and Grisez are (1) 
denying that morals and ethics have a basis in nature or the facts of nature, (2) believing 
that there is a stringent separation between ‗is‘ and ‗ought‘ and between facts and values, 
(3) insisting that ethical principles can have no grounding in fact and nature, and (4) 
supposing that ethics is absolutely independent of metaphysics and the knowledge of 
nature.
300   
In responding to Veatch, Finnis only commits himself to the following:  morals 
and ethics have a basis in human nature (or facts about human nature), there is not a 
stringent separation between Is and Ought or between facts and values, ethical principles 
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can have a grounding in fact and nature, and ethics is not absolutely independent of 
metaphysics and the knowledge of nature. There is no evidence in this text that Finnis is 
making a claim that one must have knowledge that statements about human nature are 
true in order to grasp first principles; nor is there evidence that Finnis is claiming 
anything other than that ethics can have an ontological grounding in human nature and 
facts about human nature.  All he commits himself to is the claim that there is some link 
between ethics and facts. 
A second text Murphy refers to in establishing that Finnis asserts that principles 
of natural law are grounded in human nature, is found in a context in which Finnis is 
providing a dialectical defense of basic goods and first principles of natural law.
301    
The 
passage reads: 
why is it that the basic goods are the ultimate reasons for acting?  Why do these 
goods have motivating power?  These are theoretical questions.  In trying to 
answer them, we are not trying to deduce first principles; that cannot be done. 
Rather, we are continuing our dialectical defense of these principles, by 
explaining how basic goods are both one with and distinct from persons, who, 
therefore, in one respect are and in another are not the ultimate reason for every 
human action.  Any creature which acts is one whose reality is not fully given at 
the outset; it has possibilities which can be realized only through its acting.  The 
basic goods are basic reasons for acting because they are aspects of the fulfillment 
of persons, whose action is rationally motivated by these reasons.
302
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In this passage, Finnis indeed claims that there is some relation between first principles 
and human nature.  What he does not claim, however, is that this relation involves an 
epistemological derivability or deduction of first principles from factual statements about 
human nature.  Indeed, Finnis explicitly denies that there is any such derivability. 
In yet another text that Murphy refers to, Finnis states: 
 
the diversity of the basic goods is neither a mere contingent fact about human 
psychology nor an accident of history. . . .  Rather, being aspects of the fulfillment 
of persons, these goods correspond to the inherent complexities of human nature, 
as it is manifested both in individuals and in various forms of community. . . .  (1) 
As animate, human persons are organic substances.  Life itself . . . health, and 
safety are one category of basic good.  (2) As rational, human persons can know 
reality and appreciate beauty and whatever intensely engages their capacities to 
know and to feel.  Knowledge and esthetic experience are another category of 
basic good.  (3) As simultaneously rational and animal, human persons can 
transform the natural world by using realities, beginning with their own bodily 
selves, to express meanings and purposes.
303
 
 
 
In this passage, Finnis is clearly asserting that there is a strong relationship between 
human nature and basic goods to be pursued.  For this reason, Murphy is right in claiming 
that Finnis can be read as asserting that facts about human nature explain why certain 
basic goods are true human goods.  However, in this passage, Finnis does not claim that 
one must accept statements about human nature in order to know or understand the first 
principles of natural law and, hence, there is no reason to suppose that he is making a 
statement about epistemological derivability. 
With these considerations as a backdrop, it should be evident that Murphy‘s 
accusation that Finnis holds non co-assertable claims fails.  It is possible for Finnis 
justifiably to claim that one need not know that certain factual statements about human 
nature are true in order to understand first principles of natural law.  It is even possible 
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for Finnis justifiably to claim that—epistemologically speaking— first principles of 
natural law cannot be adequately derived from facts about human nature.  However, it is 
also possible for Finnis justifiedly to claim that first principles of natural law are 
ontologically derived from or related to human nature.  In short, it is possible for him to 
justifiedly claim both of the following: 
(1R): The first principles of natural law are self-evident and thus not 
epistemologically deduced from statements about human nature 
(i.e., it is not necessary to know that certain statements about 
human nature are true in order to know that first principles of 
natural law are true). 
 
 
(2): The first principles of natural law are ontologically derived from 
human nature (i.e. goods which are referred to in the first 
principles of natural law are genuine goods because they perfect 
human nature). 
 
 
In short, if the first principles of natural law are self-evident, there is no reason to suppose 
that it cannot also be justified that they are not also ontologically grounded on human 
nature.  It may be self-evident that knowledge is a good worth pursuing.  It may also be 
the case that knowledge is a genuine good because human nature is what it is. 
Although Finnis claims that the principles of natural law are not epistemologically 
derivable from human nature, it would be inaccurate to conclude that he therefore fails to 
implement and accept the epistemological claim of natural law.  As previously 
mentioned, one of the basic claims of natural law theorists is that knowledge about 
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human nature in some way enables one to know or determine what ought to be done and 
avoided.  New natural law theorists insist that it is not necessary to know premises about 
human nature in order to know the Ought precepts of natural law.  Nevertheless, they do 
not hold that no knowledge whatsoever about human nature is necessary in order to know 
these precepts.  They are very forthcoming in admitting that the agent must know and be 
aware of his own inclinations toward the basic goods in order to know the precepts.  In 
explicating this position, Finnis states: 
…practical reasoning begins not by understanding this nature from the outside, as 
it were, by way of psychological, anthropological, or metaphysical observations 
and judgments defining human nature, but by experiencing one‘s nature, so to 
speak, from the inside, in the form of one‘s inclinations.  But again, there is no 
process of inference.  … by a simple act of non-inferential understanding one 
grasps that the object of the inclination which one experiences is an instance of a 
general form of good, for oneself (and others like one). 
304
 
 
It is not that knowledge of human nature has no relation to knowledge of the Ought, it is 
merely that experience of one‘s own nature ―from the inside‖ is sufficient to understand 
what is good and hence what ought to be pursued.  In explicating this position Finnis, 
together with Grisez, states, ―theoretical reflection [about human nature] deepens [one‘s] 
understanding of the basic goods, and knowledge about facts bearing on their 
instantiation is necessary to pursue them effectively.‖305    Thus, again, it is not that 
knowledge of human nature has no relation to knowledge of the Ought.   There is a clear 
relation between knowledge of one‘s own nature and knowledge of what one ought to do; 
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so the epistemological claim of natural law theory is clearly implemented by Grisez and 
 
Finnis.
306
 
 
By way of summary, then, Murphy‘s claim is that Finnis ―cannot justifiably assert 
that natural law is strongly grounded in human nature if the principles of the natural law 
are in no sense derivable from human nature; Finnis can assert (1), or (2), but not both.‖ 
What Murphy fails to take into consideration, however, is that (1) pertains to 
epistemological derivability while (2) does not.  Finnis never asserts that the principles of 
the natural law ―are in no sense derivable from human nature‖ but merely that they are 
not epistemologically derivable from human nature. 
 
As a consequence, there is no reason to conclude that Finnis has made non-co- 
assertable claims.   Moreover, since he has admitted that there is an ontological 
relationship between human nature and the Ought, there is no reason to conclude that he 
cannot be properly categorized as a natural law theorist. 
 
 
A. A Critique of the New Natural Law Solution 
The question which must be asked at this point is whether the new natural law 
theory provides us with a method of derivation that provides us with a robust Ought 
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which is moral, prescriptive, categorical, determinate, and egalitarian.  Since Grisez and 
Finnis claim that the Ought is not deduced from factual statements, the question thus 
becomes: Do they provide us with an underived robust Ought? 
 
 
1. Is the Ought Moral? 
Numerous philosophers have argued that the Ought of new natural law theory is 
not moral in nature.  In fact, this is one of the most common objections to it.   McInerny, 
for instance, argues that the basic goods do not pertain to a moral Ought given that they 
are not themselves moral values.  He states: ―…the basic values that Finnis lists, 
expanding a bit on Grisez, namely Life, Knowledge, Play, Aesthetic Experience, 
Sociability, Practical Reasonableness, and Religion are not moral values, singly, or 
cumulatively.‖307   V. Kerruish objects to the new natural law for similar reasons and 
points out that the basic goods are too broad to guide practical reasoning.  Commenting 
on the good of friendship, she states, ―friendship or love might encompass individually 
disinterested benevolence to all of humanity or the limited egoism of relationships 
between individuals.‖308   Since a consideration merely of the good of friendship could 
enable us to justify seeking friendship for any reason whatsoever, there is no reason to 
conclude that an Ought that is based on the this good would necessarily be moral in 
nature.  Moreover, given that Finnis and Grisez themselves claim that the FPPR and the 
basic goods are ―pre-moral‖, it is no surprise that such objections have emerged.  If the 
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FPPR and precepts concerning the basic goods are the origin of the Ought, it needs to be 
established—rather than assumed—that this Ought can be used as a foundation for a 
moral Ought.  More specifically, it needs to be established that an Ought based on the 
basic goods and the FPPR would have a necessary relation to the fostering of the basic 
well-being of the agent and others.
309
 
Although it is no surprise that these objections have emerged, they seem to be 
 
based on an inadequate understanding of the new natural law position.   It is important to 
look at the whole of Grisez and Finnis‘ claim rather than merely part of it; and it is 
precisely when we only consider part of it that these objections seem substantiated.  As 
discussed above, according to Grisez and Finnis, the Ought becomes moral only when 
integral human fulfillment is considered and when all of the basic goods are grasped. 
They fully acknowledge that considering the basic goods individually, while prescinding 
from a consideration of integral human fulfillment, is inadequate if we are seeking a 
moral Ought. 
If we consider this aspect of the new natural law position, it is not clear that 
McInerny‘s and Kerruish‘s objections hold.  Finnis and Grisez would fully agree with 
McInerny that the basic goods are not themselves moral values.  What they would insist 
upon, however, is that once integral human fulfillment and all of the basic goods which 
make up this integral fulfillment are considered, the Ought becomes moral.  It is not 
entirely clear what McInerny means by moral but if he means that it has a relation to 
authentic human well-being, it is not at all clear that he could maintain that the Ought of 
new-natural law theory is not moral in this sense.  McInerny is right in his assertion that 
the basic goods in themselves are not moral values but if he wishes to claim that the basic 
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goods taken together have no relation to basic human well-being, his claim is highly 
implausible and counter-intuitive. 
If we consider the whole of Grisez and Finnis‘ position it is also not clear that—as 
Kerruish claims—the basic goods are too broad to provide direction for practical 
reasoning and hence too broad to provide a foundation for a moral Ought.  The example 
Kerruish provides concerning friendship, when considered in light of the whole of the 
new natural law position, is lacking.  If we consider friendship alone, without considering 
the other basic goods and integral human fulfillment, it is clear that it could not provide 
us with a moral Ought.  Simply considering the basic good of friendship would indeed 
leave us with too broad of a foundation since it would not preclude the possibility of 
upholding a non-moral precept such as, ―We ought to seek the good of friendship even if 
it does not foster human well-being.‖ However, if we consider the good of friendship 
while also considering integral human fulfillment and all of the other basic goods, the 
foundation would not be too broad.   By insisting that all the basic goods and integral 
human fulfillment must be considered—rather than merely one of some of the basic 
goods—Grisez and Finnis are thereby able to provide us with an Ought that is necessarily 
relevant to basic human well-being and therefore moral. 
 
 
2. Is the Ought Prescriptive? 
 
Given that new natural law theorists base their theory on basic, self-evident goods, 
there is little reason to doubt that their theory would fail in regard to providing us with a 
prescriptive Ought.  Since self-evident, basic goods are by definition goods that we in fact 
grasp as being worthy of pursuit, and since these basic goods are part of the very 
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foundation of the Ought, there is no reason to suppose that the Ought would fail in regard 
to having the capacity to induce people to action that is in accord with the Ought.  Grisez 
admits that the FPPR, when considered in isolation from the basic goods, ―merely offers 
rational direction without promoting the execution of the work to which reason direct.‖310 
He also admits that the FPPR ―is not an imperative demanding morally good action, and 
 
imperatives… cannot be derive from it…‖.311   Nevertheless, he insists that the FPPR is 
merely part of the foundation and that once the basic goods are considered, the action- 
inducing or prescriptive nature of the Ought emerges.  And since the moral Ought is 
based on both the FPPR and the basic goods, the moral Ought—not just the pre-moral 
Ought—would also be prescriptive in nature.  Since we in fact see the basic goods as 
worthy of pursuit, at least on some level, and since the moral Ought is based on them, the 
moral Ought is capable of inducing us to action.  We might at times—or even 
frequently—desire to pursue one of the goods to the exclusion of others and hence fail to 
act morally; but since the basic goods are grasped as worthy of pursuit, the moral Ought 
would still be prescriptive.
312   
A scientist might, for instance, desire to pursue the good of 
knowledge to such an extent that he begins to offend his friends and family.  In such a 
case, the scientist would be acting contrary to the good of friendship or sociability. 
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Nevertheless, this scientist would not thereby cease to grasp that friendship is a good and, 
moreover, it might be precisely after losing his friends and family that he would realize 
that he was lacking something and ought to change his ways.
313   
So long as we grant that 
the basic goods are in some sense each a necessary part of attaining integral fulfillment 
and that agents on some level in fact grasp them as worthy of pursuit—even thought they 
may at times pursue some good or goods to the exclusion of others—an Ought that is 
based on these goods will have prescriptive force.
314
 
The only way to argue that the moral Ought is not prescriptive would be to 
establish that agents are not capable of realizing the basic goods as goods.  So long as 
agents are capable of doing so, the moral Ought must be categorized as prescriptive.  For 
instance, to argue that the moral Ought is not prescriptive, it would be necessary to 
establish that agents who do not act in accord with the moral Ought are failing not merely 
failing to act in a way conducive to the attainment of the moral Ought but are also failing 
in the sense that they are not in fact able to grasp the basic goods as goods.  In short, it is 
insufficient to argue that the moral Ought is not prescriptive merely by pointing out that 
agents often seek one good –or several goods—at the exclusion of others.  Provided that 
agents on some level can identify the basic goods as goods, and hence as worthy of 
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pursuit, this is sufficient for establishing that the moral Ought is essentially 
prescriptive.
315 
 
3. Is the Ought Determinate?
316
 
 
In the proceeding chapter, we considered Gewirth‘s objection that Aquinas‘s 
theory of natural law is not determinate.  His objection is that Aquinas‘s theory of natural 
law cannot provide us with a determinate Ought because ―no independent contribution‖ is 
made by reason.
317   
Since natural inclinations can purportedly lead to the apprehension of 
x as good and also to the apprehension of x as not good, Gewirth concludes that these 
inclinations are not an adequate starting point for upholding a determinate Ought. 
Since new natural law theorists start with the agent‘s apprehension of basic goods 
when trying to provide a foundation for the moral Ought, it might seem that Gewirth‘s 
objection might indicate that it is impossible to arrive at a determinate moral Ought using 
this approach.  More specifically, Gewirth‘s objection seems to apply to the new natural 
law solution since this solution relies on each agent‘s first-person grasp of goods and 
since it is not clear that all agents necessarily grasp the same goods.
318   
Nevertheless, 
 
provided that there are truly ―basic‖ goods which all non-incapacitated agents grasp, it 
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agents might in fact grasp contradictory goods.  In addressing the question of categoricalness, I 
will be considering the question of whether the Ought of new natural law theory pertains to all 
non-incapacitated humans who are of the age of reason.  In actuality, however, these issues are 
almost impossible to separate when being treated in light of the NNL solution. 
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would not be possible to substantiate Gewirth‘s objection.   Thus, we are left with the 
question: Is there reason to assume that there are such goods? 
As discussed above, Finnis argues that the basic good of knowledge cannot be 
denied without falling into an operational contradiction.  Again, his claim is that anyone 
who attempts to argue—in a serious and rational manner—that knowledge is not a good, 
thereby implicitly acknowledges that knowledge is a good.  It is for this reason that 
Finnis concludes that knowledge is in fact basic good.  It is also for this reason that one 
might conclude that it would be impossible to have an indeterminate precept regarding 
the pursuit of this good.  Nevertheless, Finnis‘s rationale for concluding that knowledge 
is a basic good seems to be insufficient—on its own—for concluding that all non- 
incapacitated agents in fact grasp that knowledge is a basic good.  It could be argued that 
all Finnis really establishes is that any agent who engages in argumentation in fact grasps 
that knowledge is a good.  As a consequence, it could also be argued that an agent who 
does not in fact engage in argumentation, and who does not grasp that knowledge is a 
good, could fail to grasp the precept that knowledge is a good and hence ought to be 
pursued.  Moreover, it could be argued that an agent who had a distaste for argumentation 
and knowledge might even hold that knowledge ought to be avoided. 
There are two main ways one could respond to this difficulty.  First, it could be 
argued that although it is possible to imagine that there are agents who are thoroughgoing 
misologists and who believe that knowledge ought to be avoided, it does not seem that 
agents who are capable of engaging in practical reasoning could actually fail to 
acknowledge that at least some knowledge is good.   Any agent who is capable of 
engaging in practical reasoning must be capable of recognizing that ―good is to be done 
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and pursued‖.319    In addition, any agent who is capable of engaging in practical 
reasoning must be capable of recognizing that basic knowledge about the world is 
necessary if any good is to be attained.  Though there may be misologists who detest 
certain types of knowledge, it is not possible for an agent who is capable of engaging in 
practical reasoning to be a thoroughgoing misologist.   Hence, it does not seem possible 
that a non-incapacitated agent—who is capable of engaging in practical reasoning and 
who as has at least some inclinations that she wishes to fulfill— could fail to grasp that 
basic knowledge is good at least as a means.  And from this it follows that it would be 
impossible for a rational, non-incapacitated agent to hold that ―basic knowledge ought to 
be avoided‖. 
 
Another way of responding to this difficulty would be to argue that, although there 
is certainly no paucity of agents who detest having to undertake the oftentimes laborious 
task of learning, there is no reason to suppose that agents in fact detest knowledge per 
se.
320   
Who that has reached the age of reason and is not mentally disabled would prefer 
ignorance to knowledge if knowledge were easy to attain?  What agent, who happened 
upon a mysterious box omitting strange sounds would not want to peer inside? What 
agent upon hearing an extraordinary and perhaps scandalous story about a public figure 
would not want to know if the story was actually true?  There are many people 
who dislike engaging in laborious study.  There are also many disabled people who do 
not have a natural curiosity and desire to know for the sake of knowing.  But it is far from 
clear that there are any non-disabled, non-incapacitated agents, who are capable of 
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I am here relying on Aquinas‘s definition of ―good‖ as ―what all desire‖. (ST I-II, 94, 2) 
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reasoning and who do not have at least a minimal curiosity and desire to know at least 
some things.
321   
Therefore, it is also far from clear that knowledge fails in regard to being 
a basic good which can be—and in fact is—grasped as a good by all rational agents.322 
Provided that all agents are capable of grasping that knowledge is a good, and 
provided that it is impossible for non-incapacitated agents not to hold that at least some 
types of knowledge are good, there is no reason to conclude that the Ought precept 
pertaining to knowledge is indeterminate.  If new natural law theorists wished to uphold 
the precept that ―knowledge of mathematics ought to be pursued‖ such a precept would 
be indeterminate given that not all agents see knowledge of mathematics as a good to be 
pursued.  But this is not what natural law theorists are claiming.  They are merely 
claiming that knowledge in general is a good.  Since rational agents in point of fact seem 
to grasp that knowledge in general is good, there is no reason to suppose that the precept 
―knowledge ought to be pursued‖ is indeterminate. 
 
 
3. Is the Moral Ought Determinate? 
Since Grisez and Finnis would not admit that a consideration of only one basic 
good is sufficient for a moral Ought, we are now left needing to consider whether the 
Ought of new natural law theory is simultaneously moral and determinate.  A full 
treatment of this issue would require a thorough treatment of each of the basic good 
individually and a proof that none of them can be denied by non-incapacitated agents.   It 
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Finnis does not claim that knowledge is a good merely in the sense that it is a means to 
attaining other things.  He clearly holds that it is a good in itself.  (See: NLNR, 59) Thus, this 
second response to the above difficulty is more to the point. 
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As mentioned in previous chapters, in order to be categorical, it is sufficient that the Ought is 
binding to all non-incapacitated agents. 
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has been argued that one of the weaknesses of Finnis‘s discussion of the basic goods is 
that—although he provides a detailed argument that knowledge is a basic good—he does 
not provide an adequate discussion of all the basic goods. Because it has been argued that 
some of the basic goods are not in fact basic, since it is not self-evident to all agents that 
they are worthy of pursuit, it could be argued that it would not be possible to provide a 
determinate Ought for each of them.  And, since an Ought is only moral in Finnis‘s view 
if all of the basic goods are considered, it could in turn be argued that Finnis‘s version of 
new natural law theory cannot provide us with an Ought that is both moral and 
determinate.  Merely establishing that it is possible to uphold a determinate Ought 
regarding one or only some of the basic goods would not be sufficient. 
Because a full discussion of this issue would surpass the limits of this dissertation, 
I do not intend to argue that—as it stands—Finnis‘s version of natural law theory could 
provide us with a moral and determinate Ought.   Nevertheless, I would like to suggest 
that, on the condition that it is possible to draw up a list of authentically basic, self-evident 
goods, there is reason to suppose that it would be possible to provide a moral and 
determinate Ought.  Regardless of whether Finnis‘s entire list is justifiable, so long as it is 
possible to provide some such list of self-evident, basic goods—which are essential 
aspects of basic human well-being and fulfillment—it would also be possible to uphold a 
moral and determinate Ought. 
If, for example, it could be established that knowledge, friendship, and life are 
necessary aspects of integral human fulfillment (i.e., basic goods) and that it is impossible 
for non-incapacitated agents to deny this, it would be possible to provide a determinate 
and moral Ought by relying on such basic goods.  In other words, if it can be proved that 
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these three goods are necessary aspects of human well-being, that all agents are at least 
implicitly acknowledge this, and that the FPPR is self-evident, it would be possible to 
accept the following precept without deducing it from facts about human nature:  (1) 
―One ought to pursue knowledge, friendship, and life and avoid whatever is antithetical 
to these goods‖.   It would also be impossible to accept the opposite precept: (2) ―One 
ought to avoid knowledge, friendship, and life and pursue whatever is antithetical to 
these.‖  Moreover, provided that knowledge, friendship, and life are necessary aspects of 
human well-being, precept (1) would need to be categorized as moral. 
New natural law theorists would do well to provide more in-depth analysis of each 
of the basic goods.  They would also do well to provide more reasons for believing that 
the basic goods are in fact basic in the sense that all non-incapacitated agents in fact grasp 
them and in the sense that they are essential aspects of human well-being.  Provided that 
such a list can be substantiated, it could be used to uphold a determinate moral 
Ought. 
 
 
 
4. Is the Ought Categorical? 
 
Provided that the foregoing is accurate, there would be no reason to suppose that 
the NNL solution could not be utilized to uphold a categorical Ought.  Since Grisez and 
Finnis begin with the first-person perspective, the questions of determinacy and 
categoricalness overlap almost entirely.  If all non-incapacitated agents (1) at least 
implicitly grasp that certain things are basic goods, (2) grasp the FPPR, and (3) are 
capable of recognizing that the basic goods are necessary aspects of basic human well 
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being, then they would all be bound by the moral Ought; and hence the moral Ought 
would be properly categorized as categorical. 
5. Is the Ought Egalitarian? 
 
It might seem that the NNL approach would fail to provide an egalitarian Ought 
since it focuses on the first-person recognition of basic goods.  Since the FPPR and basic 
goods are grasped by the agent and since presumably the agent sees the basic goods as 
being good for himself, the Ought pertaining to each of the goods would be non- 
egalitarian.  Moreover, since the agent presumably sees the basic goods taken together as 
leading to his own integral fulfillment, the specifically moral Ought would likewise be 
non-egalitarian.  It would seem reasonable to conclude, then, that the Ought pertains to 
the good of the individual rather than to the common good and to the equal distribution of 
basic well-being among all members of society.
323
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that such a conclusion would fail to take into 
account the fact that Grisez and Finnis explicitly claim that the Ought of their NNL 
theory is related to the common good insofar as the agent who acts in accord with it 
thereby fosters the well-being of others.  They state: ―these [practical] principles direct 
one to live at peace with others…and everyone knows from experience that harming 
others is likely to have consequences contrary to these interests.‖
324   
Their point is that if 
the agent lives in accord with the precepts of natural law, which are based on the FPPR 
and the basic goods, the agent will in fact foster not only her own well-being but that of 
others as well.   Their point is also that if the agent lives in accord with these precepts, 
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II, 94, 2 and 90,2 as well as Gewirth, IOPR, 35-36. 
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acting contrary to the well-being of people in general will be precluded.  In illustrating 
this, they provide an example of an agent who desires to read a novel that is on a six- 
month waiting list at the library.
325   
Since reading the novel would involve pursuing the 
basic good of aesthetic experience, Grisez and Finnis do not see anything intrinsically 
wrong with the agent reading the novel; but they are quick to admit that in this particular 
case it would not be permissible for the agent discard the waiting list and check out the 
book.  Such an act would be impermissible because it would fail to be in accord with the 
basic good of practical reasonableness.   An agent who acts in a selfish, non-egalitarian 
manner ―fetters reason by abusing one of its own practical principles.‖326   Moreover, 
since the agent would be capable of realizing that ―people cannot hope to live together in 
harmony if they treat one another as they themselves do not wish to be treated‖, the agent 
would also act in a way contrary to the basic good of friendship.   Thus, acting in a non- 
egalitarian manner would be contrary to the moral Ought of NNL theory insofar as it 
would require acting contrary to the basic goods of both friendship and practical 
reasonableness.
327
 
Elsewhere, Grisez and Finnis similarly assert that acting in accord with the moral 
Ought leads to the fulfillment of more than just the individual agent.  They state: ―… the 
freely chosen actions shaped by moral truth would bear fruit in the fulfillment of all 
persons in all the basic goods.  This ideal community is what we mean by ‗integral human 
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327  
Finnis elsewhere states that ―friendship involves acting for the sake of one‘s friend‘s purposes, 
one‘s friend‘s well-being‖.  (NLNR, 88)  Since friendship is one of the basic goods that ought to 
be pursued, he again provides a foundation for an egalitarian Ought. 
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fulfillment.‘ A good will is one fully responsive to thoroughgoing practical reason. 
Therefore, the morally good will is a will toward integral human fulfillment.‖328    Given 
that Grisez and Finnis here specify that integral human fulfillment pertains to all persons 
rather than merely the individual agent, there is again reason to interpret them as 
upholding—or at least claiming to uphold—a moral Ought that is specifically egalitarian. 
If we interpret Grisez and Finnis as upholding the position that acting as one 
morally ought requires only that the agent seek her own fulfillment, or that it requires that 
the agent seeks only a few of the basic goods, we would have to conclude that there is 
room for a non-egalitarian Ought.  But, since interpreting Grisez and Finnis in this way 
requires that we fail to take into account what they have in fact said, we would be 
unjustified in our conclusion.  Since integral human fulfillment pertains to the fulfillment 
of all persons there is reason to conclude that the Ought is egalitarian.  And since acting 
in accord with the moral Ought requires a consideration of all the basic goods—including 
the basic goods of friendship and practical reasonableness which in turn require that the 
agent refrain from acting in a selfish manner—there is reason to conclude that the moral 
Ought is egalitarian. 
 
 
6. Is the Ought Simultaneously Moral, Prescriptive, Egalitarian, 
Determinate, and Categorical? 
Since Grisez and Finnis rely on the basic good of friendship when arguing that the 
Ought is egalitarian, it is necessary to resolve the following question before concluding 
that the Ought is simultaneously prescriptive, egalitarian, determinate, and categorical: 
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Do all non-incapacitated agents in fact recognize that friendship is a basic good?
329   
If it 
is not the case that all such agents in fact recognize that friendship is a good, it might be 
still be possible to uphold an egalitarian Ought but there would be no guarantee that this 
egalitarian Ought would also be categorical, determinate, and prescriptive.  The 
egalitarian Ought would not be prescriptive for those agents who failed to recognize that 
friendship is a good and hence worthy of pursuit.  Likewise this Ought would also not be 
categorical since it would not be binding for the agent who did not recognize it as a good. 
In addition, if it turned out that some agents found the opposite of this good to be worthy 
of pursuit, the egalitarian Ought would not be determinate. 
In discussing the basic good of friendship, Finnis argues that it is an authentically 
basic good, and hence capable of being recognized by all rational agents as a good.  Like 
Aristotle, he distinguishes friendship of utility and pleasure from friendship in the full 
sense which ―involves acting for the sake of one‘s friend‘s…well-being.‖330   He also adds 
that such friendship is reciprocal and ―…requires that one go beyond self-love‖.331   When 
 
he claims that friendship is a basic good he is referring specifically to friendship in the 
full sense.  In regard to friendship of this sort, he states, 
having a friend is a basic form of good.  That is to say, for any person, A, to have 
a friend, B, is a basic aspect of A‘s well-being. He can scarcely think of himself 
as really well-off if he has no friends. The intrinsic value of having a true friend 
does not consist precisely in the services the friend may render him (though they 
may be valuable), or precisely in the pleasure the friend may give him (though 
who would not welcome that?), but in the state of affairs itself that we call 
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They also rely on the basic good of practical rationality but since this is a separate argument 
and since a full analysis of this good and its relationship to the present inquiry would take us too 
far afield, I will focus merely on friendship. 
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friendship.  That state of affairs itself is the source of the deep satisfaction which 
normally accompanies it and which is a manifestation of the intrinsic value of the 
state of affairs.
332
 
Finnis‘s claim here is that it is part of one‘s own well-being to foster the well-being of 
others and that agents cannot really think otherwise.  Although this may seem to be more 
of an assertion rather than an argument that friendship is a basic good, Finnis seems to be 
placing the burden of proof on those who wish to argue that it is not a basic good; yet this 
is understandable since Finnis also holds that the basic goods are self-evident goods.  He 
is implicitly saying, ―rational, non-incapacitated agents in fact are capable of recognizing, 
and in fact recognize, that seeking the well-being of others is a necessary aspect of 
attaining their own well-being.‖ He is also implicitly agreeing with Aristotle who holds 
that nobody would choose to live who did not have true friends.
333
 
Although Finnis‘s method may seem to be inadequate, there are reasons to believe 
that his conclusion is acceptable.  As discussed in previous chapters, it is difficult to 
imagine that an agent who was purely self-seeking—and who never sought the good of 
others—would really attain well-being, that is, integral fulfillment.   It is precisely the 
cantankerous loner who is suspected of lacking well-being, being mentally ill, or being 
incapacitated in some way.  Moreover, there seems to be every reason to believe that, 
given the daily experience of life, acting in a purely self-seeking manner—and being 
deprived of authentic friendship—oftentimes has quite negative consequences.334   People 
 
 
 
332
NLNR, 142. 
 
333
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1155a5-6. 
 
334  
It is important to remember that Finnis recognizes that experience plays a role in grasping self- 
evident principles.  He does not equate self-evidence principles with principles that are known 
purely a priori. 
178 
 
 
in fact easily tire of being around those who are purely self-seeking and hence such 
people lack an adequate social life and the well-being that goes with it.  Moreover, in 
order to establish that it would be possible adequately to establish that the egalitarian 
Ought is indeterminate and non-categorical, it would be necessary first to establish that 
non-mentally ill, non-incapacitated agents, who have reached the age of reason, are 
capable of holding that friendship is an evil to be avoided.  Provided that non- 
incapacitated agents in fact grasp that friendship is worth pursuing and that acting in a 
purely selfish manner is antithetical to the attainment of friendship, the egalitarian Ought 
can be properly categorized as determinate and categorical.
335
 
 
In conclusion, it seems that the new natural law theory is capable of upholding a 
robust Ought.  Since there is disagreement regarding what goods can be properly 
categorized as basic, and hence capable of being grasped as goods by all agents, new 
natural lawyers would do well to continue augmenting and, if necessarily, slightly 
revising their theory until consensus can be attained.  Nevertheless, their basic approach 
to resolving the IOP as it pertains to the robust Ought seems to be fundamentally 
successful. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In the foregoing chapters, we explored four fundamental solutions to the IOP. The 
first is to offer a counterexample to the thesis that it is not possible validly to derive an 
Ought from an Is; the second involves beginning from a first person grasp of what is de 
facto desired and, hence, self-evidently valued; the third is to return to an Aristotelian- 
Thomistic understanding of the human person; and the fourth is to begin with self-evident 
basic goods.  The task of this present chapter is to compare these fundamental methods 
and attempt to determine which of them is the least problematic for the natural law 
theorist who desires to uphold a robust Ought.  After providing a brief summary of the 
pros and cons of each of these approaches, I shall argue in favor of the fourth.  In doing 
so I shall focus especially on the third and fourth approaches and include a discussion of 
whether the third approach bypasses relativism and also a discussion of whether 
proponents of the fourth are presumptuous to assert that there are self-evident basic 
goods.  I shall ultimately argue that, while none of the solutions are problem-free, the 
fourth is the least problematic if we wish to uphold a robust Ought. 
 
 
A. Counterarguments and Natural Law Theory 
 
In chapter two, we considered Searle and Gewirth‘s attempts at providing 
counterarguments.  Searle makes this attempt by starting with the speech act of promising 
while Gewirth does so by analyzing basic features of human action in general and by 
beginning from a first-person perspective. 
Searle attempts to show that if one utters the words ―I promise to do X,‖ this 
entails that she has made a promise, has placed herself under an obligation to do X, is 
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under an obligation to do X, and—ceteris paribus—ought to do X.336   One of the 
difficulties with Searle‘s counterargument is that it does not provide us with a moral, 
categorical, determinate, and egalitarian Ought.  Since it would be possible to derive 
―Jones ought to murder his wife‖ from ―Jones uttered the words I hereby promise to 
murder my wife,‖ the Ought could not be said to be moral.  Likewise, since it would be 
possible to derive ―Jones ought to rob the poor and give to the rich‖ by starting with the 
statement ―Jones uttered the words I hereby promise to rob the poor and give to the rich,‖ 
the Ought could not be said to be egalitarian.  And, since it would be possible to derive 
―Jones ought to avoid murdering his wife‖ by starting with ―Jones uttered the words I 
hereby promise to avoid murdering my wife,‖ the Ought could not be said to be 
determinate.  Finally, since a particular Ought statement only obliges the persons who 
make promises, it cannot be said to be categorical. 
In addition to these problems, Searle‘s derivation is a poor model for natural law 
theorists since he precinds entirely from a consideration of human nature.   Irrespective of 
the nature of the human person, it is possible to derive various Ought-conclusions.  For 
example, it would be possible to conclude that Jones ought to murder his children, even if 
such an act is contrary to human nature, provided that he utters the words ―I hereby 
promise to murder my children‖.  It is not ultimately helpful to argue, as E. Wall has 
done, that it is possible for natural law theorists to utilize Searle‘s method provided that 
 
they begin with institutions that are self-evidently morally acceptable and—in addition— 
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add statements about human nature.
337   
The weaknesses of Wall‘s argument are: (1) he 
fails to provide an example of such a derivation and it is far from clear that this can be 
done,  (2) even if he could provide such a derivation it would not be clear that the Ought 
would be determinate, categorical, and egalitarian, and (3) it is not clear that merely 
adding statements about human nature would provide a necessary grounding in human 
nature.   In short, even if it is accepted at the outset that—in general—promise keeping is 
moral and part of human nature, it would not follow that: all promises are moral, that 
promise-keeping is egalitarian in that it has a necessary relation to the common good, or 
that it would be impossible to end up with indeterminate obligations.   If Jones uttered, ―I 
hereby promise to murder my wife‖ and Alex uttered, ―I hereby promise to refrain from 
murder‖ it would not matter whether promise keeping in general was moral and part of 
human nature. 
Gewirth‘s counterargument, unlike Searle‘s, begins with an analysis of basic 
features of human action in general and proceeds from a first person perspective.  He 
attempts to show that any agent who acts in an intentional manner must implicitly 
acknowledge that whatever he pursues is in some way worthy of pursuit and hence 
valuable (since otherwise that agent would not act in the first place).  Since it is a fact that 
agents value that which they pursue, Gewirth concludes that there is no true Fact—Value 
gap, even though he acknowledges that there is an Is—Ought gap.  Gewirth then shows 
that any agent who sees something as worthy of pursuit implicitly must also acknowledge 
that freedom and basic well-being are of value and hence worth preserving.  This is 
because any agent who acts, must at least implicitly grasp that he would be incapable of 
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acting without these two goods.  The goods of freedom and basic well-being, in other 
words, are grasped by the agent as at least instrumental goods which are needed as a 
means to any desired end.  For this reason, the agent then must grasp that he has a right to 
pursuing and preserving these goods as they relate to him personally.  By employing the 
Principle of Universalizability, Gewrith then shows that the agent must grasp that other 
agents also must value these two goods and, hence, have a rationale or right to pursue 
them.
338   
Finally, Gewirth concludes that, given the above steps, the agent must admit 
 
that in order to be logically consistent, he must acknowledge that he ―ought to refrain 
from interfering with the freedom and basic well-being of all prospective agents‖. 
Given that Gewirth‘s approach begins with basic features of human action, and 
given that acting is an essential aspect of human life, his approach has more to offer 
natural law theorists than Searle‘s.339     Of course, Gewirth does not invoke the sanctions 
or jurisprudential claims of natural law theory.  Nevertheless, provided that Gewirth is 
able to bridge the Is—Ought gap by beginning from the perspective of the agent, there is 
nothing that would preclude a natural law theorist from imitating his approach.   There is 
an implicit grounding of the Ought in facts about human nature in Gewirth‘s 
counterargument and, hence, this should suffice to establish that in theory it would be 
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possible for natural law theorists to resolve the IOP by beginning from a first-person 
perspective which, in turn, involves accepting that some things are de facto good and 
worthy of pursuit.   What would be necessary, in addition, would be a supplemental 
discussion of exactly how this grasp of goods relates to human nature and the other basic 
claims of natural law.  Thus, in short, Gewirth‘s approach is a step in the right direction 
though it would need to be supplemented if used by natural law theorists. 
 
 
B. Beginning With De Facto Desires 
 
In chapter three we explored an approach utilized by many natural law theorists, 
such as J. Smith, which involves beginning from the de facto desires of human agents. 
Although Smith does not overtly claim that this approach bypasses the IOP, nor does she 
recognize the similarities between her approach and Gewirth‘s, we considered whether it 
in fact bypasses the IOP.  Numerous formulations of a derivation of this type were 
proposed in chapter three.  The fundamental idea was that, if all human agents in fact 
desire certain things, then it would be possible validly to reach a conclusion such as ―All 
humans ought to do X‖ from the premises ―All humans desire X‖ and ―X is in accord 
with human nature‖.   The background assumption here, of course, is that to say ―You 
ought to do X‖ means ―If you do X, you will attain what you seek‖. 
One of the biggest objections to this approach is that there are not universally- 
desired ends—or specific things which all human agents desire—and hence this approach 
cannot be used to derive a categorical and determinate Ought.  This objection was 
addressed by exploring whether freedom and basic well-being would fit the bill.  Since, 
presumably, all human agents are capable of grasping that freedom and basic well-being 
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are necessary if they are to act or pursue anything whatsoever, and since all agents desire 
to pursue at least something, there is reason to believe that these two goods are examples 
of universally-desired by all human agents. 
Another objection to this approach is that it would be impossible to use it to 
support an egalitarian Ought—or an Ought which, when followed, promotes the common 
good—since not all agents recognize that the common good is desirable.  In response to 
this objection, we explored the claim of P. Foot that the only way philosophers have been 
able to establish that pure self-seeking is desirable for agents, is to look at examples of 
such behavior in isolation from the whole of human life.  Foot‘s claim is that human 
agents are capable of recognizing that if they consistently act in purely self-seeking 
ways—with no consideration or concern for the good of others—they will not attain what 
is truly in their best interest.  Provided that it is indeed the case that all non-incapacitated 
human agents are capable of grasping this, it would be possible to utilize this approach to 
reach an egalitarian Ought that is also categorical and determinate.  The Ought would be 
categorical insofar as it would pertain to all non-incapacitated agents, determinate insofar 
as it would preclude acts which consistently lead away from the fostering of the common 
good. 
At the end of chapter three, it was conceded that more work would need to be 
done if natural law theorists, qua natural law theorists, wish to use this approach to 
bypass the IOP.  More specifically, the conclusion reached was that more work would 
need to be done to establish that there is a necessary relation between human nature and 
the universal human desire for goods such as freedom and basic well-being, as well as the 
goods which come from avoiding purely self-seeking behavior. 
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C. Returning To the Aristotelian-Thomistic Tradition 
 
Chapter four consisted of an exploration of the approach of those who recommend 
returning to an Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of the telos, function, or essence of 
the human person.  Proponents of this approach argue that in the A-T tradition, saying ―X 
ought to do Y‖ is equivalent to saying ―Y is the telos, function, or essence of X‖.  Once 
we know the telos of the human person, we know what the human person ought to do. 
Veach is a proponent of this view.  He dismisses the possibility of basing an 
Ought on the desires of the agent since he does not think such a basis is a sufficient 
starting-point.  Since basing the Ought on the desires of the agent leaves the Euthyphro 
question unanswered (i.e., the question of whether something is good because it is desired 
or vice versa) and only provides a subjective starting point, Veatch claims that it is 
necessary first to understand what a human being is before being able to come to an 
understanding of what humans ought to do. 
Geach illustrates this position by pointing out that trying to determine what a 
human ought to do—or more precisely what a good human being is like— without first 
understanding the essence of the human person, is akin to trying to determine whether a 
mysterious object is good without first understanding what its function is.  The terms 
―good‖ and ―bad‖ are attributive adjectives rather than predicative ones.  When we say 
that an individual person is ―good,‖ we do not mean that she has the quality of goodness 
but that she fulfills her essence as a person.   Geach responds to the naturalistic fallacy 
problem by pointing out that goodness is not a quality added to a thing but is intrinsic to 
the fulfillment of a thing‘s purpose.  For instance, a good knife is not a knife that has the 
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quality of ―goodness‖ but is simply a knife that is capable of fulfilling its function of 
cutting. 
McInerny echoes Veatch by claiming that ―the dependence of the judgment that 
 
‗X is good‘ on some theoretical knowledge of X, is all but definitionally true.‖340   To 
know what a good human is and, hence, what a human ought to do, we must first know 
what a human is.  In addition to agreeing with Veatch, McInerny tries to specify what the 
human person is.  Like Aristotle, he identifies the function of the human person as being 
rational and therefore concludes that what humans ought to do is be rational which, in 
turn, means that they ought to practice the moral and intellectual virtues. 
One of MacIntyre‘s predominant contributions to the foregoing discussion is his 
in-depth analysis of tradition-based rationality.  Borrowing from Anscombe‘s insights in 
Modern Moral Philosophy, MacIntyre points out that the IOP only emerges when we 
divorce ourselves from the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.  In this tradition a distinction 
is made between ―man-as-he-happens-to-be‖ and ―man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his- 
essential-nature‖.  Moreover, in this tradition ―what is good or bad for anyone or anything 
is so in virtue of its being of a certain kind…‖.
341   
Once we know the essence of the 
human person, we know what human beings ought to become, or, in other words, what 
the human person could and should be.   Only when philosophers began doing ethics 
outside the A-T tradition did the IOP emerge and hence, one solution to it is to return to 
this tradition and its rich understanding of essence. 
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Finally, Lisska adds to this discussion by considering the fact that human nature is 
dispositional rather than static.  If we assume that all humans always fully act in accord 
with their essence, there is no sense in claiming that humans ought to act in accord with 
their essence.  For instance, if humans are always fully rational, it does not make sense to 
claim that they ought to be rational; but if humans have a disposition to be rational and it 
fulfills their essence to act rationally, then it does make sense.  Once we know the 
essence of the human person, we automatically know what the human—who has not yet 
realized that essence—ought to strive to become.   Thus, according to Lisska, it is 
ultimately impossible to grasp the Ought without first understanding the facts about what 
the human person essentially Is. 
As mentioned in chapter four, although proponents of this approach do not offer a 
syllogistic example of how an Ought can be derived from an Is, they would presumably 
accept the following:  Socrates is a human being who is rational. The function of a 
human being is to be rational.  When we say “X ought to be Y” we mean “the function of 
X is to be Y”.342   Therefore, Socrates qua human being is doing what he ought to do. To 
this, Lisska would probably want to add the concept of disposition, that is, of potentiality. 
He would presumably accept:  Socrates (as a young boy) is potentially rational.  The 
function of the human being is to be rational.  When we say “X ought to be Y” we mean 
“the essence of X is Y”.  Therefore, young Socrates ought to strive to become rational. 
Provided that we know that a given agent is behaving in a way which is in accord with 
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his essential function, and provided that we accept that the above meaning of Ought, 
there is nothing invalid about this derivation. 
This overall approach has many strengths.  First, and foremost, it overtly grounds 
the Ought in facts about human nature.  On both the epistemological and ontological 
levels, the Ought has a basis in human nature.  In order for it to be the case that humans 
ought to do X, it also must be the case that X is in accord with human nature; likewise, to 
know what humans ought to do, it is first necessary to know what humans essentially are. 
Second, this approach provides a method for deriving a universal (i.e., categorical) 
Ought. Given that in the A-T tradition species are eternal and unchanging, so too is the 
essence of the human person.  Thus, the Ought does not vary from time to time. 
Similarly, given that all members of the human species are alike in that they are 
rational—rather than that they have some non-universal desire—the Ought does not vary 
from person to person. 
In spite of these strengths, there are several difficulties with this approach.  One of 
the weightiest is that in the A-T tradition the following two claims are made: (1) we 
cannot completely understand essences, and (2) an agent cannot be morally obligated to 
do X if he is invincibly ignorant of this fact.  Given these two claims—even if we agree 
 
to return to the A-T tradition and only proceed from within the context of that tradition— 
 
more work would need to be done in order to establish that we can uphold an Ought that 
 
is universally obligatory for all non-incapacitated agents rather than merely obligatory for 
those capable of engaging in fruitful metaphysical inquiry about the essence of the human 
person.  In short, this approach leaves us with a non-categorical Ought since it is only 
binding for metaphysicians. 
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In addition to this difficulty, which was considered in chapter four, additional 
problems emerge for those who wish to provide an Ought that is universal in the sense 
that it does not require approaching ethics from within the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
tradition.  This concern is voiced by J. Haldane who notes that MacIntyre‘s approach 
will be worrying to those who saw the appeal to Aristotle as marking the adoption 
of a kind of naturalism that would begin with an empirical-cum-philosophical 
anthropology and move from this to an account of the virtues as rational habits 
which it is necessary to possess always and everywhere—variation only appearing 
at the level of their application in diverse circumstances.
343
 
Given MacIntyre‘s insistence upon tradition-based rationality and his coherentist 
epistemology, he seems to offer little to philosophers who are looking for more.  If we 
must approach ethics from within a tradition, and only then determine normative goods, 
this will leave many philosophers worried that this is just another form of relativism. 
Haldane suspects that ―given the conceptual connections between rationality and truth, 
and the claim that the former is immanent within, and constituted by, traditions of 
inquiry, it is difficult to see how truth itself can be tradition-transcendent, which is what 
metaphysical realism requires.‖ Haldane attempts to interpret MacIntyre charitably but 
ends up admitting that he finds many of MacIntyre‘s claims to ―lead to a relativism quite 
at odds with…the philosophy of Aquinas.‖344 
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If we interpret Aquinas, as I have done in Chapter one, as upholding general 
Ought-precepts which are universally binding, and differ only in respect to how they are 
applied in particular circumstances, it is easy to sympathize with Haldane.  Aquinas 
claims: ―truth in practical matters…is the same for all human beings…regarding the 
general principles.‖345   But MacIntyre seems to hold that there are no Ought-precepts— 
even general ones—that can be understood by all non-incapacitated agents and which are 
thus tradition-transcendent. 
MacIntyre‘s view is very nuanced, and it could be argued that he does leave room 
for the possibility that we could eventually arrive at a universal, non-relativistic Ought. 
In order to understand this, it will be helpful first to consider some of MacIntyre‘s more 
recent insights.  In Intractable Moral Disagreements, MacIntyre opts for a theory of 
justification in ethics that is similar to that of Thomas Kuhn‘s theory of justification in 
the hard sciences.  Kuhn acknowledges that when there are two different paradigms or 
theories, this results in incommensurability between the two.  It can and does happen in 
such circumstances that ―there are no shared neutral standards [which] can be identified 
by appeal to which the two rival contending parties could…settle their disagreements.‖
346
 
According to MacIntyre, the same is true in ethics: it can and does happen that there is 
incommensurability between rival ethical theories such that there is no shared neutral 
standard which can be appealed to in resolving the incommensurability.  Nevertheless, in 
science, it is possible in such cases to determine that one of the two rival theories is 
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superior to the other.  It can be determined, for instance, that Newton‘s physics is 
rationally superior to impetus theory.  This happens when one theory is not only able to 
―provide a superior explanation of nature‖—perhaps by being able to take account of 
anomalies in other theories while still being able to account for what is empirically 
observed—but is also able to explain why the other theory was bound to fail.347   The 
rationally superior theory, then, is the theory which is able to account for what the rival 
theory accounts for while also being able to explain why that theory had to fail. 
Likewise, such is the case in ethics.  When one theory is able (1) to determine why 
another theory had to fail and (2) more adequately to answer the questions the other 
theory is asking than that theory itself is able to, it can be identified as the superior of two 
theories. 
In explicating this claim, MacIntyre looks at utilitarianism and compares it to A-T 
ethics.  He claims that utilitarianism is beset with insurmountable difficulties because of 
its impoverished concept of happiness.  Utilitarians claim that we ought to do that which 
maximizes happiness and yet this leads to indeterminacy because happiness is understood 
to be a mere psychological state.  Utilitarians are left with ample questions about what 
happiness consists in, how it is best attained, and how to evaluate various types of 
pleasures.  According to MacIntyre, A-T ethics—with its rich understanding of 
eudaimonia, human nature, and the means-end relation—is better able to answer these 
questions than utilitarians themselves are.
348
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With this as a backdrop, it could be argued that MacIntyre does not in fact fall 
into relativism and that it is therefore possible—at least in theory—for him to uphold a 
universal, non-categorical, non-relativistic theory of ethics and ethical justification or, in 
other words, to uphold a non-relativistic Ought.  In response to the charge of relativism, 
MacIntyre states, 
…on occasion one tradition can advance and may perhaps be able to justify a 
claim to superiority over some rival tradition in respect of both rational 
justification and truth.  To recognize that one thinks and speaks out of a particular 
tradition of enquiry with its own canons and standards and its own history of 
intellectual progress is not then to condemn oneself inescapably to some version 
of relativism.
349
 
 
MacIntyre‘s basic response here is that, although all moral reasoning is tradition- 
dependent, and although there can be intractable and incommensurable disputes between 
rival traditions of moral enquiry, it is still possible to establish that one is more justified 
and closer to the truth than another.  If ethical theory Y has questions it cannot answer 
which ethical theory X can answer, and if ethical theory X is able to account for why 
ethical theory Y is unable to answer its own questions, then ethical theory X is said to be 
superior (i.e., more justified and closer to the truth). 
Given MacIntyre‘s claims, it seems that it would be inaccurate to conclude that he 
unqualifiedly leaves room for a non-universal or relativistic Ought.  He is not 
unqualifiedly concluding that there are various moral theories that are in fact each equally 
justifiable.  He is claiming, rather, that some theories are more justifiable even though 
there are no trans-traditional criteria by which to assess individual theories or traditions. 
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More specifically, he is claiming that the Ought of the A-T tradition is superior and more 
coherent than the Ought of utilitarianism.
350
 
In spite of the fact that MacIntyre has responded to the accusation of relativism, 
numerous problems remain. He holds that one tradition can be superior to another and yet 
he still explicitly denies that it is possible to establish that ―…Thomists have resources 
that should enable them to refute their opponents in ways that are or should be 
compelling to any rational individual, whatever her or his standpoint.‖
351   
Thus, in the 
 
end, he does not assert that the Ought of the A-T tradition is trans-traditionally universal. 
Haldane‘s concern with this is that (i) either there are no truly incommensurable ethical 
theories which result in intractable disputes, and hence it is possible to determine that one 
is superior, or (ii) there are truly incommensurable ethical theories and there is no way to 
avoid the pitfall of relativism. MacIntyre wishes to have it both ways, yet as Haldane 
points out, more work needs to be done if he is to pull this off. 
      By way of summary, although it is possible to resolve the IOP by returning to the 
A-T tradition, this solution leaves us with several problems.  The primary difficulty is that 
it only provides us with an Ought that is universal and non-relativistic if we accept the 
outdated Aristotelian thesis that essences are unchanging and eternal.  A second difficulty 
is that, within the A-T tradition it is difficult at best to come to knowledge of essences. 
And yet a third difficulty is that it is not clear that this approach can provide us with an 
Ought that is unqualifiedly and trans-traditionally universal and non-relativistic. 
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D. “Self-Evident” Goods and Natural Law Theory 
 
Chapter five consisted of an analysis of the new natural law approach.  Finnis and 
Grisez, the primary proponents of this approach, argue that it is not necessary to deduce 
Ought-statements from factual statements about human nature in order to understand the 
first principle of practical reasoning (FPPR): ―Good ought to be done and pursued and 
evil ought to be avoided‖.  They likewise argue that it is self-evident that some things— 
such as knowledge and friendship—are goods and, hence, that it is possible to know that 
such goods ought to be pursued.  In other words, it is possible to understand precepts 
such as ―knowledge ought to be pursued‖ and ―friendship ought to be pursued‖ without 
deducing them from purely factual statements about human nature. Although such 
precepts do not constitute the moral Ought when they stand on their own, all such 
precepts concerning the basic goods, when taken together, do constitute the moral Ought 
since they are each an essential part of integral human fulfillment. 
One of the most common objections to this approach is that it does not hold to the 
ontological and epistemological groundedness claims of natural law.  Precisely because 
the Ought is not derived from premises concerning human nature, many have argued that 
it does not have a basis in human nature and so cannot properly be categorized as a 
natural law approach.  In response to this objection, as discussed in chapter five, it has 
been argued that since our grasp of the FPPR and the self-evident goods stem de facto 
from our nature as human beings, the Ought is de facto grounded in human nature.  It is, 
in other words, by understanding our human nature via a first-person awareness of our 
inclinations towards these basic goods, that we are capable of knowing that certain goods 
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ought to be pursued; and since this awareness stems from our human nature, there is an 
implicit grounding in nature.  It has also been argued that it is possible to provide an 
account of the ontological relation between the Ought and facts about human nature 
without having to claim that it is necessary to deduce Ought-conclusions from Is- 
premises.  The response, then, is that epistemologically there is an implicit relation 
between our nature and our grasp of certain things as good and worthy of pursuit; the 
response is also that it is possible to provide an explanation of the ontological 
groundedness of the Ought as a second-order activity. 
The primary strength of this solution is that it seems capable of supporting a 
 
robust Ought.  The Ought is moral and prescriptive since it pertains to the pursuit of basic 
human well-being or ―integral fulfillment‖ which we in fact grasp as worthy of pursuit.  It 
is categorical since it pertains to all non-incapacitated human agents who are capable of 
engaging in practical reasoning and, hence, of grasping both the FPPR and basic goods. 
It is determinate insofar as it precludes upholding Ought-statements that are contrary to 
integral human fulfillment.  And, finally, provided that it is possible for non-incapacitated 
agents to see the relation between acting in an egalitarian manner and attaining the goods 
of sociability or friendship, it is possible to conclude that this approach can uphold an 
egalitarian Ought. 
Due to the fact that many philosophers have despaired of the possibility of 
justifying the claim that there are self-evident principles, one of the most formidable 
objections to this method is that it is impossible to establish that there are in fact self- 
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evident principles and self-evident goods.
352   
Finnis provides an in-depth argument for 
his claim that knowledge is a self-evident good; yet he fails to do this for his claim that 
the other ―basic goods‖ are self-evident.  Thus, one could easily object to new natural law 
theory by arguing against this ―self-evidence‖ claim. 
Although this is a very common objection to new natural law theory, it is 
important to consider this objection in light of what new natural law theorists actually 
claim regarding self-evidence.  Many who object to this method on account of the 
supposed lack of self-evidence are working with an overly-stringent understanding of 
self-evidence.  More specifically, many who make this objection seem to interpret new 
natural lawyers as claiming that we have an innate and a priori grasp of the FPPR and 
the basic goods.  As mentioned in Chapter five, however, neither Grisez nor Finnis hold 
that the Ought is self-evident in this sense; and their argument that the FPPR and basic 
goods are ―self-evident‖ should not be interpreted as a claim that the precepts which 
follow from them are analytic.  They acknowledge that experience of the world is 
necessary in order to grasp the precepts of natural law and that we can deepen our 
understanding of them through theoretical reasoning.
353
 
 
 
 
E.  Conclusion: 
Aquinas claims that it is necessary to grasp the self-evident, first principle of 
speculative reason in order to engage in speculative reasoning and that it is necessary to 
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grasp the first principle of practical reasoning in order to engage in practical reasoning. 
Our grasp of these principles is the sine qua non of these forms of reasoning. Aquinas 
states: 
now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended 
universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is 
"being," the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man 
apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that ‗the same thing 
cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time,‘ which is based on the notion of 
‗being‘ and ‗not-being‘: and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in 
Metaph. iv.
354
 
 
In addition, Aquinas claims that we have basic inclinations which enable us to grasp what 
is worth pursuing and that such inclinations stem from our nature.  He states, 
Now as ‗being‘ is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so 
‗good‘ is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, 
which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of 
good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the 
notion of good, viz. that ‗good is that which all things seek after.‘ Hence this is 
the first precept of law, that ‗good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be 
avoided.‘ All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that 
whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) 
belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.
355
 
 
Grisez and other new natural law theorists echo Aquinas by claiming both that it is 
impossible to engage in practical reasoning without grasping the FPPR and that we in 
fact grasp some things as good.  Those who wish to deny that there are ethical first 
principles, then, are left needing to explain how practical reasoning is possible; while 
those who do not are left with a method for bypassing the IOP. 
New natural law theory—with its emphasis on first principles—is not without is 
difficulties.  One must ask, however, whether these difficulties are as problematic as 
some of the ones that emerge for those who wish to return to the A-T understanding of 
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human nature and the Ought.  Solutions to philosophical problems invariably lead to new 
problems.  The question, then, is not whether there are problem-free solutions to the IOP 
but rather: Which of the solutions put forward are the least problematic, most coherent, 
and most acceptable?  Each of the solutions explored here have something to offer and 
each leave us with at least some difficulties.  Nevertheless, provided that there are some 
things which all non-incapacitated humans are capable of grasping as being worthy of 
pursuit, and provided that a grasp of the FPPR is indeed necessary if we are to engage in 
practical reasoning—and hence ethical reasoning—the new natural law solution is viable. 
Before we dismiss it in favor of returning to the A-T tradition, it is essential to ask: What 
might the cost be and is this really the least problematic solution? 
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